























The Swiss Asylum Procedure  
Irregular migration and smuggling  
of migrants along the Balkan route
 
 
n		 Under a proposed package of bills, the governing Fidesz party plans to oblige organi-
sations that ‘support migration,’ which includes helping asylum seekers and refugees, 
to apply for a newly-created work permit. Before issuing such a permit, the Minister of 
the Interior will review the opinion of the national security services, meaning that 
those organisations will be subject to a preliminary national security review.
n		 Fidesz is seeking the legal authority to ensure that only organisations approved by a 
Fidesz minister can operate, and also to ensure that only those civil organisations that 
can secure domestic funding remain viable.
n		 On the whole, the most realistic scenario for the time being is that, as of spring 2018, 
assistance to asylum seekers will become a state monopoly in Hungary, and the gov-
ernment will not shy away from curtailing fundamental constitutional rights in order 
to enforce its monopoly in this realm. 
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I INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE
I.1 Topic






the ways in which Albania, Austria, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary,
Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of
Macedonia(nowNorthMacedonia),Montenegro,
Romania, Serbia and Slovenia experienced





to investigate and displace some of the myths
andmisrepresentationsassociatedwithirregular
migration in this region. The research seeks
to provide the fullest possible picture of these
phenomena,tocollateandanalyserelevantdata
and documentation, to identify information and








Irregular migration, refugee movements, and
the smuggling of migrants have emerged as
significant and complex issues in the domains
of international relations,human rights,national
politics,andcriminaljustice.Globally,thesetopics
arethesubjectoffierceandcontroversialdebate;
they polarise opinions, and feature prominently




referred to as ‘the Balkans’) have been one of
themain focal points of irregularmigration and
of national and international efforts to control,
contain and stop the flow of irregular migrants,
manyofthemrefugees, intotheEuropeanUnion
(EU). It isestimated that in2015aloneoverone
millionpeoplemigratedirregularlytotheEUalong
routesleadingthroughthecountriesofSoutheast
Europe. Many countries have responded to this
surge by tightening border controls, building
fences and other border fortifications, denying
entrytoasylumseekersthroughtheuseofforce,
andrestrictingtheassistanceaffordedtorefugees.
Such measures are, however, incapable of
stopping internationalmigrationand the flowof
refugees. At best they may redirect migration
routesanddetersomemigrants,oratworstpush
themintothehandsofsmugglers.Recentyears
have witnessed a surge in migrant-smuggling
activities in Southeastern Europe as irregular
migrants,manyofthemrefugeesfleeingconflict
zones in the Middle East and South Asia, have
come to rely on smugglers to flee persecution
and reach those destinations where they seek
protection.Migrantsmugglersexploitdifferences
innational laws to their advantage.Theycreate
illegalavenuesofmigrationbytransportingpeople
in a clandestine manner and/or by supplying
fraudulentdocuments to thosewillingor forced
to migrate. Smuggled migrants are vulnerable
to life-threatening risks and exploitation, while




flows through the Balkans have responded in
manydifferentwaystothechallengesassociated




of irregular migrants, to stop the smuggling of
migrants, and to protect the rights of refugees
and other migrants, currently stymie concerted
actionbytheEUandthedevelopmentofcommon
asylumandmigrationpolicies.




The term ‘Western Balkan route’ is widely used
by lawenforcement and immigrationauthorities
andintheliteraturetodescribeirregularmigration
from Turkey to Greece, through FYRMacedonia
(now North Macedonia), Serbia, Hungary or via
Albania,Montenegro,Bosnia-Herzegovina,Croatia,
Slovenia, toAustria,Germanyandotherpartsof
WesternEurope.The term ‘EasternBalkan route’
isoftenusedtodescribe irregularmigrationthat
leads from Turkey to Bulgaria (sometimes via
Greece)andthenviaRomaniaorSerbiatoHungary
andon toAustria. This route is less established
and less predictable than the Western Balkan
routes. In this report, the Western and Eastern
Balkanroutes,includingalloftheirvariations,are
collectivelyreferredtoastheBalkanroute.
Smuggling along the Balkan route usually in-
volves land-based means of transport such as
private vehiclesor trucks, thoughsomeborders
mayalsobecrossedonfootorbytrain.Theroute
is usually travelled inmultiple stages, andmost
migrants use several smugglers and several
smugglingmethodsastheymaketheirwayalong
this route.Generally, covert smugglingmethods
suchashidingincarsortrucksareonlyemployed
whensmuggledmigrantswanttocrossborders





flights toairports inBalkancountries from third






Mediterranean route. In somecases, smuggling
byseainvolvesdeparturesfromTurkeytoBulgar-
iaanddeparturesfromAlbaniatoItaly.
The Balkan route gained particular prominence in












ders remained relatively open.Starting inSeptem-
ber2015,countriesintheregiongraduallyadopted
measures to close borders, in some cases fortify-
ingthemwithwallsandfences,anddenyingentry




The purpose of this report is to document and
criticallyreflectontheflowofirregularmigrants,
including refugees and asylum seekers, along
the Balkan route to Europe, then to examine
the methods of their migration, the levels and
characteristics of migrant-smuggling, and the
profilesofmigrantsandsmugglers.
The research seeks to provide the fullest possible
picture of how irregular migration in this region
manifests itself, to collate and analyse relevant
open-sourcedataanddocumentation,andtoiden-
tify information and knowledge gaps. One of the






This report systematically examines the levels
and characteristics of irregularmigration in thir-
teen Southeast-European states situated along
theBalkan routewhich is commonly usedby ir-
regularmigrants, refugees, asylum seekers and
in turnmigrant smugglers, andwhich connects









measures tocloseborders,denyentry to irregu-
larmigrants,andstopthesmugglingofmigrants.




The focus of this report is on the movement
of irregular migrants into and through these
countries, the methods of their migration, and
their status in the host countries. This includes
personsseekingasylumandapplyingforrefugee
status or complementary protection through
officialchannels,aswellaspersonswhomigrate

















Figure 1: Southeast-Europe 
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tional protection systems. The role of local
communities and social networks, as well as
criminal elements assisting irregular migrants
by facilitating their illegal entry and, in some
cases, exploiting irregular migrants are also be
examined..
I.5 Structure
This report is divided into fifteen chapters,
comprisingthis introduction(Chapter  I), thirteen
chapters examining each of the countries
along the Balkan route (Chapter II–XIV), and a
concluding chapter (Chapter XV) summarising
the main findings and making observations for
further policy development, cooperation, and
researchinthisfield.
Eachcountrycoveredbythisreportisexamined










that is consistent with international law and
academic standards, as well as being gender-
neutralandnon-discriminatory.
The term ‘smuggling of migrants’ adopts the
definition in Article  3(a) of the United Nations
(UN)Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Sea and Air1supplementing theConvention 





resident’. In some instances, the term ‘migrant
smuggling’isusedforbetterreadability.
Article  3(b) of the UN Smuggling of Migrants 
Protocol defines ‘illegal entry’ tomean ‘crossing
borders without complying with the necessary
requirements for legal entry into the receiving
State’. Accordingly, the term ‘illegal border
crossing’ is used throughout the report to refer
specifically tosituations inwhichpersonscross
an international border without complying with
thenecessarylegalrequirements.
The term ‘refugee’ isused inaccordancewith the
definitionintheConvention relating to the Status of 
Refugees as amended by theProtocol relating the 
Status of Refugees.3Refugeereferstoapersonwho:
owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality,membershipofaparticularsocial




The term ‘asylum seeker’ is not defined in
international law. It broadly refers to persons
seekingprotectionbutwhohaveyettoreachthe
placewhere theycanseekprotection,orwhose














with the terminology of IOM, the International
OrganisationforMigration.IOMdefinesamigrant
as any person who is moving or has moved
across an international border orwithin a state
away from his/her habitual place of residence,
regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2)
11






rant’ are not defined in international law. They
arebroadlyusedintheliteraturetodescribeany
type of relocation, usually across international
borders, that is not in conformity with existing
migration laws and regulations in the countries
of origin, transit or destination. IOMdefines the
termas ‘movementthat takesplaceoutsidethe
regulatory norms of the sending, transit and
receivingcountries’andfurthernotes:
There is no clear or universally accepted
definition of irregular migration. From the
perspective of destination countries, it is
entry,stayorwork inacountrywithoutthe
necessary authorisation or documents
required under immigration regulations.
Fromtheperspectiveofthesendingcountry,
theirregularityisseenforexampleincases





The research for this project was conducted
through the collection and analysis of open-
sourcematerial, includingprimarysources,such
as reported cases and official data collections
and reports, as well as secondary sources
preparedbyinternationalorganisations,academic




consisted of two phases: First, a comprehensive
literaturesearchwasundertakenusingonlinelibrary
databaseaggregators.Thisenablesthesearching
of over 1,000 research databases containing
journalarticles,books,onlineresourcesandreports
authored by government agencies, international
andnon-governmental organisations.The targets
of this search were resources dating from 1
January 2011 to 31 January 2017, and Boolean





for relevance. The information retrieved from
these sources was sorted into a predetermined
structure developed to systematically document








search are deliberately ambitious, although there
aremany limitations to researching,documenting,
and analysing irregularmigration in Southeastern
Europe. The research also revealed many facets
anddimensionstothisphenomenonwhicharenot
adequatelyresearchedordocumented,anddemon-
strated where the available information is out of
date,incomplete,questionable,orunreliable.Obsta-
cles,concernsand limitationsencounteredduring





in Brisbane, Australia; Budapest, Hungary; and
Vienna,Austria.
Notes
1 Opened for signature 15 December 2000, 2241 UNTS 507
[hereinafter Smuggling of Migrants Protocol]. 
2 Openedforsignature15December2000,2225UNTS209.
3 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,openedforsignature
28 July 1951, 189UNTS 150 (entered into force 22 April 1954)
[hereinafter Refugee Convention];Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees,openedforsignature31January1967,606UNTS267
(enteredintoforce4October1967)[hereinafterRefugee Protocol].






ANDREAS SCHLOENHARDT  |  IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS ALONG THE BALKAN ROUTE 
II GREECE
II.1 Overview
Greecemarks thefirstentrypoint intoEurope for
irregularmigrantstravellingacrosstheBalkansto
Western Europe. Several routes used by irregular
migrantsandmigrantsmugglersstartinGreece,in-
cludingtheWesternBalkanroutethatleadsacross
the border to FYR Macedonia and on to Serbia,
Hungary, Croatia or Slovenia; the Eastern Balkan















thatare instituted tostop irregulararrivals:When





Turkey. When special operations were instigated,
fences built, and border controls stepped up to
reducecrossingsbyland,migrantsandsmugglers
shifted to seaborne methods instead, departing
fromTurkey’seastcoasttomaketherelativelyshort
journeytooneoftheGreekIslands.In2015,several
hundred thousand irregular migrants crossed
fromTurkeytoGreecebysea,manyfacilitatedby













stranded in Greece or were returned to Greece
fromcountriessuchasFYRMacedoniaandSerbia,
and that more migrants who originally sought
to reach Western Europe applied for asylum in
Greece in order to remain in the EU. The large





The available information about irregular mig-
rationandthesmugglingofmigrantsinGreeceis
fargreaterthanfortheothercountriesexamined
in this report. The following sections provide a





II.2.1.1 Numbers relating to illegal entry 
Overview
For the past ten years or more, Greece has
witnessed among the highest numbers of
irregularmigrantarrivalsofanyEuropeancountry,
and perhaps one of the highest in the world.
Numbersrelatingto illegalentry,especiallyfrom
neighbouring Turkey, have been very high for
some time, but peaked between July 2015 and





detected irregular arrivals dropped significantly
13
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until2013.1DatafromtheGreekMinistryofPublic
Order & Citizen Protection, shown in Figure  2
below,summarisethistrend.
Figure 2: Apprehensions of irregular persons 








Data relating to irregular arrivals published by
Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard
Agency, is somewhat higher than the numbers
shown in Figure  2 above. According to Frontex,
thenumberofirregularmigrantarrivalsrosefrom
76,697personsinthefirstninemonthsof2010to
113,844over thesameperiodoneyear later.3 In 
responsetotheriseofirregularmigrationacross
the land-border to Turkey, Greek authorities
launched ‘Operation Aspida’ (Operation Shield)
inmid-August2012,which led toa reduction in
theoverallnumberofarrivalsbutalsodisplaced








860,000 migrants are believed to have arrived
irregularly in Greece in 2015, most of them by
boatfromTurkey.6







Jan2015 1,505 33 1,472
Feb2015 2,563 83 2,480
Mar2015 6,785 202 6,583
Apr2015 12,029 156 11,873
May2015 18,057 168 17,889
June2015 31,503 185 31,318
July2015 55,103 204 54,899
Aug2015 108,635 792 107,843
Sep2015 147,913 274 147,639
Oct2015 212,168 505 211,663
Nov2015 151,716 467 151,249
Dec2015 109,386 644 108,742
2015 total 857,363 3,713 853,650
Jan2016 67,954 539 67,415
Feb2016 57,540 547 57,066
Mar2016 27,123 152 26,971
Apr2016 3,934 284 3,650
May2016 1,910 189 1,721
June2016 1,654 100 1,554
July2016 2,047 127 1,920
Aug2016 3,789 249 3,540
Sep2016 3,256 204 3,052
Oct2016 3,570 492 3,078
Nov2016 2,215 283 1,932
Dec2016 1,914 199 1,715
2016 total 176,906 3,292 173,614
Jan2017 1,520 130 1,390
Feb2017 1,185 161 1,024
Mar2017 1,702 148 1,554
Apr2017 1,364 194 1,170
May2017 2,246 171 2,075
June2017 2,662 753 1,909
July2017 2,615 332 2,283
Aug2017 4,240 575 3,665
Sep2017 5,799 1,195 4,604
Oct2017 5,007 789 4,218
Nov2017 3,867 738 3,129
Dec2017 2,845 365 2,480
2017 total 35,052 5,551 29,501
14
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Starting in December 2015, and continuing to
anevengreaterextent in thefirstsixmonthsof
2016, thenumberof irregulararrivalsdecreased




for large financial incentives.8 Irregular arrivals
started to increase again in the second half of













Figure 4: Non-EU citizens refused entry, Greece 2011–2016 (Eurostat)9
Total land border air border sea border
number % number % number %
2011 11,160 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a.
2012 9,415 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a.
2013 6,995 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a.
2014 6,445 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a.
2015 6,890 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a.
2016 18,145 17,230 95.0% 640 3.5% 275 1.5%
II.2.1.2 Numbers relating to persons staying in the 
country illegally
Thehighernumberofirregularmigrantsentering
Greece corresponds to the high number of
foreignersfoundtobestayinginGreeceillegally.
AsshowninFigure 5below,theirnumberpeaked




broadly correspond with the number of people
enteringGreeceillegally.
Figure 5: Third country nationals found to be 









(orundocumented) foreigners residing inGreece
to be much higher. A 2013 article, for instance,





migrants in Greece (including irregular entrants,
rejected asylum seekers, visa overstayers and
individuals whose temporary permits were
not renewed) was approximately 390,000’.12 
Other sources similarly estimate that 390,000
undocumented migrants resided in Greece in
2011,risingto470,000in2013.13
II.2.2 Entrypoints
Irregular entry into Greece occurs mostly from
Turkeyand, toa lesserextent, fromAlbania.The
latter is largely associated with the regional,
circularmigrationofAlbaniannationals.In2017,
someirregularmigrationfromFYRMacedoniato
Greece was also observed following enhanced
15
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border control activities in theWesternBalkans,
which prevented onward migration from FYR
Macedonia to Western Europe. In recent years,
the non-regional flow of migrants through
Turkey has vastly outweighed the number of
migrants entering Greece irregularly across all
other borders. Irregular arrivals fromTurkey are
associated with non-regional migrants from
countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.
Arrivals fromTurkeymaybe furtherdivided into
entry across the land border and arrivals from
Turkeybysea.Figure 6belowshowsthenumber
of illegal border crossings for the 2011–2017
period as reported by Frontex. Irregular arrivals
fromTurkeyandAlbaniaarediscussedseparately
inthefollowingsections.
Figure 6: Illegal border crossings into Greece, 2011–2015 (Frontex) 14
Illegal border crossings 
from Turkey to Greece
Illegal border crossings 





2011–1stquarter 6,504 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011–2ndquarter 11,137 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011 – total 55,630 3% 5,269
6,472*
–85%
2012–1stquarter n.a. n.a. 1,475 n.a.
2012–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. 2,050 n.a.
2012–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 – total n.a. n.a. 8,983 n.a.
2014–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. 2,142 n.a.
2014–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 – total n.a. n.a. 9,829 9%
2015–1stquarter  n.a. n.a. 2,540 n.a.
2015–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. 3,202 n.a.
2015–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.








routes from Turkey into Greece. One route
leadsacrossthe200kilometre-longlandborder
between the two countries. The other involves
travel by sea from Turkey’s west coast to the
GreekislandsintheAegeanSea,predominantly
Lesbos, Chios, and Kos. Over the past fifteen
yearsthefavouredroutehasswitchedbetween
thesetwoalternativesseveraltimes,depending
on the ease of crossing the border. From2001
to 2009, most irregular movements occurred
across theAegeanSea until Frontex increased
surveillanceinthisareatostopsuchactivities.15 
Fromearly2010arrivalsacrossthelandborder
began to increase, overtaking arrivals at the
sea border in the first quarter of that year.16 
Detections along the land route increased by
372%from2009to2010.17 
Throughout2010,thevastmajorityofdetections
of irregular migrants entering Greece occurred
at the land border with Turkey. This occurred
in spite of the several EU border enforcement
operations to reduce illegal arrivals fromTurkey
whichcommencedinNovember2010(‘Operation
RABIT’) and March 2011 (‘Operation Poseidon
Land’).18 Most migrants entered Greece by
crossing the River Evros that marks much of
the land border between the two countries.19 
Between the first and second quarters of 2011,
the number of illegal border-crossings detected
increased from 6,057 to 10,582.20 This number
furtherincreasedto18,509detectionsinthethird
quarter of 2011.21 In October 2011 the single
highest number of detections of any month
from 2009 to 2014 was recorded.22 There has 
been some debate about whether the higher
number of detections in this period show that
the border operations had the desired effect
of apprehending more irregular migrants, or
whetheritdemonstratestheresilienceofirregular
migrants and the networks that assist irregular
migrants trying to reach Greece.23 According to
several sources, some 54,000 to 57,000 people
weredetectedattemptingtoenterGreecein2011
across the land border to Turkey.24 In the same
year, only about 1,000 people were detected
crossingillegallyfromTurkeytoGreecebysea.25
Until2012,thelandrouteremainedthepreferred
route for entry intoGreece fromTurkey, though
the combined effect of further border control
operations (such as ‘Aspida’ and ‘Xenios Zeus’)
meant that the number of persons seeking
to cross the land border illegally started to
decline.26 Operation Aspida sought to increase
the surveillance and response capacity at the
border, and to reduce the number of migrants
attempting entry. It involved the deployment
of1,881additionalGreekpoliceofficers,aswell
as additional technical equipment at the border
with Turkey.27 Operation Xenios Zeus targeted
irregular migrants in Athens and other urban
areas of Greece.28 Whereas more than 2,000
peoplehadbeendetectedattemptingentry into
Greece via the land border in the first week of
August 2012, fewer than ten people per week
weredetectedattemptingentryinOctober2012.29 
Detectionsatthelandborderremainednegligible
for the remainder of the year.30 According to
Greekauthorities,30,433irregularmigrantswere
detectedattemptingtoenterfromTurkeybyland




the shared border between Kastanies and Nea
VyssanotboundedbytheEvrosRiver.Thiswas
completedinDecember2012.33 
The sharp reduction in the number of irregular
migrants using the land route was followed by
an increase in the number of irregularmigrants
arriving by sea.34 Irregular arrivals from Turkey
byseamorethandoubledinthethirdquarterof





into Greece. The extent of Greece’s coastline,
its many islands, and the proximity of these
islandstoTurkey,makepolicingverydifficult.As
a consequence, reported apprehensions do not
17
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necessarilyreflecttheactualnumberofmigrants
crossingalongthisroute.Increasesordecreases
indetectionsalong this routeare influencednot
onlybychangesinthenumberofmigrantsusing
the route, but also changes to the enforcement
activitiesofauthoritiesalongtheborder.37Figure 7
belowshowshowthemajorityofdetectedillegal
border crossings fromTurkey to Greece shifted
fromthe land to thesea routeduring the2011–
2017period.
Figure 7: Illegal border crossings into Greece from Turkey, separated by land and sea borders, 2011–
2016 (Frontex) 38
Illegal border crossings 
from Turkey to Greece by land
Illegal border crossings 









2011–3rdquarter 18,509 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–1stquarter 7,650 29% n.a. n.a.
2012–2ndquarter 13,145 26% n.a. n.a.
2012–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 – total 1,910 73% 44,051 272%
2015–1stquarter 318 n.a. 12,645 n.a.
2015–2ndquarter 509 n.a. 65,996 n.a.
2015–3rdquarter 1,388 n.a. 314,289 n.a.
2015–4thquarter 1,624 n.a. 480,008 n.a.
2015 – total n.a. 102% n.a. 1,915%
2016–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
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Detections at Greece’s land border with Turkey
remainedlowthroughout2013;39onlyabout1,100































control agencies were quickly overwhelmed by
the unprecedented number of arrivals, and it is
likelythataconsiderablenumberofirregularsea
arrivals fromTurkey remainedundetected.2015
alsosawan increaseof80% in illegalcrossings
fromTurkeytoGreecebyland,though,asFigure 7
above shows, land crossing remained very low
comparedtothosebysea.48
ThesurgeinmaritimearrivalsacrosstheAegean
began in March 2015, after two months of
relatively low detections due to poor weather.49 
By theendoffirstquarter, thenumberof those
detected—most of them Syrian, Afghan, and
Iraqi nationals—reached more than 13,000.50 In 
the second quarter, 29,016 irregular migrants
weredetectedatLesbosalone,around20%ofall
migrantsthatenteredtheEUillegallyduringthis
period.51 Figure  7 above shows that more than
314,000 irregular arrivals were recorded in the
thirdquarter,andasmanyas480,000inthefourth
quarter.Althoughinpreviousyearsthebeginning
of autumn usually heralded a reduction in the
numberofmigrantsattemptingtoreachGreece
bysea,detections inOctober2015increasedby
45% compared to the previous month.52 More
than125,000peoplearrivedonLesbosalone.53 
From November 2015 onwards, the numbers
slowlystartedtodecreasebut remainedathigh
levelsforseveralmonths.54Thelowernumberof
arrivals during the winter months were mostly
the result of the weather conditions during
this period.55 In March 2016 a controversial
agreement was struck between the European
Union and Turkey, which—along with other
measured adopted to close borders and stop





apply for asylum, or whose asylum claims are









common point of entry for irregular migration
into theEU.58The lowernumberofarrivalsalso
meantthatmostpersonswhoarrivedirregularly
at the Greek islands could be contained locally
forprocessing,and fewermigrantswereable to
reachtheGreekmainland.59Asaresult, irregular
migration through all Balkan countries declined
considerably.
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illegalbordercrossingfromTurkeytoGreeceby
searemainedsmallcomparedtopreviousyears.
Arrivals in October 2016 were almost 99% less
thanayearearlier.Forthewholeof2016,173,450
irregular arrivalswere recorded entering Greece
byseafromTurkey,mostoftheminthefirsttwo
monthsoftheyear.3,282migrantsweredetected
entering Greece illegally by land from Turkey in
2016.61
In the first quarter of 2017, fewer than 5,000
people were detected seeking to enter Greece
byseafromTurkey.62Apprehensionsatthe land
border increased by almost 36% in the second





to takeupwork inGreece’sagriculturalsector.64 
Much of that work, and the migrants’ stay in
Greece, is seasonal, and themigrants return to
Albania after a period of time abroad. For this
reason,thesemovementsarecommonlyreferred




Figure  8 below shows that the number of
migrants entering Greece illegally from Albania
exceeds1,000 inmostquarters in the reporting






Prior to theperiodshown inFigure 8above, the
level of irregular migration from Albania was
considerably higher, as Albanians did not have
visa-free entry for short visits to the EU at that
time. In 2010 alone, some 12,000 illegal border
crossingswererecordedbyFrontex.Withthevisa
liberalisation that came into effect in December




change to same 
previous period 


































2017 – total n.a. n.a.
*Forthemarkedperiods,separatepublicationsreportslightlydifferent
numbers.
2010, the number of illegal crossing dropped
markedlyinthenextquarter.67AccordingtoData
collectedbyGreekauthoritiesandpublishedbythe
European Commission in 2015, ‘apprehensions
20
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for illegal entry and stay’ at the Albanian-Greek
borderdroppedfrom38,164in2009to33,979in
2010,andtojust11,743in2011.68




In the following years, Frontex reported that
many Albanianswere travellingwith counterfeit
documents, especially forged stamps used to
fabricate travel histories and thus extend their
stay in Greece.69 In 2014, the number of illegal
border crossings nearly doubled from 1,373 in
thefirstquartertomorethan3,000inthefourth
quarter.70 Greek authorities recorded 10,927
‘apprehensions for illegal entry and stay’ at the
Albanian-Greek border in 2012, 10,413 in 2013,
and9,290in2014.71
Inearly2015Frontexnotedadropinthenumber
of Albanian migrants seeking to enter Greece,
and in thenumberof thoserefusedentryat the
shared border. At that time it was believed that
fewer migrants were seeking work in Greece,
and that they were instead turning to other EU
Member States where an increase of Albanian
migrants travelling with fraudulent documents
had been recorded.72 The drop of illegal border
crossingsfromAlbaniatoGreecewasonlysmall,







numberswere reportedagain in thefirsthalf of
2017.75
II.2.2.3 From FYR Macedonia
IrregularmigrationbetweenFYRMacedoniaand
Greecehasgenerallyoccurredonlyatlowlevels.
Data from the Macedonian Ministry of Internal
Affairs shows in Figure  9 below that between
2011 and 2013, fewer than 100 migrants were
apprehended crossing irregularly between FYR
Macedonia and Greece. This was a significant
decrease on apprehensions in the immediately
preceding years. In 2009, 791 people had been
apprehendedattheborder,andin2010thisfigure
droppedto412.76Inthefirsttwomonthsof2015,
36 migrants were apprehended attempting to
enterGreeceattheMacedonianborder.77
Figure 9: Illegal border crossings from FYR 
Macedonia to Greece, 2011–2014 (Ministry of 







In 2017, as a result of more intensive border
control efforts along the Western Balkan route,
the number of migrants crossing from FYR
Macedonia toGreecebegan to increase. InMay
2017, the number of non-regional migrants
irregularly exiting FYR Macedonia for Greece
surpassed thenumberofnon-regionalmigrants
enteringFYRMacedoniafromGreeceirregularly.
While Frontex hailed this development as
evidenceofthesuccessofmoreintensiveborder-
control activities and cooperation in reducing
the attractiveness of the Western Balkan route
for irregular migration, the fact that irregular
migrants return fromFYRMacedonia toGreece
may also demonstrate that migrants have




Formostmigrants arriving in Greece, including
most Afghans and Syrians, the country is not
a destination but a transit point for onward
migration. The majority of migrants entering
Greece do not apply for asylum in Greece, and
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II.2.3.1 Temporary stay
Notwithstanding the desire of most irregular
migrants to eventually leave Greece, many end
up staying in the country for longer than they
anticipated.81 Insomecases theymaynothave
sufficient funds to pay for the onward journey,
andwaitinGreeceformoneytobewiredbyfamily
members. Others work in the informal labour
sector until they have earned enoughmoney to
get to thenextdestination,or topaysmugglers
to take them there. It is not uncommon for









II.2.3.2 Greece as a destination country
Greece has been a destination country for
irregular migrants, particularly for Pakistanis.
Some Pakistani migrants arriving in Greece
will live and work in the country for extended
periods of time. Greece is home to a well-
establishedPakistani diasporawhichprovides
migrants—regular and irregular—with support








networks from Bangladesh to Greece are less-
established than those fromPakistan.Forother









sector, and as street vendors.86 Bangladeshis
in Athens sometimes work in small hardware
stores, textile, factories, and restaurants. Some
irregular migrants become involved in criminal
activitiesonthestreets,suchassellingdrugsor
asbrokers formigrantsmugglers.87 The right of 
asylumseekers towork inGreece is contingent
uponobtainingrefugeestatus.Theprocessingof
asylum applications has traditionally been very
slow, with some asylum seekers having towait
years for the outcome. This pushes them into
working in the informal sector. But even those
refugeeswhohavebeensuccessful inobtaining
workpermitsmayfacedifficultiesfindingregular
employment.88 The employment of migrants
withininformalsectorsoftheeconomyhasalso
been driven by demand for informal workers in
Greece.89
ThesefactorshavebeencompoundedbyGreece’s
struggling economy.90 The country’s financial
crisishashitmigrantsparticularlyhard,withmany
losingtheirjobsandthepossibilityoffindingwork





migrants, including many Pakistani nationals
forwhomthecountrywas initiallyadestination
country, to leave and seek work elsewhere.94 
IrregularBangladeshimigrants have sometimes
resortedtocleaningcarwindowsattrafficlights
or selling goods on the street as strategies for




to xenophobic violence and maltreatment.
Greece’s economic difficulties have triggered
resentment and hostility towardsmigrants, and
the number of racially motivated attacks on
migrantsinGreecehasgrownsharply.97Numerous
publications report instances of physical abuse
22
  




made in several cases before the European
CourtofHumanRights.99MigrantsinGreeceare
routinely stopped, patted-down and searched in
the streetswithout any reasonable suspicion of
havingcommittedanoffence.Immigrationstops
andarrestsofmigrantswereheightenedduring
Operation Xenios Zeus, which commenced in
August2012:migrantsweregrabbedoffthestreet,
takenoff buses, andhad their homes searched.
BetweenAugust2012andFebruary2013,nearly
85,000 people were brought to police stations
in Athens for verification of their immigration




number of people stopped and taken to police
stations compared with the small number of







Migration from Greece to Western Europe is
influencedbyanumberofpushandpullfactors.
Manymigrants,includingthoseforwhomGreece
was formerly a destination country, decide to
leave because of their poor economic situation,
lackof jobopportunities, reducedwages, labour
exploitation and squalid living conditions.104 
Exposuretocrime,racially-motivatedattacksand
harassmentby thepolice serveas further push
factors.105Thedefactorealityofbeingunableto
obtainprotectionasa refugee isa furtherpush
factor. Difficulties in obtaining refugee status
and the limited protection ofmigrants’ rights in
day-to-daylifealsocontributetothedecisionsof
migrantstoleaveGreece.106 
Positive stories from friends and family who
have migrated to other European countries are
anaddedpull factor formanymigrants.107Most
AfghanandSyrianmigrantshopetoreachSweden
or Germany after transiting through Greece.108 
Migrants receive information on staying in and
departingfromGreeceinvariousways,principally
through familyand friends living inor transiting
throughGreece,butalsothroughsmugglers,other
migrants and social media.109 It was reported
that in2015 the timenecessary formigrants to
organiseonwardsmugglinghadshortened,with
somemigrantsheadingtowardstheborderwith
FYR Macedonia roughly forty-eight hours after
reaching the Aegean Islands.110 Somemigrants
transiting in Greece are willing to pay migrant
smugglersextraforaswiftdeparture.111
II.2.4 Departures
Irregular migrants transiting Greece usually
departfromthecountryinoneofthreeprincipal
ways.112 Most migrants leave Greece by land
throughtheWesternBalkansorBulgaria.Ofthese
migrants,mostcrosstheborderbetweenGreece




popular.113More recently, the land route through
FYRMacedoniahasbecomethemostcommon,
followedbytherouteviaBulgaria.Thelevelsand
characteristics of departures on each route are
outlinedinthefollowingsections.
II.2.4.1 To FYR Macedonia
TheborderbetweenFYRMacedoniaandGreece,
measuring246kilometres in length, is themain
exit point for irregular migrants from Greece.
Figure 10belowshowsthatthenumberofillegal
bordercrossingsfromGreecetoFYRMacedonia
wasvery low in2011and2012, anddoubled in
2013andagainin2014.In2015,some800,000
irregularmigrantsenteredFYRMacedonia from
Greece, creating some dramatic scenes at the
border and posing serious challenges for a
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dropped significantly, though absolute numbers
arenotprovidedinthesourcesconsultedforthis
researchproject.
Figure 10: Illegal border crossings from Greece 
into FYR Macedonia, 2011–2017 (Frontex)114
absolute 
number
change to same 
previous period





































migration and the smuggling of migrants from
Greece to FYR Macedonia started to surface
in the early 2010s. A variety of means have
been used to enter and cross FYR Macedonia,




started to rise in the first quarter of 2013, and
continuedtogrowthroughouttheyear.Tosome
extent thiswas influencedbyheightenedefforts
to detectmigrants.116 Further data published by
Frontex from October 2013 onwards, shown in
Figure 11below,demonstratesthesharpincrease
in quarterly detections. The rise in illegal border
crossingswasobservedbothatthemainofficial




fleeing theMiddleEast, the increase inmigrants
crossingbetweenGreeceandFYRMacedoniain
2014 was also influenced by poor conditions at
sea during thewintermonths for crossing from
Greece or Turkey to Italy, and the comparative
easeofthelandroutethroughMacedonia.118




up efforts to detect illegal border crossings,













By the end of the year, the number of irregular
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Figure 11: Illegal border crossings, Greece to 








































measures ranged from requiring migrants to
showtraveloridentitydocumentationuponentry
into the country, limiting entry to persons from
countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq,
requiring prior registration in Greece, imposing
daily quotas on border crossings, refusing
migrantswhohavepreviouslyresidedincountries
considered to be safe, and refusing entry to
migrantsnotcooperatingwiththeauthorities.125
The gradual closure of the border to Greece
resulted in largenumbersofmigrantsno longer












had been established at Idomeni and relocated
manyofits12,000to13,000residents.129Others
voluntarily moved to nearby border areas and
intootherrefugeecamps,andcontinuedtolinger
around the border in the hope of entering FYR
Macedonia.130
By the middle of 2016, illegal border crossings
haddroppedtothelevelslastseeninthespring
of2015.131Ninemonthslater,onlyafewhundred
people were crossing the border from Greece




Turkey to Greece before they enter Bulgaria. As
an internal EU border, travelling fromGreece to
Bulgariainvolvesfewerobstaclesthanthedirect
route from Turkey.134 In 2010, some 25% of all
illegalbordercrossingsinBulgariaweredetected
attheborderwithGreece.135 
Based on the available information, illegal entry
fromGreeceintoBulgariaappearstospikeduring
periodswhen other routes are not available. An
increase was recorded, for instance, in the first
quarter of 2012,136 and again in 2016 after it
becamenearly impossible formigrants tomove
from Greece to FYR Macedonia.137 In the first
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II.2.4.3 To Albania
Much of the irregular migration across the





these numbers have increased each year from
2012to2015.




change to same 
previous period
2012 – total 810 146%
2013 – total 807 0%















2017 – total n.a. n.a.
MostirregularmigrantsenterAlbaniafromGreece
overland,usuallyonornear themain road from
Greece which crosses the border near Kakavia
(Kakavijë) insouthernAlbania.Therelatively low
numbersofillegalbordercrossingsfromGreece
toAlbania have also been explained by the fact
that the terrain between the two countries is
verymountainousandthattheborder isdifficult
to cross in many places. Nevertheless, some
migrants, usually in groups and with the aid of
guides,crossthe‘greenborder’toreachAlbaniaor,
inthereversedirection,inordertoreachGreece.141
In 2011, smuggling through Albania became
moreattractivefornon-regionalmigrantsexiting
Greecewhofounditincreasinglydifficulttoleave
by ferry to Italy or by air.142 The sharp increase 
in 2012 has been attributedmostly to Albanian
nationals returning from Greece, though larger
numbers of Pakistanis, Syrians, and Eritreans
werealsodetectedinthatyear.143Thereissome
information suggesting thatAlbaniawas, at the
time,usedasatransitpointforirregularmigrants
fromNorthAfricaseekingtoreachtheEuropean






from Greece to Albania, causing an increase in
detectionofillegalbordercrossingsinthatyear.146 
While the land border betweenGreece and FYR




In 2015, irregular migration of third country
nationals from Greece to Albania decreased
whenmigrantsfacedfewobstaclestravellingon
themoredirectrouteviaFYRMacedonia.148With
the volume of arrivals in and departures from
Greece, some migrants, albeit in comparatively
small numbers, also departed fromGreece and
enteredAlbania,whichexplainstheriseinillegal
border detections in the first half of 2015.149 
Significantly fewermigrants attempted to cross
fromGreecetoAlbaniainthesecondhalfof2015.
The overall increase in 2015was, however, very
smallincomparisontomostotherbordersalong
theBalkan route, and in fact reflected the route
becoming relatively less attractive asmorenon-
regional migrants opted to travel through FYR
Macedonia.150
Figures for 2016 and 2017 were not available
at the time of writing. In the first quarter of
2016,Frontexreportedthatmoremigrantswere
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The number of migrants attempting to enter
Albania through Greece continued to increase






in 2016 was very low and did not reflect any






after the launch of Frontex’s Joint Operation
EPNAeneas2013on3June2013. In2013and
2014, Frontex reported that this indicated that
thesearoutefromGreecetoItalywasbecoming
less relevant compared to the Western Balkan
Route.154 In 2013, 1,943 persons were detected
arriving in Italy from Greece, which dropped to
1,508in2014.155MigrantsarrivinginItalyin2014
included Pakistanis and Syrians arriving from
Greece,butalsoSyriansarrivingfromEgyptand
AfghansarrivingfromTurkey.156Atthesametime,
growing numbers of migrants were choosing
to take the land route through the Western
Balkans rather than crossing to Italy by sea.157 




II.2.4.5 To other European destinations by plane
Greece was, along with Italy, one of the places






flights.159 Most migrants detected at this time
wererefugeesfromSyria.160
Following the commencement of Greece’s
Operation Aspida in August 2012, detections of
irregular migrants exiting Athens or arriving in
otherSchengencountriesonflightsfromAthens
decreased by 50%, owing both to the fact that
fewermigrantswereenteringGreece in thefirst





using theair route fromGreece toGermany led
to a 20% rise in the number of detections in
2015 compared to 2014.163 In 2016, detections
of migrants travelling by air with fraudulent
documentsagainincreasedasmigrantsbecame





vast majority of passengers were travelling on
flightsfromThessaloniki,Athens,andHeraklion.165 
Almost all of those detected were Syrian, Iraqi,
Afghan,orIraniannationals.166Inthefirstquarter
of2017,arecordnumberofSyriansweredetected
departing from Athens International Airport to
reachotherEUMemberStates.167Detectionswere
again high in the second quarter of 2017, with
the top nationalities detected including Syrians,
Afghans,Iranians,Turks,AlbaniansandEritreans.
In the same quarter, a trend was observed of
SyrianmigrantsoptingforflightstoSwitzerland,









regional migrants entering Greece irregularly
during this period, followed by Algerians and
27
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Congolese (Republic of Congo). During this
period, there was also a constant circular flow
of irregularmigrants fromneighbouringAlbania
which is not included in the numbers shown in
Figure 13below.
Syrian,Afghan,andIraqinationalsalsoconstituted
the largest groups of refugees and asylum
seekersinGreece.StatisticspublishedbyUNHCR,





and asylum seekers were recorded in Greece,
whichisdueinparttothefactthatmigrantshad
fewer options to continue their journey to other
destinationsinWesternEurope.
Figure 13: Migrant arrivals Greece, 2015–2017, main nationalities (IOM)
Syria Afghan . Iraq Pakistan Iran Palestine Algeria Congo Rep .
2015 total 475,902 205,858 86,989 23,260 22,276 6,115 1,353 1,217
2016 total 79,467 41,369 25,975 8,353 5278 1,675 1,629 861
2017toJun 2,587 442 921 404 184 249 439 522
Figure 14: Refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR, Greece 2011–2016, top nationalities169
Afghanistan Iran Iraq Pakistan Syria
2011—total 208 168 746 20 10
- refugees 208 168 656 20 10
- asylum-seekers 0 0 0 0 0
2012—total 343 254 928 19 20
- refugees 343 254 838 19 20
- asylum-seekers 0 0 0 0 0
2013 – total 4,025 894 3,835 16,139 9,860
- refugees 632 321 1,019 84 195
- asylum-seekers 3,393 573 2,816 16,055 1,665
2014 – total 2,225 656 1,789 1,485 4,095
- refugees 1,451 479 1,242 441 3,913
- asylum-seekers 774 177 100 994 182
2015 – total 5,810 664 5,193 1,582 9,549
- refugees 5,223 543 4,348 522 9,101
- asylum-seekers 587 121 397 1,060 448
2016 – total 15,657 1,472 11,296 4,657 28,417
- refugees 11,440 693 8,161 590 14,420
- asylum-seekers 4,217 779 3,135 4,067 13.997
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detections in2011to7,927 in2012. 170By2014,
Syrianmigrantswerealready the topnationality
arriving in Greece by sea.171 In 2015 and 2016,
Syrianswereagainthelargestgroupofmigrants
that arrived in Greece,172 with the vast majority
arrivingbysea.173 
AnumberofmigrantsdetectedenteringGreece




Most of these were Iraqi nationals. To a lesser
extent, Egyptians, Moroccans, Libyans and
Tunisianshavealsobeendetectedmaking false
claims of this kind.176 The trend of migrants
falsely claiming to be Syrian is largely due to
a perception that Syrian nationals can move
throughEuropemorefreelyandaremorelikelyto
receiveprotectionintheEU.177From2014,Greece
stopped keeping Syrians who were detected in
the Eastern Aegean in detention centres on the
islands.178GreeceallowedSyrianstoboardferries
to themainland to register their asylum claims
in Athens. Migrants of other nationalities were,
however,keptontheislands.Forthisreasonmany
claimed tobeSyrian,andsometimespresented
fraudulent Syrian documents.179 Circumstances




After relatively large numbers of Iraqis fled
to Greece in 2007–2008, the number of Iraqi
migrantsdetected for illegal entryor residence
inGreecedroppedtoonly700in2013and1,023
in2014.180In2015,thenumberofIraqimigrants
detected illegally entering Greece increased
again,particularlytowardstheendoftheyear.181 
In 2015 and 2016, Iraqis were the third-most
largestgroupof irregularmigrants inGreece.182 
In2015,86,989IraqimigrantsarrivedinGreece
irregularly, constituting 11% of all arrivals; in
2016thisfurtherincreasedto15%.183Theactual
number of Iraqi nationals arriving in Greece is
likelytobehigherbecause,asmentioned,some
IraqinationalsclaimtobeSyrianwhendetected
by authorities.184 The geographical proximity
of Iraq to Syria, as well as ethnic, cultural




of all Iraqi nationals arriving in Greece falsely
claimedtobeSyrian.186
Iran
Alongwithmost other nationalities, the number
of irregular Iranian migrants arriving in Greece
increased over the course of 2015.187 In 2016,
Iranian nationals represented around 3% of all
migrantsarrivinginGreecebysea.188
Palestine
In the years prior to 2011, increasing numbers
ofPalestiniansweredetectedatGreece’sborder
with Turkey.189 In 2011, 2,065 Palestinianswere
apprehended for illegally entering or staying in
Greece.Overthefollowingyearsthisfellto1,718
migrants in 2012 and to just 469 in 2013.190 It 
hasbeensuggestedthatsomeofthesemigrants





In the first half of 2017, greater numbers of
ethnic Bedoons, stateless Kuwaiti nationals,
began to arrive in Greece. From about March
2017 onwards, more than 100 Bedoons were
arriving each month. More than 60% of these
arrivals were minors. Many applied for family
reunificationvisasafterarrivinginGreece,some
with fraudulentdocuments,witha largenumber








the most commonly detected nationalities of









among persons entering Greece illegally, with
205,858detections.198In2015,25%ofallrefugees
detected entering Greece were Afghans,199 a 
proportionthatremainedsteadyin2016.200
Pakistan
Pakistani nationals have been among themost
commonly detected migrants entering Greece
irregularly.201 In 2011, Frontex reported that the
numberofPakistanimigrantsarriving inGreece
hadincreasedgreatly,andthatatGreece’sborder
with Turkey the number of Pakistanis detected
was second only to the number of Afghans.202 
19,975Pakistaninationalswereapprehendedfor











In the first quarter of 2012, the number of
Bangladeshi migrants arriving at Greece’s land
border with Turkey surged, with Bangladeshis
being the most commonly detected nationality
during this period.207 In total, 7,863Bangladeshi












were apprehended for illegal entry or residence
in Greece. 4,606 Algerianswere apprehended in
2012,butthisfiguredroppedtoonly443in2013.212 




In 2011 and 2012, 3,405 and 2,207Moroccans
respectively were apprehended for illegal entry
or residence inGreece.214Moroccans arriving in
Greece are generally removed from the country
and, as a consequence, often resort to falsely
claiming to be nationals of other countries.












this flow has decreased significantly since the
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introduction of legal avenues for migration
in December 2010.217 After peaking at 72,454
detectionsforillegalentryandresidencein2008,
around 10,000–17,000 Albanian migrants were
detectedintheyearsimmediatelyfollowingvisa
liberalisation.218 Circular migration from Albania
to Greece has also been slowed by Greece’s
economic troubles and fewer employment
opportunitiesinrecentyears.219
Somalia
Somalians have been detected at Greece’s land
border with Turkey.220 2,238 Somalians were ap-
prehendedforillegalentryorresidenceinGreece
in 2011. This number fell to 1,765 in 2012 and
1,004in2013butroseagainto1,876in2014.221
Further nationalities regularly detected entering
Greece irregularly include Eritreans, Sudanese,
andGeorgians.222
II.3.2 Otherbackground




almost three quarters of all Syrians detected
entering Greece illegally were male, and most
werebetween20and28yearsofage.223In2015,
many Syrian and Afghan family units, rather
thanmen travellingwithout their family, entered
Greece by sea.224 In 2016 UNHCR estimated
that approximately 21%of allmigrants entering
Greecewerefemale.225
Syrians
As mentioned, Frontex reported that in 2012,





of between 25 and 60 years. Some groups
included three generations of family members
travelling together. About half of the Syrians
arriving in Greece in 2012 already had relatives
livingintheEU,mostlyinGermanyandSweden.226 
Based on the available information, it appears
that insubsequentyearsmoreSyrians travelled
in family groups than had previously been the





Irregular migrants from Afghanistan entering








typically young, non-skilled, singlemenbetween
the21and29yearsofage.Mostarebelievedto
travel toEurope insearchofbetteremployment
opportunities and higher wages.231 Many were
previously unemployed in Pakistan.232 It is less
common for irregular migrants from Pakistan







Turkey had been working in construction in the





30% of all migrants apprehended in Greece
for illegal entry or stay were minors.236 UNHCR
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reportsthataround37–38%ofallmigrantsand







in Greece.239 Greece is believed to be the main
transit point for unaccompanied Afghanminors
whoaresmuggledtoEurope.240Inthefirstseven
months of 2016, Greek authorities registered
morethan3,300unaccompaniedminorsseeking
asylum;241inthefirstfivemonthsof2017,1,800
unaccompanied minors were recorded.242 The 
majorityofunaccompaniedminorsaremale,and
many are from Afghanistan.243 Unaccompanied




II.4.1.1 Into the country
Themainroutesforsmugglingmigrantsleadfrom
TurkeytoGreeceoverlandorbysea.245Smugglers
choose between these twomethods depending
on border controls and law enforcement
activities.Between2009and2010, for instance,
many smuggling operations changed from sea
crossings to landcrossingsas itbecameeasier
to use the land route. As interdiction efforts
increased along the land border, smugglers
again turned to the sea route from about 2011
onwards.246 
Overland from Turkey
From early 2010, the majority of smuggling
activities into Greece shifted from the Aegean
Sea to the land borderwith Turkey.247 This shift 
occurred following the de-mining of the Greek








the two countries.250 This crossing can be






Following the completion of this fence and
heightenedbordercontrolsalongthelandborder,
beginning with the Greek Operation Aspida in
August 2012, smugglers operating on the land
routeshiftedtheiroperationstothesearoute.254 
Since then, Greek and Turkish authorities have
been cooperating more closely, with the result
that most apprehensions of irregular migrants
takeplaceontheTurkishsideoftheborder.255 
From Turkey across the Aegean Sea
From2007to2009,andagainsincelate2012,the
routefromTurkeyacrosstheAegeanSeatothe
Greek islands has been themost popular route
forsmugglingmigrantstoGreece.256Controlsand
fortificationsalongthelandborder,asmentioned,
displaced the main smuggling route from land
to sea in 2012, and since then the majority of
smugglingventuresfromTurkeytoGreecehave
beenconductedbyboat.257 
Despite many efforts and large investments
made to stop irregular departures from Turkey
and prevent the smuggling of migrants across
the Aegean Sea, the task ofmounting effective
patrolshasprovenchallenging.Measuring13,676
kilometres, the Greek coastline is the longest
of any European country, and Greek territory
includessome6,000islands.258
Smuggling by sea from Turkey to Greece
encompasses routes from several departure
points along the west coast of Turkey, leading
either tooneof theGreek islands in theeastern
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Aegean or to the Greek mainland.259 The cities 
of Izmir and Bodrum have been popular points




coastand theeasternAegean islands,but Izmir
is significantly larger. In Izmir, migrants have
accesstogreateramenitiesandcantransit less
conspicuously. From Izmir, groups of migrants
are generally transported by smugglers in vans







Arrivals have been recorded throughout the
Greek islands, fromSamothrace in the north to




places, the distance between the two countries
isaslittleasonekilometre.267Thejourneyacross
the Aegean Sea to the eastern Aegean islands
is thus quite short but nevertheless often quite
dangerous.268
The precise routes taken and the specific
islands targeted by smugglers have changed
constantly.269 Frontex reported that in 2012,
Lesbos,Samos,Agothonisi,FarmakonisandSymi










Greece witnesses some inbound smuggling
activitiesfromAlbania.Whiletheseactivitieshave




A further route to smuggle migrants by sea
to Greece starts in Egypt and runs across the
Eastern Mediterranean. In 2014, this route was
used by many smuggled migrants from Syria,
but since 2015 migrants from Sudan and sub-
SaharanAfricancountrieshaveusedthisroute.276
II.4.1.2 Through/within the country
After arriving in Greece, asylum seekers are
registered and then generally travel from the
Aegean to Athens. Athens is the main hub for
organisingonwardsmugglingformigrantsofall
nationalities.277Undocumentedmigrantsmaybe
detainedonthe islands forsomeperiodof time
beforetheyareallowedtocontinuetotheGreek
mainland.278 Since 2014, Syrian nationals have
notbeenkeptinreceptioncentresontheAegean
Islands, and have been allowed to board ferries




provided, public or private transportationcanbe
usedtoreachAthens.UpuntilMarch2016,Greek
authorities sometimes facilitated onward travel
formigrantsseeking to reach theborder toFYR




unless they file asylum applications which are
deemed admissible by Greek authorities.281 
Without admissible asylum claims, irregular
migrantsaredetainedontheislandsbeforebeing
returnedtoTurkey.282
There are some reports of migrants being
smuggled in vehicles or hiding in trucks, for
example after crossing the land border from
Turkeyclandestinely,orinordertoreachtheborder
to FYR Macedonia.283 Based on the available
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information, however, such covert smuggling
methods are not commonly used to transport
migrantswithinGreece.
Thessaloniki, in the north of Greece, has been
describedasahub forsmugglingactivities that
take migrants across the Balkans to Western
Europe.284 From Thessaloniki, two main routes
leadtoFYRMacedonia:Themostcommonroute
takesmigrantstoEvzonoiorIdomeniontheGreek
side of the border near the Macedonian town
of Gevgelija.285 Some migrants have reportedly
made this journey on foot.286 The other route
involves migrants taking public buses to Kilkis,
fromwheretheyuse local taxiservicestoreach
theborder.287
Migrants seeking to cross illegally into Albania
mostly use public transport to reach Ioannina
in Greece’s northwest. Here they encounter




but rather from smugglerswho take advantage
ofnewly-arrivedmigrants.Smugglerssometimes
offer transportation or accommodation at
excessive cost and in very poor and crowded












II.4.1.3 Out of the country
The smuggling of migrants from Greece may
occur across the land borders to Bulgaria, FYR
Macedonia,Albania,orbyseatoItaly.Alternatively,
migrantsmaybesmuggledbyplanefromGreece
to destinations in Western Europe or to other
transit points.292 Up until the early 2010s, most
smuggling ventures involved sea or airborne
methods.293Morerecently,bordercrossings into
FYRMacedoniahavebecometheprevalentroute




specific routes that invariably follow the same
line between departure, transit, and destination
points. Each ‘route’ entails multiple variations
and combinations, depending on a range of
circumstances. The methods used to smuggle
migrants and the speed at which they travel
furtherdependontheintendeddestination,border
controlsandlawenforcementactivitiesalongthe
route, the know-how of the smuggler, and the
financialresourcesofthesmuggledmigrants.294
Routes and contact points are identified and
shared amongmigrants and smugglers alike in
various ways. Migrants arriving in Greece often
make contact with their diaspora, which can






a preferred route for irregularmigration and for
thesmugglingofmigrantsbecauseit isadirect,




(nearGevgelija and Idomeni) andStarDojran.297 
Macedonian authorities have also reported
smugglingactivitiesnearthetownofMedžitlija.298 
Duringtheperiodwhenbordercontrolsweremore
relaxed,manymigrantswere able to cross into
FYRMacedoniaonfoot,someindependentlyand
others after receiving instructions or guidance
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border failed.299 Migrants seeking to cross the
border faster, travel deeper into or across FYR




Smuggling from Greece into Albania is mostly
donebyland,oftenusingroadsandpathwaysthat
run through rural and remote areas, away from
officialbordercontrolpoints.A reportpublished
by Frontex in 2015 implies that the scale of
migrant smuggling through Albania is mostly
determinedbythe levelofbordercontrolsalong
the border to Greece.301 Most of the migrants




from Greece to Albania (and subsequently
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia
and/orSerbia)isamorecumbersomeroutethan
the one via FYR Macedonia, and the means of
transportationandinfrastructurealongthisroute
are not as well-developed.303 Smuggling from
Greece throughAlbania tends to increasewhen
otherroutesarenotavailable.Forexample,in2011,




a port city and the intended departure point for
smugglingventurestoItaly.304
To Bulgaria
Smuggling activities across the border from
GreecetoBulgariaarenotwelldocumentedand
may not occur on a large scale. Because this
borderisaninternalEUborder,manycrossings
involveovertmethods,thoughtherearereports
of cases in which covert methods are used
to smuggle migrants from Greece to Bulgaria
and inwhichsmugglershaveactively recruited
migrantswhowereunabletocrossfromGreece
into FYR Macedonia and then took them to
Bulgaria.305
To Italy
Patras and Igoumenitsa appear to be themain
departure points for the smuggling ofmigrants
fromGreecebysea,thoughthescaleofsmuggling
activities is difficult to gauge. Both cities have
beendescribedasmajorhubs for smuggling to
Italy,306 thoughtheopeningofnewport facilities
in Patras in 2011, equipped with fences and
surveillance, reportedly made it much harder, if
not impossible, for smuggledmigrants to travel




Italian port cities such as Ancona or Venice. It
mayalsoinvolvesmugglingonsmaller,privately-
owned vessels departing from points anywhere
along Greece’s west coast, crossing the Ionian
SeatodestinationsinApuliaorCalabria.Insome
instances the smuggled migrants first board
lorries and hide in their cargo compartments
before the lorriesboard the ferries.Thismaybe
donewithorwithouttheknowledgeofthedriver
andwithorwithouttheaidofsmugglers.309 
Since 2012, border controls at both ports have
intensified significantly, making successful
smuggling to Italy bothmoredifficult andmore
expensive.In2014,Frontexreportedthatthesea
route fromGreece to Italywasbeginning to fall
out of favour, and that due to increased costs
anddifficultyofsmugglingtoItalyasaresultof
intensifiedbordercontrolsatGreekportsand in
the IonianSea,migrantsnowpreferred to travel
on the Western Balkan route.310 Following the
closureofthebordertoFYRMacedoniainMarch
2016,migrantswere again detected attempting
tocrossfromGreecetoItalybyboat.311
II.4.2 Methods
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Methods of smuggling by land are especially
variable, and the means and conditions often
dependonhowmuchmigrantsareableandwilling
topay.313
Cars, vans, trucks and buses





if migrants are crowded into spaces that are
insufficientlyventilated,oriftheyareleftwithno
foodorwater.315
In some cases, migrants entering Greece from
TurkeyaretakenintruckstotheGreekborder,but
areunloadedbeforethetruckcrossestheborder.







without the knowledge of the driver. Migrants
wait for truck drivers to fall asleep at known
rest stops near the Macedonian border before
enteringthetruckandhidinginthecargoarea.318 
Frommid-2011,Frontexreportedthatthenumber




travelling as stowaways on trucks and buses
thatboardferriesboundfor Italy. Inothercases,




Migrants may be smuggled on freight trains
departing Greece travelling via FYR Macedonia




some cases, migrant smugglers have misused
customs stamps and seals in an attempt to
ensure that the smuggled migrants reach
their destination undetected.323 In other cases,








Greece on foot.326 In the summer months, the
waterlevelsoftheEvrosRiverthatseparatesthe
two countries are low enough that it is possible
formigrantstowadeacrosstheriverintoGreece
at some points; at other times they may use
makeshift floatationdevicesorattempt toswim
fromone side to the other.327 Bothmethods are
very dangerous, and many migrants have died
attemptingtomakethecrossing.328
Border crossing into FYR Macedonia from
Greecearegenerallyundertakenonfoot,usually
without the use of a migrant smuggler. Many
migrantsusemobilephoneswithGPSandmap
applications tocross theborder. Insomecases,
smugglers provide migrants with instructions
about where and how to cross the border but
do not accompany them.329 Travelling on foot
is particularly dangerous for migrants during
wintermonths. Some journeys can take several
days and lead through forests and rural areas
where migrants are forced to sleep outside in
cold temperatures. Migrants risk hypothermia
andfrostbite,particularlywheretheydonothave
adequateclothing,foodormedicalassistance.330




predominantmethodofentry intoGreece.331 The 
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most common type of vessel used to smuggle
migrantsistheinflatablerubberdinghy.332 These 
vesselsare typicallypackedwitha largenumber
migrants to maximise the profits of migrant
smugglers.333 Smugglers sometimes instruct
the migrants to slash the boats before arriving
in Greece or being intercepted by authorities to
preventaforcedreturntoTurkey.334Ithasalsobeen
reportedthatsomesmugglerscollecttheengines




dinghies to travel to Greece without the use of
smugglers.336Toavoiddetectionbytheauthorities,
manyvesselsdepartduringthenight.337 
A wide variety of other vessels have also been
usedtosmugglemigrantsfromTurkeytoGreece,






Likewise, to reduce costs smugglers generally
hire either an inexperienced crew or no crew at




hours to several days.342 Notwithstanding the
often short distances between Turkey’s west
coastandtheGreek islands,smuggling inthese
waters can be very dangerous. In 2015, around
5,000 cases of shipwreck occurred, and more
than 89,000 migrants had to be rescued by
authorities,includingmorethan16,500minors.343 
Many irregular migrants, especially those from
landlockedcountries,donotknowhowtoswim
and are not equipped with lifejackets.344 Many
migrantshavedrownedattempting tocross the
Aegean Sea into Greece. In 2015, 779 people
drownedcrossingfromTurkeytoGreece.In2016,
thatfigurestoodat441.345 
Smuggling is particularly dangerous during win-
termonths,wheremigrantsareexposedtohypo-
thermia and often require hospital treatment fol-
lowingrescue.346Eveningoodweatherconditions,
the vessels often carry insufficient food, water,
andclothing.Insomecases,migrantshavebeen
forced onto boats bound forGreece at gunpoint
when they expressed hesitation about boarding
the vessels during bad weather conditions. Fur-








four kilometres out to sea where they are then
transferredtoalarger‘mothership’or‘rendezvous
vessel’. This vessel then travels towards the
territorial seaofGreece (or in other cases Italy)
wherethemigrantsareagaintransferredtosmall
boats. Smugglers ormigrantsmay then launch
aflareorsendoutadistresssignalforthelocal





Two distinct modi operandi have principally
been employed for entry into Italy. Onemethod
involved the use of private boats to cross from
Greece to Apulia or Calabria. The othermethod
involved hiding on ferries or using fraudulent
documentation to board ferries departing from
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II.4.2.3 Smuggling by air
The fastest, safest,butalso themostexpensive
methodtobesmuggledinoroutofGreeceisby
air,which usually involves the use of fraudulent
traveloridentitydocumentstoboardinternational
commercialpassengerplanesandpassthrough






boardordisembarking from international flights
bound forGreece; though this isnot tosay that
smugglingbyairtoGreecedoesnotoccur.
Thevolumeofsmugglingofmigrantsbyairfrom
Greece is determined, inter alia, by the demand
for irregularmigration from Greece to other EU
destinations, the availability of other routes and
their associated risks, and seasonal variations
betweentheavailabilityofflightsandthepriceof
airfares.354
In the past, smuggling by air from Greece was
typicallyassociatedwithdeparturesfromAthens





flights toSwitzerland, Italy andBelgium instead
ofGermany, thoughGermanywasstill themost
populardestinationatthattime.357






For migrants entering the country, fraudulent
documents are used or carried by regional
migrants entering Greece from Albania, as well
as non-regional migrants entering Greece from
Turkey by land or by sea. Notwithstanding the
introduction of visa-free travel for Albanians
in late 2010, the Greek-Albanian border has
remained particularly affected by instances of
document fraud. This mostly involves genuine
AlbanianpassportswithcounterfeitGreekborder
stamps, though fraudulent Albanian passports
and fraudulent Italian identification documents
havealsobeendetected.359
Migrants arriving in Greece by sea sometimes
carry fraudulent documents. In 2016, Frontex
found that approximately 5% of the 1,500
examineddocumentscarriedbymigrantsarriving
inGreecebyboatwerefraudulent.Approximately
two-thirds of these were Syrian documents,
mostly poor-quality counterfeit Syrian identity
cards,butsomehigh-qualityforgerieswerealso
detected.360 
Many irregular migrants have been detected
using fraudulent Greek registration papers to
enterFYRMacedonia.BetweenDecember2015
and January 2016 over 8,000 such caseswere
recorded. Someof these cases involved Iranian
migrants changing the nationality on their
registrationpapersfrom‘Iran’to‘Iraq’inorderto
gainentryintoFYRMacedoniaafterthecountry
limited entry to migrants from Iraq, Syria, and
Afghanistan.361 For this reason, some Afghan,
Iraqi, and Syrian migrants applied for multiple
registration certificates to sell the additional
certificates to nationals of countries unable to
enterFYRMacedonia.362
In other cases, migrants have ‘rented’ the






countries and destinations in Western Europe
is often wholly or partly facilitated by migrant
smugglers.Wheremigrants can cross a border
without the assistance of a smuggler, they will
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oftenprefertodosobecausemigrantsgenerally
dislike,distrustorevenfearmigrantsmugglers.364 
Crossing without a smuggler is cheaper, but it
increases the risk of detection by authorities.
One strategy employedbymigrants attempting
entryintoFYRMacedonia,forinstance,hasbeen
to first attempt the journey alone and engage





is carriedoutbynationalsof origin, transit and/
ordestinationcountries.366 In2016, themajority
of persons arrested in Greece as suspected
migrant smugglers were nationals of Albania,
Greece, Syria, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, Iraq and
Turkey.367 In 2017, Frontex noted that Albanian
and Greek nationals were the most commonly
detectednationalitiesamongmigrantsmugglers













from Turkey to Greece, facilitating their stay
in transit through the country and on to FYR
Macedonia.372 
Little information is available regarding the
nationalities of smugglers involved in bringing
migrants from Greece to Italy, though a recent
reportnotedthatUkrainianandRussiannationals
were themost commonly detected nationalities
captaining boats detected entering Italy from
TurkeyorGreece.373








tures. In largeroperations, theremaybemultiple







for smuggling, and the recruitment of low-lev-
el smugglers to bring the migrants to Greece.










They may receive payments from migrants on
behalfofthesmugglingorganisers.Therecruiters
areoftenmigrantsthemselvesandcanspeakthe
same language as the smuggled migrants. In
smaller smuggling operations, this role may be




transport smuggled migrants, either to their
destinationortothenexttransitpoint.Theymay
workonmultiplesmugglingroutesorformultiple
organisers. In complex smuggling networks,
collectors and guarantors receive smuggling
feesfrommigrantswhensuchfeesarenotpaid
to organisers directly. This function may be
performed by insurance offices or hawaladars 
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operating the hawala system, a money transfer
systemcommonlyusedbyAfghanmigrants.377 
A range of opportunistic actors operate on the
peripheriesofsmugglingactivities.Theseinclude
persons providing food or accommodation to
smuggled migrants, selling them lifejackets or




Once in Greece, smuggled migrants can move
aboutandtravelwithouttheaidofsmugglers.If
they wish to travel onwards they usually move
to Athens, Thessaloniki, or another ‘smuggling
hub’ to establish contact with other smugglers
and, perhaps, to compare the prices, routes,
and services on offer. Finding a smuggler in a
smugglinghubsuchasAthensisreportedlyquite
easy.Cafés frequentedby persons of the same
backgroundasthemigrant,orwhospeakthesame
language,arecommonlyvisitedbynewlyarrived
migrants to receive information on smuggling
services and to make contact with smugglers.












tiple borders are rarely pre-arranged frombegin-
ningtoend.Rather,thesmugglingjourneyusually
consistsofmultiple legs,andsmugglersareen-
gaged ifmigrants cannot reach their next desti-




or Pakistani nationals—sometimes accompany
themigrantsacrossseveralborders.380
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grantSmugglersinTurkey’(2017)23(3)European Journal on Crimi-
nal Policy and Research371,380.
50
  
ANDREAS SCHLOENHARDT  |  IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS ALONG THE BALKAN ROUTE 




for irregular migration across the Balkans. The
vast majority of non-regional migrants arrive in
thecountryfromGreeceandtakeashortperiod,
sometimes several days, to cross the country,
beforecontinuing toSerbia, thenon toHungary
orCroatiaandonwardtodestinationsinWestern
Europe.1Smugglersfrequentlyfacilitateentryinto,
transit through and exit from FYR Macedonia,
though on certain occasions during the period
from 2011 to 2017 government authorities
actively assisted irregular migrants on their
journeys,whichallbutdestroyedthedemandfor
smugglersatthosetimes.
In recent years, FYRMacedonia, a countrywith
aterritoryoflessthan26,000 squarekilometres
and a population of just two million, with a
relativelyweakeconomyandhighunemployment,
has experienced some of the highest levels of
irregularmigrationofanycountryintheBalkans.
In2015alone,severalhundredthousandirregular
migrants, most refugees from Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Syria, transited through the country.
When other countries further along the Balkan
route later closed their borders to irregular
migrants, many found themselves stranded in
FYR Macedonia with little protection and no
legal status.2 InFebruary2016, FYRMacedonia
moved to close its border with Greece, leading
to tumultuous scenes in border areas on the
Greeksideof theborder.Bordercontroland the
management of such large numbers of people
poseseriouschallengestoFYRMacedonia,and
international cooperation remains hampered by
protracted political disputes with neighbouring
Greece. FYRMacedonia is neither aMember of


















III.2.1.1 Numbers relating to illegal entry 






Ministry of Internal Affairs, published by the Eu-
ropean Commission, show that the number of
irregular migrants detected at the border rose





suggesting that in 2011, 209 irregularmigrants






iting in thecountryand,once registrationbegan,
only about 30% – 50% of migrants were regis-
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months from September to December 2015 a






in 2015 ‘more than 750,000 migrants passed
throughthecountry’,thoughthesefiguresappear




2015 and March 2016, the number of arrivals
dropped from 95,500 to just 1,783. Since then,
monthlyarrivalshaverangedbetween0and107
permonth.
Figure 15: Migrant arrivals FYR Macedonia, 
2015–2017 (IOM)11
2015 2016 2017
January n.a. 53,436 2
February n.a. 34,404 56
March n.a. 1,783 14
April n.a. 0 5
May n.a. 47 0
June n.a. 0 45
July n.a. 12 107
August n.a. 9 90
September 49,996 7 64
October 87,204 66 29
November 102,776 7 50
December 95,500 0 85
year total 388,233 89,771 547
The decrease in arrivals since late 2015 has
beenattributedtothemeasuresadoptedbyFYR
Macedonia, along with Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia,
and Austria—the subsequent transit countries
for irregular migrants travelling through FYR
Macedonia—tocurbtheflowofirregularmigrants
along the Western Balkan route. The decision
taken by some countries in November 2015 to
restrict entry and transit to Afghan, Iraqi, and
Syriannationalsisseenasthemainreasonwhy







becoming stranded in Greece, especially at the
bordertoFYRMacedonia.13 
Starting in February 2016, FYR Macedonia
likewisetookmeasurestolimitentrytorefugees
fromAfghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, and inMarch









III.2.1.2 Numbers relating to persons staying in the 
country illegally
Informationaboutthenumberofpersonsresiding
in FYRMacedonia illegally is, for themost part,
not available. A 2015 publication merely cites
datafromtheMinistryof InternalAffairs for the
yearsupto2013.Thesefiguresshowthatin2011,







stranded in FYR Macedonia. Data on stranded
migrants has not been collected systematically,





reflects the fact that manymigrants eventually
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Figure 16: Stranded migrants and asylum 
























measuring 246 kilometres in length, is the
mainentrypointforirregularmigrants,andhas
been one of the ‘busiest’ borders for irregular
migrationflowsanywhereintheregioninrecent
years.Figure 17belowshows that thenumber
of illegalbordercrossings fromGreece toFYR
Macedoniawasverylowin2011and2012,then
doubled in2013andagain in2014. In theyear
2015,accordingtoFrontexdata,some800,000
irregularmigrantsenteredFYRMacedoniafrom
Greece, creating some dramatic scenes at the
border and posing serious challenges for a
countrywithapopulationofmerely2.1million.
In2016, thenumberof illegalbordercrossings
again dropped significantly, though absolute
numbers are not provided in the available
sources.
Figure 17: Illegal border crossings from Greece 







































2017 – total n.a. n.a.
Developments
FYRMacedoniastartedtobecomeanimportant
transit country for irregular migrants travelling
fromGreecetoSerbia inabout2013.Previously,
the number of irregular migrants apprehended
53
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at the border was very low. Data provided by
MacedonianauthoritiesfortheperiodofJanuary
2009toFebruary2015showsthatsmallnumbers
of ‘irregular migrants aiming to enter the FYR
Macedonia’wereapprehendedattheborderwith
Greece(seeFigure 18below).
Figure 18: ‘Number of apprehended irregular 
migrants aiming to enter FYR Macedonia, 
2009–February 2015 (FYR Macedonia, Ministry 










Reports observing an emerging route of irregular
migrationandsmugglingofmigrantsfromGreece
to FYR Macedonia started to surface in the ear-
ly2010s.Ineffectivebordercontrolsandalackof














terly detections. In 2014, Macedonia’s National
RapporteurforTraffickinginHumansandIllegal







Figure 19: Illegal border crossings, Greece to 



































In June 2015, FYR Macedonia announced that
it would permit irregular migrants to enter and
stay legally if they left the country againwithin
three days. It further allowedmigrants to apply
forasylumatanypolicestation,andbusesand
trains were offered to bring migrants from the
Greek border to immigration reception centres
orallthewaytothebordertoSerbia.25ByAugust
2015, some 1,500 to 2,000 irregular migrants
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that number had risen to about 3,000–4,000
migrantsperday.27
The high number of border crossings continued
intoearly2016. InFebruary2016,afteraseries
of regional meetings and following the lead of
othercountries,FYRMacedoniabegan toadopt
measures to control and close the border to
Greece which, as shown in Figures  17 and 19
above,ledtoareductioninthenumberofarrivals.28 
Thesemeasuresrangedfromrequiringmigrants
to show travel or identity documentation upon
entry into the country, limiting entry to persons
from countries such as Syria, Afghanistan
and Iraq, requiring prior registration in Greece,




One consequence of the gradual closure of
the border to Greece was that large numbers






haddropped to levels last seen in the spring of
2015.31 Nine months later, only a few hundred
people were crossing the border from Greece
illegally eachmonth.32 UNHCR reports that over
2,400 refugees and irregular migrants crossed
fromGreece into FYRMacedonia betweenApril
andJune2017.33Macedonianauthorities,onthe
otherhand,havebeencitedstatingthatonly216




III.2.2.2 From other countries
Albania
IrregularmigrationfromAlbaniatoFYRMacedonia
appears to involve several hundredpeople each
year. Data relating to illegal border crossings,
showninFigure 20below,suggeststhatthereis
less variation across different reporting periods.











(which do not appear in Figure  20) have been
explainedbyeasierdirectaccesstoGreece.36 
Fromthelimitedinformationavailable,itappears
that irregular migration from Bulgaria to FYR
Macedonia occurs only in very small numbers.
ThedataprovidedbyFrontexfor2014and2015,
shown in Figure  20 above, involves single-digit
figuresinmostquarters.37
III.2.3 Stay
FYR Macedonia is almost exclusively a transit





of FYR Macedonia to accommodate, support,
and process irregular migrants is extremely
limited. Prior to 2011, FYR Macedonia did not
grant asylum to those seeking protection in its
territory.Sinceabout2012,procedurestoprocess
asylumclaimsandgrantasylumhave improved





on Asylum and Temporary Protection,introducedin
June2015,did little to improve thesituation,as
waitingperiods for lodgingandgrantingasylum
claims continued to be long. As a result, many
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Figure 20: Illegal border crossings into FYR Macedonia, 2011–2017 (Frontex)39
Illegal border crossings from Albania to 
FYR Macedonia






2011 – total n.a n.a n.a n.a.
2012–1stquarter 28 –48% n.a n.a
2012–2ndquarter 77 +88% n.a n.a
2012–3rdquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a.
2012–4thquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a.
2012 – total 253 +32% n.a n.a
2013–1stquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a
2013–2ndquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a.
2013–3rdquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a.
2013–4thquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a.
2013 – total 226 –11% n.a n.a.
2014–1stquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a.
2014–2ndquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a.
2014–3rdquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a.
2014–4thquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a.
2014 – total 246 +9% 39 +77%
2015–1stquarter 39 +18% 2 –83%
2015–2ndquarter 46 –34% 3 –86%
2015–3rdquarter 31 –48% 19 –533%
2015–4thquarter 43 –48% 2 0%
2015 – total n.a –35% n.a –33%
2016–1stquarter n.a +38% n.a n.a
2016–2ndquarter n.a –24% n.a n.a
2016–3rdquarter n.a +/–0% n.a n.a
2016–4thquarter n.a +121% n.a n.a
2016 – total n.a +35% n.a n.a
2017–1stquarter n.a –76% n.a n.a
2017–2ndquarter n.a +48% n.a +/–0%
2017–3rdquarter n.a –47% n.a n.a.
2017–4thquarter n.a +67% n.a n.a.
2017 – total n.a n.a n.a n.a.
migrants, after filing applications for asylum,
simply left the country, some after waiting for
theirinterviewsorthedecisionoftheirapplication
forsixmonthsormore.Fewmigrantsaresaidto
stay until the endof the processbecausemost
losehopethattheywillbeaffordedprotection.40 
Reports by human rights organisations show
thatsomemigrantswereabusedbyMacedonian
authorities or experienced attacks, theft, and
exploitationbycriminalgroups.41
Althoughthemajorityofmigrantsmerelytransit
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choices.Astheopportunitiestomoveelsewhere
have narrowed, more migrants remain in FYR
Macedonia,andthenumberofpersonsapplying
forasylumisrising.42
The measures adopted to close borders and
stop the flow of migrants along the Western
Balkanroutemeantthatsomemigrantsbecame
stranded in FYR Macedonia or returned from
Serbia toFYRMacedonia.Since2015, following
the closure of the Hungarian-Serbian border,
reports have emerged of migrants becoming
‘increasingly trapped’ in FYR Macedonia and








through FYR Macedonia leave the country by
crossing theborder intoSerbia. Throughout the
2011–2017period,irregularmigrationacrossthe
border fromFYRMacedonia toSerbia occurred
at high levels. Figure  21belowshows that high
increaseswere recorded in2011and2012.The
numbersdroppedin2013and2014,beforerising






Frontex publishes quarterly reports containing





is thecompletedrop innumberssince thestart
of 2016. By looking at the numbers relating to
detectionsbetweenbordercontrolpointsonthe
Figure 21: Illegal border crossings from FYR 
Macedonia into Serbia, 2011–2017 (Frontex)44
absolute 
number
change to same 
previous period

































2017 – total n.a n.a.
*Forthemarkedperiods,separatepublicationsreportslightlydifferent
numbers.
onehandand those relating todetectionat the
border on the other, it becomes evident that for
aperiodof time in thesecondhalfof2015, the
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Figure 22: Illegal border crossings, FYR 






























The route from Greece via FYR Macedonia into
Serbiahasbeenanestablishedavenueforirregular





on this route at that time.46 The Macedonian
authorities have been criticised, since despite
their awareness of the situation they did little to
stop irregularmigration through the country and












most irregular migrants entering Serbia from
FYRMacedoniadidsowiththeaidofsmugglers,
many crossing the border clandestinely on foot
in remote areas.49 Reports which surfaced in
2015statingthatbothHungaryandSerbiawere
returning refugees and other migrants to FYR
Macedonia, sometimes forcibly, did not deter
othermigrantsfrommovingalongthisroute.50
FromJuly2015onwards,thenumberofpersons
entering Serbia from FYRMacedonia increased
quite dramatically. This increase reflected the
much higher number of arrivals recorded in
Greece a few months earlier, but can also be





The level of irregular migration from FYR Mac-










migrants were apprehended crossing irregularly
from FYR Macedonia to Greece. This was a
significantdecreasecomparedtoapprehensions
inprecedingyears.In2009,791peoplehadbeen
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Figure 23: Illegal border crossings from FYR 
Macedonia to Greece, 2011–2014 (Ministry of 








In 2017, as a result of more intensive border
control efforts along the Western Balkan route,
the number of migrants crossing from FYR
Macedonia to Greece began to increase.55 In 
May2017, thenumberofnon-regionalmigrants
irregularly crossing from FYR Macedonia to




control activities and cooperation in reducing
the attractiveness of the Western Balkan route
for irregular migration,57 the fact that irregular




III.2.4.3 To other countries
Information about irregularmigration from FYR
Macedoniatoothercountriesisextremelylimited.
According to information published by the
MinistryofInternalAffairsofKosovo,285persons
were refused entry at border control points to
























Figure 24: Illegal border crossings into FYR 
Macedonia by nationality, 2012–February 
2015 (Ministry of Internal Affairs of the former 





Afghanistan 65 134 291 118
Albania 328 400 624 34
Algeria 5 27 7 0
Bangladesh 4 26 5 1
Coted’Ivoire 0 36 9 0
Eritrea 4 11 15 0
Mali 0 36 9 0
Pakistan 88 73 21 15
Senegal 1 31 0 0
Serbia 12 12 7 0
Somalia 34 34 42 28




Since then, most irregular migrants have been
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Afghan nationals entering the country illegally,
a shift that followed the increasing numbers of
Syrians and Afghans arriving in Greece several
monthsearlier.63
Frontex noted in 2015 that 60% of irregular
migrantswererecordedasof‘unknownnationality’
byMacedonianauthoritiesbecausetheyhadno
capacity to record, letalonevalidate, thedetails
ofthelargenumberofpersonstransitingthrough
the country at that time.64 It is also noteworthy
that in the 2012–2015 period, nationals from
several South Asian and African countries
enteredFYRMacedoniainnumberstotallingtwo
hundred or more. These nationalities no longer
crossintoFYRMacedoniainsignificantnumbers,
since the country instituted measures on 19
November2015toonlyallowAfghan,Syrian,and
IraqinationalstoenterfromGreece.65According




III.3.1.1 The Middle East
Thelargestnumberofirregularmigrantsarriving
in FYR Macedonia in 2014, 2015, and 2016
came from Syria. Their number started to rise
significantlyin2013.67In2014,severalthousand
Syrians crossed through FYR Macedonia, most
of them continuing across the border to Serbia.
Some 700 to 800 Syrian nationals applied for
asylum in FYR Macedonia, constituting more
than 50% of all asylum applications lodged in
thatyear.68ThenumberofSyrianscrossingFYR




the tenweeks between 19 June and 27August
2015alone.6962%ofallirregulararrivalsrecorded
inthefivemonthsfrom19Juneto19November
2015were Syrian nationals.70 According to IOM,
44,808SyrianarrivedinFYRMacedoniain2016.71
Iraqi nationals were the third largest group
crossingthroughFYRMacedoniainthesummer
of2015.Between19Juneand27August2015,
Macedonian authorities recorded the arrival





throughFYRMacedonia in recentyears, though






Afghan nationals have been the second largest
group of irregular migrants transiting through
FYRMacedoniasince2011.Theirnumberstarted
to rise in2012,dropped in2014,but roseagain
in2015.76Between19Juneand27August2015,
Macedonian authorities recorded the arrival of
2,258 Afghan nationals.77 25.3% of all irregular
arrivalsrecordedintheperiodfrom19June2015
to13January2016wereAfghannationals.78
Pakistanis are another large group of irregular
migrants who have transited through FYR
Macedonia in recent years, and constitute the
fourth largest group of persons applying for
asyluminthecountry.79Between19Juneand27
August 2015, Macedonian authorities recorded
thearrival1,452Pakistaninationals.801.3%ofall




have transited throughFYRMacedonia is small
incomparisontomigrantsfromtheMiddleEast
andSouthAsia.Basedonthelimitedinformation
available, Moroccan and Somali nationals
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III.3.2.3 Other nationalities
A further significant group of irregularmigrants
enteringFYRMacedonia areAlbaniannationals,
who constituted the largest group of irregular
arrivalsupuntil2014.83Frontexreportsthatinthe
firsthalfof2014,detectionsofAlbaniannationals
crossing intoFYRMacedonia illegally increased
by150%inbothquarters.84Albaniansalsomake
uponeofthelargestgroupsofirregularmigrants











of irregular migrants entering FYR Macedonia
which shows that the majority of migrants are
men,mostbetween theagesof18and35,and
travellingwithoutanyfamily.88
It has also been noted that the number of
unaccompanied minors travelling through FYR
Macedonia has increased between 2013 and
2015,albeitstartingfromverysmalllevels.89
III.4 Smugglingofmigrants
While FYRMacedonia has experienced very high
levelsof irregularmigration in the2011–2017pe-
riod, thenumberofdetected incidentsofmigrant
smuggling,criminalisedinArticle 418boftheMac-













1,032migrants were smuggled from Greece into
FYRMacedoniaandontoSerbia.92







though disproportionately lower than the overall
levelof irregularmigration. In2012,Macedonian






















and fourth quarter, only 5–10 smugglers were
detectedperquarter.98
III.4.1 Routes
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glers to assist them in entering FYR Macedo-
nia,transitinginthecityofVelesandthecapital
Skopje, thencrossing intoSerbia.Thedistance
across FYR Macedonia from the Greek to the
Serbian border is only about 150 kilometres,
thus many migrants spend less than a day in






III.4.1.1 Into the country
Many smuggling ventures leading into and
across FYR Macedonia start in Thessaloniki,
Greece’s second largest city, situated some 60
kilometres south of the border. Once in Greece,
many irregular migrants independently make
theirwaytoThessalonikiwheretheyspendsome
timeworking out how to continue their journey.
If freight trains or trucks are used to cross into
FYRMacedoniaundetected,themigrantsusually
board these vehicles in or near Thessaloniki
and then travel on themain roadsand railways
north,crossingtheborderneartheGreektowns





points. Sometimes, migrants will initially try to
cross usingmore direct routes running through
urbanareas,andiftheyarebarredfromcrossing
or pushedbackbyMacedonianauthorities they









either with the assistance of smugglers or
alone,crosstheborderonfoot.Thesecond
route departs from Thessaloniki, where
through the use of public buses migrants
















Several reports show that smuggling activities
acrosstheborderfromGreecetoFYRMacedonia
prospered at the time when Macedonian
authorities prevented irregular migrants from




became stranded in and around Idomeni and
smugglersquicklysawanopportunitytopreyon
themigrants, offering thempassageacross the
border. International organisations and human
rights organisation observed that smugglers
were operating very overtly, and noted that the
risk of abuse, exploitation and trafficking rose
concomittantly with the desperation of the
migrants.102 The European Commission further
noted in this context that ‘the absence of legal
avenuesofentrypushesbotheconomicmigrants,
forced migrants and asylum seekers to use
smugglers’.103
Migrant smuggling also occurs across the
border from Bulgaria, though the level and
patterns of smuggling across this route are not
well documented. Some sources suggest that
smugglingfromBulgariainvolvestrucksinwhich
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III.4.1.2 Through/within the country




migrants did not have to rely on smugglers
at all and their movement was facilitated by
governmentagencies.
Migrantswhouseclandestinesmugglingmethods
such as hiding in the cargo compartments of
trucksorfreighttrainsmerelytransitthroughFYR
Macedoniaanddonotneedtochangesmugglers
or smuggling methods if they hide on vehicles
or carriages travelling all the way from Greece
to Serbia and, perhaps, onwards. Those using
less direct, multi-stop methods generally resort
topublic transportationsuchasbusesor trains,
orusetaxistoget fromtheareaneartheGreek
border to themain cities, especially the capital
Skopje,andthenontotheSerbianborder.A2015
reportnotesthatusingacombinationofwalking
and cars, smuggled migrants on average need
approximatelytwodaystocrossthecountry.105










It has also been reported that some migrants
contact smugglers in FYRMacedonia ahead of




cases, all theway into Serbia.108 At timeswhen
the risk of detection and arrest for irregular
migrantswasrelativelylow,mostmigrantsused
public transportation instead of smugglers, or
else simply walked, following the main roads
and railway lines.109 When numbers of irregular
migrantsgrewin2014–2015,sodidthenumber
of accidents and injuries, as migrants walking
alongroadsandrailwayswerehitbycars,trucks,
ortrains.110
The rapidly-increasing number of irregular
migrants transiting through FYR Macedonia,
along with increasing numbers of accidents
along the country’s roads and railways, and
growing frustration among drivers about roads
being blocked by large groups of migrants, led
the Government of FYRMacedonia to take the
step of legalising and facilitating their passage
through the country.111 On  18 June 2015 an
amendment toMacedonia’s Law on Asylum and 
Temporary Protection came into effect, allowing
irregular migrants to enter the country lawfully
andfileasylumapplicationswiththeMacedonian
authorities within three days. Migrants were
permitted to use public transportation to reach
relevant offices and immigration reception
centres,whichmadeboththeuseofsmugglers
and the long, dangerous walks across the
countryredundant.112Afterfilingtheirapplication,
migrants would then be transferred to open
accommodation centres where, in theory, they
wouldawaittheauthorities’decision.Inpractice,
however, 95% of migrants, often following
instructions received by smugglers, would
abscondfromtheaccommodationandmaketheir
ownwaytotheborderandacrossintoSerbia.113 
As a result, the steps taken by theMacedonian
Government greatly increased the pressure on
the Serbian border, and are seen by some as
oneofthereasonswhyirregularmigrationalong
the Western Balkan route grew so significantly
between June and August 2015.114 The use of
specialbusesandtrainswhichmetthemigrants
at the Greek border to transport them to the
northernpartsofthecountryfurtheraccelerated
the flow of migrants, and subsequently shifted
migration pressure to countries further down
the route, especially Hungary.115 For a short
period, transportation across FYR Macedonia
wascoordinatedwithsimilarinitiativesinSerbia,
resulting in relativelysmoothandfastmigration
processes which greatly reduced the need of
migrants to employ smugglers.116 This situation
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changed once Macedonia moved to restrict
entry to the country for irregular migrants, and
ultimatelycloseditsborderwithGreece.
III.4.1.3 Out of the country
For the great majority of irregular migrants,
including smuggledmigrants, Serbia is the next




andLojane in theLipkovomunicipality, southof
thebordertoSerbiaandeastofthemainhighway
andrailwaylineconnectingthetwocountries, is
an important transit point formigrants seeking
tocrosstheborder.Heretheyencounterarange
ofsmugglerswhooffertotakethemacrossthe
border by car or guide them to and across the
border on foot through remote areas, usually in
groups of 30 to 40 migrants. Many crossings
on foot are done at night to avoid detection
by border guards. Some migrants reportedly
became stranded in Lojane and paid locals for
accommodation or camped in nearby forests
until they had the funds or the opportunity to
crossintoSerbia.117Ithasalsobeenreportedthat
migrantsmayreceivemapsfromtheirsmuggler
or that smugglers use plastic bags hanging on




border. When the number of irregular migrants




caused other migrants to resort to smugglers
insteadofcrossingtheborderindependently.119
The patterns and levels of migrant-smuggling
from FYR Macedonia into Kosovo are not well
documented. This route, as mentioned, serves
as an alternative means of reaching Serbia, or
continuing to Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
andCroatia.120
III.4.2 Methods
III.4.2.1 Smuggling by land
Thesmugglingofmigrantsinto,across,andoutof
FYRMacedoniaisdoneexclusivelybyland,using




border on foot.121 The smugglingmethods, and
thus the time needed to cross FYRMacedonia,
frequently depend on the funds available to the
migrants:iftheycanaffordit,theymayusetaxis
arranged independentlyorbysmugglers; if they
are less well resourced, they are more likely to
have towalkacross theborderand through the
country.122
Smuggling involving private cars sometimes
entails little or no concealment of themigrants.
Somesmugglersmerelyserveasdriverstotake
themigrants from one point to another, across
the border or within FYR Macedonia. It is not
uncommon formigrants to use taxis or for taxi
drivers to offer their services and, wittingly or




Regional bus services may also be used by
migrants to travel from Greece’s main cities to
the border region and, as previouslymentioned,
theMacedonianauthoritiesdidforatimeprovide
busesandtrainstotransportmigrantsfromthe
border with Greece to immigration reception
centres.124
The smuggling of migrants in private vehicles
suchasvansandtrucksmorecommonlyinvolves
clandestine methods in which migrants are
hiddenbehindseats, inseparatecompartments,
or amongcargo. Frontex reports that instances
in which migrants are hidden in vehicles when
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andfreighttrainshasalsobeenobservedacross
the border from Greece into FYR Macedonia.
Migrants may be concealed on freight trains




of smugglers, are a commonoccurrence at the
borderbetweenGreeceandFYRMacedoniaand
between FYR Macedonia and Serbia.128 Many
migrants also walk for long distances across
the country, some to evade detection by the
authorities, some because they have no funds
to pay for transportation or smugglers. Maps
andmobile phones are often used bymigrants
to navigate; in some cases smugglers furnish
migrantswithsuchequipment,ortheymayguide
themigrantstooracrosstheborder.129Migrants
may also be given instructions to destroy their
documentsaftercrossing theborder inorder to
avoididentificationandreturn.130
It isnotuncommonformigrants to followmain
roadsandrailwaylinestomaketheirwayacross
FYR Macedonia, which has resulted in a large
numberofaccidentsanddeathswhenmigrants
werehitbytrainsorroadtraffic.131Thelongwalks
through remote areas and mountainous terrain
also entail dangers, and some migrants have
drownedwhiletryingtocrossrivers.Othershave
beenrobbedorattackedbylocalgangs.132
III.4.2.2 Smuggling by air
Information about the smuggling of migrants
by air through FYRMacedonia is, for the most
part, non-existent. The available information is
presently limited to several reports by Europol
detailingcircuitoussmugglingventuresinvolving
Chinese nationals seeking to reach Western
Europe. In one instance, Chinesemigrants flew
toBelgrade,Serbia,thentravelledintheopposite
directionviaFYRMacedonia,withGreeceasthe
intendeddestinationor transit point en route to
otherEUdestinations.133Othervariationsof this
route involve, forexample, asmugglingnetwork
that brought Chinese nationals to Kosovo and
FYRMacedonia, then flew them fromSkopje to
destinationsinFranceandSwitzerland.134
















pretending theywere refugees fromoneof these
three countries.137 It has also been reported that






of smugglers operating in FYR Macedonia and
across Macedonia’s borders is limited. A 2016
publicationnotedthataccording toMacedonian
media outlets, most persons engaged in the
smuggling of migrants (along with other cross-
bordercrime)aremaleforeignnationals.139
As in other places along the Balkan route, it
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–Smugglers of foreign origin (Pakistani of
Afghan), involvedwith organised criminal
groupsfromothercountries(usuallyfrom
Turkey orGreece). They act as leaders of
smuggling operations within the country,
staying illegally in the former Yugoslav
RepublicofMacedonia.Theyare involved
inthesmugglingoperationseitherbecause






whooperate from inside the country and
are exclusively involved in the facilitation
of the smuggling processes, providing




onceorseveral times inorder toconduct
the smuggling operation and then leave
thecountry.140
Afghan,Bangladeshi,andPakistaninationals,for
instance, occasionally work as organisers who
assist irregular migrants from South Asia (and
Syrians assist fellow Syrian nationals) to enter
andcrossFYRMacedonia.Sometimestheyalso
actasguides,andleadgroupsofmigrantsfrom
FYR Macedonia into Serbia. Smugglers of this
type were usually themselves once smuggled
migrants who became stranded in transit
countriesand/orsawanopportunitytousetheir
knowledge to facilitate illegal border crossings




other EU countries such as Bulgaria, Germany,





Macedonian and Serbian nationals sometimes
adopttheroleofsmugglersiftheyassistmigrants
with local transportation, use their private
vehiclestobringmigrantstooracrosstheborder,
orofferaccommodation to irregularmigrants. It
hasbeenreportedthatmanyMacedoniansassist
irregular migrants out of compassion and for
humanitarianreasons,providingthemwithfood,
accommodation, and other necessities, often
without asking for compensation. Some locals
also provide their banking details so migrants
canreceivemoneytransfersfromtheirremaining
relatives and friends in their countries of origin.
There are, however, others who prey on the
vulnerabilityanddesperationofmigrants,charge
excessivepricesandexploitmigrants.Somelocal
smugglers operate independently if and when
they see a demand or opportunity, while others
maintaincontactwithasmugglingnetworkand
become involved in smuggling-related activities
onanongoingbasis.143
III.4.3.2 Organisations and networks
There is some disagreement between sources
about the extent to which smugglers operating
inFYRMacedoniaarenetworkedandorganised,
with some sources referring to hierarchical,
mafia-esquecriminalorganisations,whileothers
suggest that these structures are much more
























ings and belongings or extortmoney from their
familiesandfriends.147
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migrate irregularly to other countries, especially
Greece. Based on the available information and
data,Albaniaappearstoexperiencesomeirregular
transitmigrationofnon-regionalmigrants,albeit
at moderate levels. Irregular migration of non-
regionalmigrants throughAlbania is a relatively
new phenomenon. Previously, illegal border






is positioned in a strategic location, offering an
exitpoint for irregularmigrantsseekingto leave
Greece,especiallyattimeswhenbordercrossings
fromGreecetoFYRMacedoniaandBulgariaare





Limiting Albania’s attractiveness for irregular
migration and smuggling of migrants is the
fact that Albania continues to lag behind most
its neighbours in economic development, and
Albania’s infrastructure is fragmented and
frequently in poor condition. Access to Albania,
especially from Greece, is limited to a small
numberofmainroads.Thebordergoesthrough
mountainous terrain in many areas, making
it difficult to cross, especially during winter.
Furthermore, the irregular migration route from
GreeceintoAlbaniaandontoMontenegro,Croatia
orother transitcountries (often referred toasa
‘subroute’intheWesternBalkans)2involvesmore
bordercrossingsofnon-EUstates,addingtothe
time and expenses associated with this route.
Greater border surveillance, as well as policy
announcements by the Albanian Government
thatthecountrydoesnotwelcometheentryand




IV.2.1.1 Numbers relating to illegal entry 








between 2009 and 2013. The data shows a




in 2013. The rise of illegal entries into Albania




Figure 25: Illegal entries (apprehended upon 
entry, in country, or upon exit), Albania, 2009–
2013 (IOM)6






The large number of irregular migrants who
travelled from Greece to FYR Macedonia and
Bulgaria (and onwards) in 2015 caused some
fear that Albania would experience a large
influx of irregular migrants, especially once
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ANDREAS SCHLOENHARDT  |  IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS ALONG THE BALKAN ROUTE 
FYR Macedonia adopted measures to reduces
the flow of migrants from Greece. In October
2015, the Albanian Government presented a
‘Contingency Plan for Possible Mass Influx of
Migrants and Asylum Seekers at the Albanian
Border’whichsetupasystemtochannel,manage,
and accommodate migrants in large numbers,
should a ‘crisis situation’ arise. The expected
shiftofirregularflowstoAlbania,however,never
materialised, and a scaled-down version of the
planreplacedtheoriginalinMarch2016.7
IOMpublishesmonthlydata for irregularentries
to Albania.8 These figures, shown in Figure  26




border crossings into Albania, especially from
Greece,reportedbyFrontexforthesameperiod.9















Total year 831 752




to be entering the country illegally. Information
on this point is limited to one 2014 report by
IOMwhich‘mapsmajormigrationflows’through
Western Balkan countries. According to this
data,displayedinFigure 27below,thenumberof
‘foreignersfoundtobepresentillegallyinAlbania’
increased from just 96 in 2009 to 444 in 2011,
and923in2013.Thenumbersfor2013arehigh
comparedtootherneighbouringcountries.11
Figure 27: Foreigners found to be illegally 
present, Albania, 2009–2013 (IOM)12










across the border from neighbouring Greece.
Nearlyalltheavailablesourcesexclusivelycontain
information concerning illegal immigration
across thisborder.Thisborder, as laterpartsof
thisChaptershow,alsoexperiencesconsiderable
levels of irregular emigration from Albania to
Greece. Much of the irregular migration across
thisborderissaidtoinvolvecircularmovements
byAlbaniannationals.13 
The number of irregular arrivals in Albania from
Greeceisnotavailableforallyears,thoughfigures
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Figure 28: Illegal border crossings, Albania–Greece, 2011–2017 (Frontex)14
Illegal border crossings 
from Greece to Albania
Illegal border crossings 





2011 – total n.a. n.a. 6,472 –88%
2012–1stquarter n.a. n.a. 1,475 –11%
2012–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. 2,050 +39%
2012–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 – total 810 146% 5,502 +4%
2013–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. 3,013 +72%
2013–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–4thquarter n.a. n.a. 2,933 n.a.
2013 – total n.a. n.a. 8,728 +59%
2014–1stquarter n.a. n.a. 1,540 n.a.
2014–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. 2,572 n.a.
2014–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. 2,620 n.a.
2014–4thquarter n.a. n.a. 4,666 n.a.
2014 – total 1,596 91% 11,398
8,841*
+1%
2015–1stquarter 350 +132% 2,890 n.a.
2015–2ndquarter 757 +323% 3,959 n.a.
2015–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. 2,506 n.a.
2015–4thquarter n.a. n.a. 2,960 –37%
2015 – total n.a. 8% 12,315 
8,932*
+8%
2016–1stquarter n.a. n.a. 1,914 41%
2016–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. 2,209 51%
2016–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. 1,407 –55%
2016–4thquarter n.a. n.a. 1,603 –49%
2016 – total n.a. n.a. 7,166
5,121*
–42%
2017–1stquarter n.a. n.a. 1,939 +23%
2017–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. 1,867 n.a.
2017–3rdquarter n.a. +583% 1,924 +37%
2017–4thquarter n.a. +83% 2,424 +51%
2017 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
*Forthemarkedperiods,separatepublicationsreportslightlydifferentnumbers.
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Thesharp increase in2012hasbeenattributed
mostlytoAlbaniannationalsreturningtoGreece,
though larger numbers of Pakistanis, Syrians,
and Eritreans were also detected during that
year.16 There is some information suggesting
thatAlbaniawas,atthattime,usedasatransit
point for irregular migrants from North Africa
seeking to reach the European Union.17 The 
higher number of irregular migrants arriving
in Greece in 2014,many of themSyrians, also
had the effect that more irregular migrants
were trying to travel from Greece to Albania,
causinganincreaseindetectionofillegalborder
crossingsinthatyear.18
In 2015, irregular migration of third country
nationals from Greece to Albania initially
decreased when migrants faced few obstacles
travelling on the more direct route via FYR
Macedonia.19Whilethevastmajorityofmigrants
optedtotaketheroutethroughFYRMacedonia,
the large increase in the volume of migrants
departingGreece in the first half of 2015 led to
amodest increase in illegalborderdetectionsat
theborderwithAlbaniainthefirsthalfof2015.20 





of 2016, Frontex reported that more migrants
were crossing fromGreece to Albania, trying to
bypasstherouteviaFYRMacedonia.21According






In thecontextof irregularmigration throughthe
region,Albaniaisprimarilyatransitpointfornon-




Albania in the 2011–2017 period resulted in a
highervolumeofasylumapplicationssubmitted
inthecountry.Whereasin2009onlythreepeople
applied for asylum inAlbania, thatnumber rose
to 16 in 2012, and increased further in 2013.25 
AftertheclosingoftheMacedonian-Greekborder,
asylum applications jumped to over 1,000.26 In 
manyinstances,migrantswhoapplyforasylum
in Albania leave before their application has
beenorcanbeproperlyprocessed.27Thepoorly-




IV.2.4.1 To Greece 




countries thus experiences irregular migration
flows in both directions, which is commonly
referredtointheliteratureas‘circularmigration.’
Albanian nationals crossing to Greece generally
dosointhecontextoflabourmigration,asmany









rants entering Greece illegally from Albania
exceeds1,000 inmostquarters in the reporting
period.Thisnumber isgenerallyhigher thanthe
numberofirregularmigrantsarrivingfromGreece
across this border (see Figure  28 above). The
highest total number in the 2011–2017 period
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Figure 29: Illegal border crossings from Albania 






in the previous 
year)


































2017 – total n.a. n.a.
*Forthemarkedperiods,separatepublicationsreportslightlydifferent
numbers.
Prior to the period shown in Figure  29 above,
thelevelof irregularmigrationfromAlbaniawas
considerably higher, as Albanians did not have
visa-free entry for short visits to the EU at that
time. In 2010 alone, some 12,000 illegal border
crossingswererecordedbyFrontex.Withthevisa
liberalisationwhichcameintoeffectinDecember
2010, the number of illegal crossing dropped
markedlyinthenextquarter.32Accordingtodata
collectedbyGreekauthoritiesandpublishedbythe
European Commission in 2015, ‘apprehensions
for illegal entry and stay’ at the Albanian-Greek
borderdroppedfrom38,164in2009to33,979in
2010andtojust11,743in2011.33
Although theoverall numberof illegal crossings
dropped significantly, and despite the changes
to visa requirements, considerable numbers
of Albanian nationals continued to cross into
Greece illegally. In the following years, Frontex
reported that many Albanians were travelling
with counterfeit documents, especially forged
stamps used to fabricate travel histories and




‘apprehensions for illegal entry and stay’ at the
Albanian-Greek border in 2012, 10,413 in 2013,
and9,290in2014.36
Inearly2015,Frontexnotedadropinthenumber
of Albanian migrants seeking to enter Greece
and in the number of those refused entry at
the shared border. At that time it was believed
that fewer migrants were seeking employment
in Greece and that they were instead turning
to other EUmember states where an increase
of Albanian migrants travelling with fraudulent
documents had been recorded.37 The drop of 
illegal border crossings fromAlbania toGreece
was, however, only small, as more than 2,000
irregular migrants crossed into Greece each
quarterin2015.Atthattime,Albaniannationals
were the largest group of regional migrants
crossingEUbordersillegally.Reportsthatmany
ofthemweretravellingonfraudulentdocuments
continuedat that time.38 In2016and into2017,
fewer migrants were detected crossing from
76
  
ANDREAS SCHLOENHARDT  |  IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS ALONG THE BALKAN ROUTE 
AlbaniaintoGreece,averagingabout1,300each
quarter.39Thesourcespresentlyavailabledonot
contain any explanation for this development,
whichmay only reflect a temporary drop since
highernumberswere reportedagain in thefirst
halfof2017.40
IV.2.4.2 Departures to other countries
As previouslymentioned, for most non-regional
migrants Albania is largely a transit country en
route toWestern Europe. Irregularmigration by
non-Albaniannationalsismostlynorthbound,with
migrantsdepartingAlbaniaforMontenegro,FYR






For non-regional migrants, Montenegro seems
tobethelogicalnexttransitpointenroutetoEU
member states. Once in Montenegro, they can
cross intoCroatiaand followtheCroatiancoast
to reach Slovenia and Austria, travel via Serbia
toHungary,orusealternativeroutes.41 The data 
regarding illegal border crossings from Albania
intoMontenegro,showninFigure 30above,isnot
available formany reporting periods. It appears
that several hundredmigrants cross this border
illegally each year, though it is not possible to
identify any trends or periodic developments.






The level of irregularmigration from Albania to
FYR Macedonia appears to be broadly at the




border crossings to FYR Macedonia involve a




border crossings to FYRMacedonia in the first
half of 2012, for instance, has been attributed
to seasonal workers from Albania travelling to
Greece via FYRMacedonia instead of going to
Greece directly.42 Similarly, decreases of border
crossings from Albania to FYR Macedonia
recordedin2014(notshowninFigure 30above)
have been explained by easier direct access to
Greece.43
To Kosovo
Information and data about irregular migration
from Albania to Kosovo is very limited. Most
illegalbordercrossingsappeartoinvolveAlbanian
nationalsratherthannon-regionalmigrants.The
data shown in Figure  30 above suggests that
thelevelofirregularmigrationacrossthisborder
is very low, though very high increases were






fromAlbania to Italyhavebeensurfacing fora
long time. The distance between the coasts of
the two countries is less than 100 kilometres
in some places. Based on the limited number
of reports it appears that both regular ferry
servicesand, inparticular, privatevesselshave
been used by irregular migrants to leave from
AlbaniaforItaly.44In2016,followingtheclosure
of many borders along the main Balkan route,
itwas anticipated that smuggling fromGreece
via Albania to Italy would emerge as a likely
alternative.45Dataandfurtherinformationabout
developments along this route were, however,
notavailableatthetimeofwriting,andthereare
no specific indicators suggesting that irregular
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Figure 30: Illegal border crossings from Albania, 2011–2017 (Frontex)46
Illegal border crossings 
from 
Albania to Montenegro
Illegal border crossings 
from 
Albania to FYROM


















2011 – total 180 +260% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–1stquarter 104 +478% 28 –48% n.a. n.a.
2012–2ndquarter 165 +313% 77 +88% n.a. n.a.
2012–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 – total 387 +115% 253 +32% n.a. n.a.
2013–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 – total 235 +37% 246 +9% 104 n .a .





46 –34% 15 –38%
2015–3rdquarter 7 –22% 31 –48% n.a. n.a.
2015–4thquarter n.a. n.a. 43 –48% 21 –5%
2015 – total n.a. –22% n.a. –35% n.a. –37%
2016–1stquarter n.a. –76% n.a. +38% n.a. +133%
2016–2ndquarter n.a. –83% n.a. –24% n.a. –47%
2016–3rdquarter n.a. +471% n.a. 0% n.a. +1,886%
2016–4thquarter n.a. +47% n.a. +12% n.a. +462%
2016 – total n.a. –49% n.a. +35% n.a. +454%
2017–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–3rdquarter n.a. +710% n.a. –47% n.a. –83%
2017–4thquarter n.a. –35% n.a. +67% n.a. +113%
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IV.3 Profileofirregularmigrants
Information about the nationalities and profiles
of irregular migrants moving across Albania’s
internationalbordersisverylimited.Asmentioned
earlier, many illegal border crossings involve




irregular migrants entering or seeking to enter
Albaniawerenationalsofneighbouringcountries,
orofcountriesinsomeproximityorwithspecific
tiestoAlbania. IOM,for instance, reportsthat in
2013 the ‘threemain groupsof citizens refused
entry’toAlbaniacamefromTurkey,Kosovo,and
Russia.47
Since the early 2010s, non-regional migrants
fromcountriesoforiginintheMiddleEast,South
Asia, and Africa have moved through Albania,
usually by entering the country from Greece.48 
Since about 2010, international organisations
have been reporting on Syrian, Afghan and
Pakistani nationals crossing through Albania to
reach Western Europe. The route from Greece
into Albania and on toMontenegro and Croatia
emergedasanalternative—albeitmoregruelling—
route to the more common route from Greece
viaFYRMacedoniaandSerbiaor viaBulgaria.49 
Because the route viaAlbania is less frequently
used, and often runs throughmountainous and
remoteareas,migrantsmayalsohopethatthese
circumstances may make it easier to evade
detection, arrest, and return. Since 2012 there
have also been reports of Algerians crossing
illegally from Greece into Albania. At that time
Frontexfearedthatthissignalledatrendtowards
increasingnationaldiversificationonthisroute.50 
A 2016 publication citing Albanian government
sourcesreportsthatin2015,1,534Syrianswere
detectingcrossingAlbanianbordersillegally.The
second largest group that year were Eritreans
(171) followed by Somalis (118).51 IOM has
published data on the nationalities of irregular
migrants apprehended on entry into Albania for
the years 2016 and 2017. This data, shown in
Figure 31below,confirmsthatSyriansconstitute
the largestgroupof irregularmigrants.Afghans
and Iraqis were the second and third largest
groups in 2016, but their numbers dropped
significantly in the following year. Instead, the
number of Algerianmigrants grew considerably
from2016to2017.
Figure 31: Top nationalities of irregular migrants 










The number of refugees and migrants applying
forasyluminAlbaniaisquitelow,butasFigure 32 
below demonstrates, it grew considerably be-
tween 2013 and 2016. This is due in particular
to the increasing number of Iranian nationals
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Figure 32: Refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR, Albania 2011–2016, top nationalities53
Afghanistan Iran Iraq Pakistan Syria
2011 – total n.a. n.a. 5 n.a. n.a.
- refugees n.a. n.a. 5 n.a. n.a.
- asylum-seekers n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. n.a.
2012 – total n.a. n.a. 5 n.a. 3
- refugees n.a. n.a. 5 n.a. n.a.
- asylum-seekers n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3
2013 – total n.a. 196 5 n.a. 15
- refugees n.a. n.a. 5 n.a. n.a.
- asylum-seekers n.a. 196 n.a. n.a. 15
2014 – total n.a. 456 3 n.a. 11
- refugees n.a. 0 3 n.a. 3
- asylum-seekers n.a. 456 0 n.a. 8
2015 – total n.a. 822 3 n.a. 3
- refugees n.a. 9 0 n.a. 3
- asylum-seekers n.a. 813 0 n.a. 0
2016 – total n.a. 2,762 23 n.a. n.a.
- refugees n.a. 17 23 n.a. n.a.
- asylum-seekers n.a. 2,745 0 n.a. 0
IV.4 Thesmugglingofmigrants
IV.4.1 Routes
Albania serves as a transit country for the
smuggling of migrants through the Western
Balkans or by boat to Italy. The sea route is
believedtobemoreexpensiveandriskier,andas
aresultisusedlessfrequently.
Smuggling fromGreece into Albania ismostly
doneby land,oftenusing roadsandpathways
that run through rural and remote areas, away
from official border control points. A report
published by Frontex in 2015 implies that the
scaleofsmugglingofmigrantsthroughAlbania
is mostly determined by the level of border
controls along theborder toGreece.54 The city
of Ioannina in north-western Greece, some 50
kilometres south of the Albanian border, has
beenreferredtoasa‘hub’formigrantsseeking
to find smugglers to take them along the
land route to Albania.55 Most of the migrants
smuggledfromGreecetoAlbaniain2015were
Syrian nationals; Afghans are believed to use
thisroutelessfrequently.56




a route that is less popular than others as it
leadsthroughmountainousterrainandcountries
with less developed infrastructure and roads
that involve significant detours. A 2016 report,
for instance, notes that migrants crossing into
Albania fromGreece throughor near the border
controlpointeastofKorçë (inAlbania’seast)or
Kakavia(inthesoutheast)havetowalkorpaya
taxi fare for at least 31 kilometres to reach the
closest point with meaningful public transport.
Furthermore,Albaniahasnointernationalrailway
connectionsandnationaltransportnetworksare
very fragmented,making it difficult to cross the
country.57Thiscanaddtothetimethatisneeded
to reach the desired destination. Furthermore,
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canaddtodelaysandcosts.Thefactthatnone
ofAlbania’snorthernneighboursareEUmember






Information about the smuggling of migrants
fromAlbaniabysea to Italy isquitescarce,and
it is difficult to gauge the level of smuggling
activitiesfromAlbaniaacrosstheAdriatic.Given
that at the narrowest point the two countries
are only separated by some 80 kilometres, one
might expect—or at least speculate—that small
vessels are used to smuggle migrants from
Albania to Italy,aphenomenonwhichwasquite
common in the1990s.Thereareonlyscattered
reports to substantiate such claims, and some
of the available sources reporting on migrant
smugglingactivitiesfromAlbaniatoItalyareout
ofdate.60Amongthefewmorerecentandreliable
sources is a 2015 publication by the European
Commission,statingthat‘theroutefromAlbania
to Italy, suppressed years ago, has recently
been reactivated by involving Italian smugglers






to use their own cars or public transportation
such as buses to make this journey. They
frequentlycarryfraudulentdocuments,especially
counterfeit border stamps, to falsify their travel
historyandthedatetheylastcrossedtheborder.62 
Several reports point to the smuggling of
Albanian nationals by air. Detections at airports
in EU member states, especially in Italy, the
UK and Ireland, involved instances in which
Albanian nationals used fraudulent Greek and
Italian travel and identity documents.63 The fact 
thatmanyAlbaniansspeakGreekand/or Italian
makesiteasierforthemtoposeasnationalsof
these countries and thus gain visa-free access
to Schengen countries.64 Throughout the 2011–
2017 period, Albanian nationals consistently





countries, constituting 16% of all detections
in that year.66 Albanian nationals also feature
very prominently among refusals at airports
for failing to hold valid visas or other required
documentation.67 
Figure 33below,althoughnotdirectly related to
the smuggling of migrants, shows the number





Albania from Greece using bus lines, though
the use of covert methods appears be more
common. In some instances, unknown to the
driver, smuggled migrants hide in the cargo
compartments of trucks crossing the border.68 
In most cases, smugglers guide or direct the
migrants to and across the border on foot and
provide themigrantswith informationonwhere







The limited information concerning smuggling
by boat from Albania suggests that smaller,
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Figure 33: Illegal border crossings, Albania–all Schengen associated countries, 2011–September 2017 
(Frontex)72

























2011 – total 15,947 +586% 8,978 +611% 3,302 +429% 3,667 +739%
2012–1stquarter 2,261 –54% 1,192 –59% 617 –25% 452 –64%
2012–2ndquarter 3,737 –17% 2,587 –15% 638 –13% 512 –29%
2012–3rdquarter 2,872 –19% 1,718 –8,8% 582 –27% 572 –34%
2012–4thquarter 3,207 +8,8% 1,915 +65% 853 –9,6% 439 –48%




+11% 2,689 +6,1% 1,969 +30%
2013–1stquarter 2,789 +23% 1,576 +32% 724 +17% 489 +6,4%
2013–2ndquarter 2,695 –28% 1,474 –43% 747 +17% 474 –8,8%
2013–3rdquarter 3,225 +14% 1,919 +14% 735 +27% 571 –0,3%
2013–4thquarter 2,855 –11% 1,535 –20% 953 +12% 367 –16%
2013 – total 11,564 –4,1% 6,504 –12% 3,159 +17% 1,901 –4,6%
2014–1stquarter 2,977 +4,9% 1,443 –12% 1,011 +40% 523 +7%
2014–2ndquarter 3,342 +24% 1,883 +28% 923 +23% 537 +13%
2014–3rdquarter 3,028 –6.1% 1,782 –7,1% 710 –3,4% 536 –6,1%
2014–4thquarter 3,650 +28% 1,897 +24% 1,115 +17% 638 +74%
2014 – total 13,001
12,099*
+12% 7,005 +7,7% 3,760 +19% 2,234 +18%
2015–1stquarter 3,326 +12% 1,539 +6,7% 1,075 +9,8% 616 +29%
2015–2ndquarter 3,705 +9,1% 1,903 +1,1% 1,172 +21% 630 +17%
2015–3rdquarter 3,915 +29% 2,069 +16% 1,247 +75% 603 *12%
2015–4thquarter 4,171 +14% 2,382 +26% 1,107 –0,7% 682 +6,9%
2015 – total 15,025 +16% 7,893 +13% 4,602 +22% 2,531 +13%
2016–1stquarter 3,585 +12% 1,701 +11% 1,152 +8,2% 732 +22%
2016–2ndquarter 4,715 +28% 2,871 +51% 1,050 –10% 794 +28%
2016–3rdquarter 4,841 +23% 3,078 +49% 937 –27% 826 +37%
2016–4thquarter 6,410 +54% 2,879 +21% 2,126 +92% 1,405 +106%
2016 – total
2017–1stquarter 7,899 +119% 3,999 +135% 2,195 +88% 1,705 +133%
2017–2ndquarter 9,007 +91% 5,400 +88% 2,087 +99% 1,520 +91%
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IV.4.3 Informationaboutsmugglersand
networks
Individuals and networks involved in the smug-
gling ofmigrants in Albania fall into two broad
categories: thosewhosmuggleAlbaniannation-
alsandfurnishthemwithfraudulentdocuments
inorder to reachEUmemberstates, and those
who operate locally and engage in smuggling
non-regional migrants across one of Albania’s
landbordersoracrosstheAdriatictoItaly.
Theprovisionanduseoffraudulentdocumentsby
Albaniannationals is frequently associatedwith
smuggling by air,whichmakes it amore costly




isations.74 InJune2014, for instance,Britishau-
thoritiesdismantledanetworkthathadfurnished
hundreds of Albanian nationals with fraudulent
documentsandsmuggledthemonflightsviaIs-
tanbulandRometotheUK.Themigrantshadto
pay between €6,000 and €10,000 and generally
usedidentitycardswithsubstitutedphotos.75
Smuggling foreign nationals across Albania’s
bordersfrequentlyrequiresverylittlesophistica-
tion.Itisoftendonebylocalindividualsorsmall
groups with local knowledge who either guide





to Italy tends to involve a slightly higher degree
ofcoordinationandplanning. Ithasbeenreport-
edthatwhenthe flowof irregularmigrantswas
at its peak in 2015, organised networks set up
to recruitmigrants incamps in Idomeni,Greece,
wouldtakethemtoAlbaniaand,avoidingtheAl-
banianandItaliancoastguards,smugglethemby




smuggling ventures are so complex and cost-
ly that they are unattractive for smugglers and
smuggledmigrantsalike.76
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travelling from Turkey across the Balkans to
WesternEurope.While the country only shares
a relatively short land border with Turkey, it is
situated along a direct line—and along main
roads and train services—between Istanbul,
Belgrade,andWesternEurope.Accordingly,most
irregular migration flows cross Bulgaria in an
east-westdirection,enteringthecountryacross
thelandborderfromTurkeyandleavingoverthe
border to Serbia. During periodswhen irregular
migrationfromGreecetoFYRMacedoniaisnot
feasible or involves great obstacles, irregular
migrants in Greece often divert via Bulgaria to
Serbia. In some instances irregular migrants
cross from Bulgaria into Romania and then
continuetoHungary.
At the start of the 2011–2017 period, the level
of irregular migration from Turkey to Bulgaria
wasrelatively low,asmigrantscouldcrossfrom
TurkeytoGreecewithrelativeease.Thebuilding
of a border fence along the Greek—Turkish
border, along with other measures designed to
stoptheflowofmigrantsacrosstheAegeanSea,
has meant that more irregular migrants—and
moremigrantsmugglers—trytoentertheEUby
crossing intoBulgaria.Asa resultof thegreater
number of people entering Bulgaria, and due to
themeasures adoptedby other countries along




Bulgaria is one of the poorest nations in the
EuropeanUnion(EU)andhas,attimes,struggled
tocontrolorstoptheinfluxofirregularmigrants
from Turkey. Bulgaria’s capacity to control its
borders effectively, manage immigration and
processasylumapplicationsefficientlyislimited
incomparisontomanyotherEUmemberstates.
Bulgarian politics, nationalist rhetoric and
corruption also frequently stand in the way of
measures that could reduce irregularmigration,




V.2.1.1 Numbers relating to illegal entry 
ThelevelsofirregularmigrationthroughBulgaria
appear to be mostly determined by the ability
or inability ofmigrants tomove from Turkey to
GreeceandfromGreecetotheFormerYugoslav
Republic (FYR) of Macedonia. The route via








smaller numbers, fromGreece. Figure  34 below
shows the number of non-EU citizens refused
entryatBulgaria’sborder.In2016morethanthree-



















Organization forMigration (IOM) showa signifi-
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Figure 34: Non-EU citizens refused entry, Bulgaria 2011–2017 (Eurostat)4
Total land border air border sea border
number % number % number %
2011 2,810 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 3,070 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 2,550 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 2,315 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015 2,405 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016 2,170 1,655 76.3% 470 21.7% 45 2.1%
cant fluctuation between individual months for
theyears2015and2016(Figure 35below).The
numberofirregulararrivalswasparticularlyhigh




Figure 35: Migrant arrivals Bulgaria, 2015–2017 
(IOM)5
2015 2016 2017
January 504 596 48
February 502 450 50
March 568 524 158
April 1,090 1,201 347
May 782 782 209
June 1,508 1,436 158
July n.a. 1,236 330
Aug n.a. 4,022 311
Sep 7,706 2,645 354
Oct n.a. 2,133 190
Nov 21,602 1,129 161
Dec 1,866 487 n.a.
year total 31,174 15,962 2,562
V.2.1.2 Numbers relating to persons staying in the 
country illegally
Bulgaria has witnessed a significant increase
in thenumberof foreigners found tobestaying
in the country illegally. As shown in Figure  36
below, from 2011 to 2015 the number of ‘third
country nationals found to be illegally present
in Bulgaria’ rose from just 1,355 to 20,810. The
highestincreasewasrecordedintheyears2014
and2015,whichhasbeenattributedtothesharp
rise in the number of Syrian nationals entering
BulgariafromTurkey.6
Figure 36: Third country nationals found to be 









Most irregular migrants enter Bulgaria from Tur-
key, and in lowernumbers fromGreece.Thepat-
ternsandlevelsofirregularentryintoBulgariavery
much depend on themeasures adopted to stop
irregular flows from Turkey to Greece: If border
crossingsfromTurkeytoGreecebecomemoredif-
ficult,migrantswillattempt to travel fromTurkey
toBulgariainlargernumbers.Ifmeasurestostop
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V.2.2.1 From Turkey
Priorto2012,illegalbordercrossingsfromTurkey
to Bulgaria occurred on a relatively small scale.
In 2010, for instance, 1,036 illegal crossings
were recorded along that border, some 61% of
all detections recorded in Bulgaria that year.9 
In 2012, a significant increase in the number of
illegal crossings from Turkey was noted, which
has been attributed to the strengthening of
bordercontrolsattheGreco-Turkishlandborder.10 
The displacement of irregular migration to the




the land border (and the EvrosRiver) toGreece
on 6 August 2012. At the same time, Bulgarian
authoritiessteppedupmeasures tomonitor the
Turkish border and apprehend those crossing
it illegally,which furthercontributed toagreater
numberofpersonsbeingdetected.11
During 2013, illegal border crossings from
Turkey to Bulgaria continued to rise. While the
displacement to theTurkey-Bulgaria landborder
wasrathermodestinthefirst12monthsfollowing
theadoptionofOperationAspida,thenumberof




While irregular migration appears to occur all
along the 240  kilometre long border separating
thetwocountries,mostmigrantsseemtotravel




effect of Operation Aspida was a displacement




Borders Fund, Bulgaria introduced additional
measurestostopandapprehendpersonsseeking
tocrosstheborderclandestinely.Newtechnology







said tohaveoccurredat theeasternpartof the
Turkey-Bulgariaborder,whichwasnotcoveredby




lost relative significance compared to irregular
migration from Turkey to Greece. Nevertheless,






independently. Instead, migrants had to hide in
vehiclestakingthemacrossclandestinely.19Later
that year, the percentage of irregular migrants
travelling from Turkey to Bulgaria decreased
further, as more attractive options opened up











The decrease in the number of illegal crossings
over the land route continued in 2017, though
a new, albeit small trend emergedwith irregular
movements from Turkey to Bulgaria (and also
Romania) by boat across the Black Sea. This
methodwasused in201422butsinceseems to
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Figure 37: Illegal border crossings into Bulgaria, 2010–201724
Illegal border crossings 
from 
Turkey into Bulgaria
Illegal border crossings 
from 
Greece into Bulgaria
Illegal border crossings 




















2010 – total 1,036 n.a. 419 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 – total 1,700 +206% n.a. n.a. 10 –41%
2013–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 – total 4,028 –64% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015–1stquarter 956 +148% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015–2ndquarter 1,454 +64% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015–3rdquarter 3,028 +88% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015–4thquarter 1,754 +54% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–1stquarter n.a. –6% n.a. n.a. n.a. 100%
2016–2ndquarter n.a. –35% n.a. n.a. n.a. –74%
2016–3rdquarter n.a. –69% n.a. n.a. n.a. –50%
2016–4thquarter n.a. –78% n.a. n.a. n.a. 0%
2016 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–1stquarter n.a. –46% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–2ndquarter n.a. –50% n.a. –91% n.a. n.a.
2017–3rdquarter n.a. +1% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–4thquarter n.a. –65% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
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V.2.2.2 From Greece
Insomecases,irregularmigrantsfirsttravelfrom
Turkey to Greece before they enter Bulgaria. As
an internal EU border, travelling fromGreece to
Bulgariainvolvesfewerobstaclesthanthedirect
route from Turkey.25 In 2010, some 25% of all
illegalbordercrossingsinBulgariaweredetected
atthebordertoGreece.26 
Based on the available information, illegal entry
from Greece to Bulgaria appears to spike at
times when other routes are not available. A
large increasewasrecorded, for instance, in the
firstquarterof2012,27andagain in2016after it
becamenearly impossible formigrants tomove
fromGreecetoFYRMacedonia.28
V.2.2.3 From Serbia and FYR Macedonia
The border to Serbia appears to be rarely used
for irregular crossings into Bulgaria (but it is
frequently crossed irregulary in the opposite
direction;seesection V.2.4.1below).Therehave
been occasional reports of irregular migrants
enteringBulgariafromSerbia,thoughthelimited





scale, and mostly involves migrants from the
regionratherthanfromthirdcountries.30
V.2.3 Stay
Bulgaria is both a destination and a transit
countryforirregularmigrants.Forsomemigrants,
Bulgaria is merely the first entry point into the
European Union and they quickly move on to
other countries where they may have relatives
andfriends.Someasylumseekersalsopreferto
leaveBulgaria,whichonlyhas limited resources
to support refugees, does not offer the same
protectionsasWesternEuropeancountries,and
whereallegationsofforcedpush-backsofasylum
seekersmaydetermigrants fromstaying in the
countryanylongerthannecessary.31
Others,however, seek to remain inBulgariaand
applyforasylum.ManyrefugeescometoBulgaria
to escape inadequate conditions and uncertain
statusinTurkey,becausetheyhavebeenunable
to reach Greece, or because the cost of living
is lower in Bulgaria than in Greece.32 Figure  39
below shows that the number of refugees and
asylum-seekersfromAfghanistan,Iraq,Syria,and
PakistaninBulgariahasgrownverysignificantly
in recent years.According toother sources, the
total number of asylum applications lodged in














that year. At that time, Frontex alreadypredicted
thatanyincreaseinirregularmigrationfromTurkey
to Bulgaria would result in growing secondary






drop early in the year,38 detections on the route
from Bulgaria to Serbia and Hungary increased
bya further65%,whichhasalsobeenattributed
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Irregular departures from Bulgaria to Serbia
increasedgreatlyin2015,especiallyinthesecond




Turkey.40 It appears that in 2015moremigrants
enteredBulgaria fromGreece, and perhaps that
moremigrantswereabletocrossfromTurkeyto
Greece undetected.41 By the end of 2015,more
than 48,000 illegal border crossings had been
detectedattheBulgaria-Serbiaborder,asixty-fold
increaseover2014.42
The number of illegal border crossings from
BulgariatoSerbiawaslowerin2016thanin2015,
but remainedathigh levels throughout theyear.
Most of these migrants had previously arrived
fromTurkey, thoughsomehadenteredBulgaria
from Greece after they were no longer able to
travel fromGreece toFYRMacedonia.43Figures
for theyear2017werenotavailableat the time
ofwriting.InJuly2017,Frontexreportedthatthe
numberofdetectionsof illegalbordercrossings
by Bulgarian authorities at the border to Serbia
haddroppedsignificantly compared to the third
and fourth quarters of 2016, indicating that
fewer irregular migrants were travelling along
the Eastern Mediterranean andWestern Balkan
routes.44 In the first quarter of 2017 detections





Figure 38: Illegal border crossings from Bulgaria, 2012–2016 (Frontex)46













2012 – year total n.a. n.a. 36
2013–4thquarter 335 10 n.a. n.a.
2013 – year total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–1stquarter 89 0 n.a. n.a.
2014–2ndquarter 27 6 n.a. n.a.
2014–3rdquarter 147 9 n.a. n.a.
2014–4thquarter 557 34 n.a. n.a.
2014 – year total n.a. n.a. 820 39
2015–1stquarter 1,886 19 912 2
2015–2ndquarter 7,828 114 4,130 3
2015–3rdquarter 18,673 147 n.a. 19
2015–4thquarter 20,108 30 n.a. 2
2015 – year total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–1stquarter 2,182 0 n.a. n.a.
2016–2ndquarter 495 0 n.a. n.a.
2016–3rdquarter 4,162 2 n.a. n.a.
2016–4thquarter 4,928 37 n.a. n.a.
2016 – year total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
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of irregular border crossings from Bulgaria to
Romaniaappears tobeaffectedby theeaseor
difficulty of crossing from Bulgaria to Serbia.
UNHCR, for instance, noted inSeptember 2016
that increased restrictions at the border to
Serbia had redirected some irregular migrants
totheRomanianborderandforcedthemtouse
dangerous, clandestinemethods to cross from
BulgariatoRomaniatoavoiddetection.48
V.2.4.3 To FYR Macedonia
Fromthelimitedavailableinformation,itappears
that irregular migration from Bulgaria to FYR
Macedonia occurs only in very small numbers.
Thedataprovidedfor2014and2015byFrontex,
shown in Figure  38 above, involves single-digit
figuresformostquarters.49
V.3 Profileofirregularmigrants





also found among irregular migrants, albeit in
muchsmallernumbers.50 
Figure  39 below shows that Afghan, Iraqi, and
Syriannationalsalsoconstitutethelargestgroups
ofrefugeesandasylumseekersinBulgaria.Their
number grew significantly between 2013 and
2016, as did the number of Pakistani nationals
seekingasyluminBulgaria.
Figure 39: Refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR, Bulgaria 2011–2016, top nationalities51
Afghanistan Iran Iraq Pakistan Syria
2011 – total 2,414 304 2,475 36 168
- refugees 2,067 250 2,109 1 98
- asylum-seekers 347 54 366 35 70
2012 – total 368 89 1,359 4 97
- refugees 368 89 1,359 4 97
- asylum-seekers 0 0 0 0 0
2013 – total 852 140 1,439 38 4,604
- refugees 268 70 1,200 4 2,104
- asylum-seekers 584 70 239 34 2,500
2014 – total 2,845 199 1,805 167 11,011
- refugees 121 73 1,207 6 8,501
- asylum-seekers 2,633 126 567 161 2,510
2015 – total 3,438 204 4,861 356 15,502
- refugees 197 72 1,339 7 13,819
- asylum-seekers 3,241 132 3,511 349 1,683
2016 – total 7,806 485 5,477 1,466 16,988
- refugees 170 68 1,385 1,458 1,961
- asylum-seekers 7,636 417 4,092 8 15,027
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illegally fromTurkey started to rise towards the
endof2012duetothedeterioratingsituationin
their country of origin and the growing number
ofSyrians fleeing toTurkey.While in2012most
Syrians left Turkey for Greece, enhanced border
protection and interception efforts along the
Turkish-Greek border led to a displacement of
irregular migration from Turkey to Bulgaria in
2013. Detections of Syrian nationals fleeing to








for asylum in Bulgaria rose very sharply, and
since then Bulgaria has increasingly become
a destination country for Syrian migrants.54 
By early 2014, Bulgaria reportedly recorded
the highest numbers of detections of Syrian
nationalsstayinginanyEUmemberstate.55 The 
shift to the route via Bulgaria alsomeant that
detections of Syrian nationals leavingBulgaria
for Serbia started to go up in the second half
of 2013.56 Throughout 2014 and 2015, Syrian
nationals continued to be among the main





Bulgaria. Most Iraqis enter Bulgaria across the
land border from Turkey and leave by crossing
intoSerbia.AbsolutenumbersforIraqistransiting
throughBulgaria in the2011 to2017periodare
notavailable, though Iraqisareamongthemain
nationalities apprehended each year in the
reportingperiod, albeit in smaller numbers than
SyriansandAfghans.58
Palestinians
Among the irregular migrants entering Bulgaria
are a considerable number of Palestinians. In
2012 and 2013 Palestinians were among the















in Greece under Operation Aspida shifted irregu-
larmigration to the route fromTurkey toBulgar-
ia.ManyAfghannationalswhoarrivedinBulgaria
subsequently applied for asylum in the country;










cross illegally from Turkey to Bulgaria. Border
crossings are usually made overland. Pakistan-
isoftenusecovertmethodstoenterandtransit
through the country, including concealment in
carsandtrucks,ortheuseoffraudulenttravelor
identitydocuments.64Inearly2016,Pakistanina-
tionalswere the fourth largestgroupofpersons
apprehended on exit from Bulgaria to Serbia.65 
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entering or transiting through Bulgaria is rather
scattered. Nationals of Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire,
Ghana,andMalihavebeenfoundcrossingfrom
BulgariaintoSerbiaillegally.AlgeriansandMalians




entering or transiting through Bulgaria mostly
involve persons from Algeria and West African
nations; the source material consulted for this





V.4.1.1 Into the country
Most efforts to smugglemigrants into Bulgaria
take place across the border with Turkey, and
mostdetectionsof smugglersarealsomade in
connectionwiththeseactivities.67Thesmuggling
of migrants from Turkey to Greece, along with
otherformsofirregularmigration,issaidtohave




Smuggledmigrants usually travel from Istanbul
to Edirne, then employ one of several methods
to enter Bulgaria. Crossings on foot between
TurkeyandBulgariausuallytakeplaceintherural
areas between the main border control posts






clandestinely with relative ease. This is why
fencesandelectronicequipmenttodetectborder
crossings have been installed in someplaces.69 
When entering Bulgaria from Turkey, smuggled
migrants are usually brought by smugglers to
anareanear theborder, then toldhowtoget to
Bulgaria. Sometimes local residents who work
independently or are connected to smuggling
networks based in Istanbul assist migrants
in finding their way to the border. Bulgarian
authorities report that smugglers have ceased
accompanying migrants across the border to
avoidbeingapprehendedbyborderauthorities.70 
Aftercrossingtheborder,thesmuggledmigrants
are frequently met by another member of the
smuggling organisation who is responsible for
arranging their accommodation and onward
travel.Mostmigrants are initially taken toSofia,





smuggling in private vehicles, and concealment
in cars, trucks, and vans.72 Sometimes the
smugglersinstructthemigrantstomisrepresent
their nationality should they be apprehended
by Bulgarian authorities.73 Covert smuggling
methods, especially concealment in various
means of transport, are said to have increased
considerably, as it hasbecomemoredifficult to
cross the border without the aid of smugglers.
Migrants have become more dependent on
smugglers,whofacilitatethebordercrossingby
hidingmigrantsinfreighttrainsandtrucks.74 





from Turkey to Greece before they enter Bulgar-
ia. Because the border betweenGreece andBul-
garia isan internalEUbordermanycrossings in-
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volveovertmethods, though thereare instances
in which covert methods are used to smuggle




V.4.1.2  Out of the country
Most smuggling activities out of Bulgaria take
placeacrosstheborderwithSerbia.Thismayat
firstsightseemsurprising,giventhatthisborder
crossing takes migrants out of the European




mountainous areas and places with very poor
infrastructure.77
The smuggling of migrants from Bulgaria to
Serbia directly correlates to irregular migration
from Turkey to Bulgaria: It involves the same
nationalities, and smuggling activities along
thisroute increaseattimeswhencrossingfrom
Turkey to Greece and FYR Macedonia entails




with their vehicles by taking them fromSofiaor
other parts of the country to the ‘green border’
and giving them instructions about how, where,
andwhen it isbest tocross. Insome instances
smuggled migrants are hidden in vehicles and




as mentioned, tends to be used less frequently.
Bothovertmethods, suchaswalkingacross the
border, and covert methods, such as hiding in
privatevehicles, trucks,orvans,areused to take
migrantsacrossthisborder.Therearealsoreports




V.4.2.1 Smuggling by land
Most migrant smuggling ventures into, across,
and out of Bulgaria are made overland, using







privatevehiclesor trains. If trucksandvansare
usedtosmugglemigrantsfromTurkeytoBulgaria,
this is usually done with the knowledge of the
driver, and special compartments are installed
tohidethemigrants.Similarly, ifprivatevehicles
are used,migrants are often hidden behind the
seats.82 Such methods frequently entail great
dangers for the migrants, especially if they are





is said to be used mostly by Afghan, Syrian,
and Pakistani nationals who are hidden on the
trains in Turkey, usually in Edirne, then cross
theborderby trainnear thebordercontrolpoint
at Kapitan Andreevo and disembark at the first
stopinSvilengrad,havingtravelledonlyabout30
kilometresbytrain.84 
In some apparently less common instances,
migrants are furnished with fraudulent travel




in the hope that they can cross without being
checkedthemselves.85
Once in Bulgaria, private vehicles and taxis are
generallyused tocarrymigrants, either toSofia
or another transit city, or to the next border,
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especially the border to Serbia. Private vehicles,
asmentionedearlier,areoftenusedtosmuggle
migrants covertly from Bulgaria to Serbia, or
migrants may be driven to a place near the




or with the aid of smugglers, is a common
method used by irregular migrants to enter or
leavethecountry.Mostsmugglingventuresinto
and out of Bulgaria involve a combination of
methods.Smuggledmigrantsareoftendrivento
theborderorusepublictransporttoreachtowns
near theborder,andare thenguidedacross the
border or are given instructions by smugglers
abouthow,where,andwhentocross.Sometimes
borders are crossed at night to avoid detection
by border guards. To reduce the risk of arrest,






V.4.2.2 Smuggling by air
Informationaboutthesmugglingofmigrantsby
air through Bulgaria is extremely limited. There
are only occasional reports about smuggling
aboard commercial flightsoriginating in non-EU
StatesboundforSofia.89
V.4.2.3 Smuggling by sea
Reports about the smuggling of migrants by
sea toBulgariaare very isolatedandsomewhat
anecdotal. They mostly refer to instances in
which vessels were used to smuggle migrants
fromTurkeyacrosstheBlackSeatotheBulgarian










of the countries in question: Turkish nationals
tend to be involved in facilitating illegal border
crossings from Turkey into Bulgaria, Bulgarian
nationals transport migrants through the
countryandsometimesintoSerbia,andSerbian
smugglers assist in bringing migrants from






smugglers have little influence on the level of
irregularmigrationandonly play aminor, if any,
roleincreatingorfunnellingthedemand.Thisis
also supported by the fact that local residents
oftenplayanimportantroleinassistingsmuggled
migrants, especially by driving or otherwise
guidingthemtotheborder.94
These local residents often operate individually
or in small local groups. Sometimes they are
connected to smugglers in larger cities such
as Istanbul, Sofia, or Belgrade, who may pass
on phone numbers or other details of local
smugglerstomigrants.Organisersofthissortare
notnecessarilynationalsofthecountriesinwhich
they operate; they frequently share the same
nationalityasthemigrantswhomtheysmuggle.95




the border to Bulgaria and onwards to Sofia or









EUR 10,000–EUR 13,000. He would receive
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VI SERBIA
VI.1 Overview
Serbia is a major transit country for irregular
migrationand thesmugglingofmigrants in the
Balkans. During the 2011–2017 period Serbia
experienced some of the highest numbers of
irregular arrivals, and the country was most
profoundlyaffectedbythe largeflowof irregular
migrants travelling across the Balkans in the
second half of 2015. Although exact figures
varyacrosssources, overhalf amillion irregular
migrantspassed throughSerbia in 2015alone.1 
‘At the beginning of themigratory surge’ inmid-
2015,aFrontexreportnotesthefollowing:
Serbianauthoritiesimplementedaseriesof
prevention measures (such as increasing
thenumberofpersonnel,enhancedcontrol
activities and opening a new migrant
receptioncentreinPresevo).Later,however,
the focus was shifted from prevention
measures to organised orderly transit,
registrationandonwardstransferbypublic
transport (i.e. towards Hungary and after
SeptembertowardsCroatia).2
Serbia also felt the effects of the policies and
measures adopted by the other countries in
regionmore thanmost. In particular, Hungary’s
unilateraldecisiontocloseitsborderto irregular
migrants,includingrefugeesandasylumseekers,
followed by measured adopted in Slovenia and








north-western borders. In recent years, the vast
majorityof irregularmigrantshaveenteredfrom
FYRMacedoniaandcontinuedacrossSerbia to
Hungary and Croatia. Irregular migration also
occursacross theborders toBulgaria,Romania,
and Montenegro, albeit at much lower levels
and usually only at timeswhen themore direct
andpopular routesarenotopen.3Adding to the
scale of irregular migration through Serbia are
movements by Albanian nationals, Kosovars,
and persons from other parts of the former
Yugoslaviawhopass throughSerbiaen route to
WesternEurope.DisputesaboutsomeofSerbia’s
borders,anduncertaintiesabouttheinternational
status of Kosovo, further fuel the complexities
ofmigration-related issues.A2016publications
notes:
Faced with extremely complex migration
situation, Serbia does not have the
appropriate institutional and regulatory
framework,norapoliticalresponsetoaseries
of complex issues in theareaofmigration
andmigration-relatedissues,suchasasylum
system, irregular migration, sustainable
return of our citizens asylum seekers in
EUMember States, implementation of the
agreement on readmission, the departure
ofhighlyeducated—braindrain,migration
and development, the fight against human
trafficking(protectionofvictims,prevention,
criminal prosecution of traffickers), and
smuggling of migrants, issues of border
management, demarcation and boundary




VI.2.1.1 Numbers relating to illegal entry 
Serbia’s central location and the large size of
its territory relative to most of its neighbours
are some of the reasons why the country is




of irregular migrant arrivals in recent years. In
2012,Frontexreportedthat‘Serbiawasbyfarthe
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Reports by the InternationalOrganization forMi-
gration(IOM)showthatin2014,8,238foreigners
were denied entry at Serbia’s borders, up from
8,069in2013.Mostofthesedetectionswerenot
connectedtorefugeesseekingtoenterthecoun-





















people’7 or ‘more than 815,000 refugees andmi-
grants’8passedthroughSerbiain2015.















Year total 579,518 98,975
FromNovember2015thenumberofmigrantarriv-
alsbegan todropconsiderably. InDecember less
that100,000arrivalswererecorded,byMarch2016





the same source. UNHCR, the UN High Commis-
sioner forRefugees, reported thatsome2,500ref-
ugeesandotherirregularmigrantsarrivedinSerbia
inthesixmonthsfromJanuarytoJune2017.10 


















Serbia shares borders with seven countries (in-
cluding Kosovo). In the 2011–2017 period, the





when compared to the influx of migrants which
hascrossedfromFYRMacedonia.Thenumberof
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Figure 41: Illegal border crossings into Serbia, 2011–2017 (Frontex)13
Illegal border crossings 
from 
FYR Macedonia to Serbia
Illegal border crossings 
from 
Montenegro to Serbia





















2011 – total 7,045 +421% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–1stquarter 1,731 +149% 40 +100% n.a. n.a.
2012–2ndquarter 2,216 +86% 78 +420 n.a. n.a.
2012–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 – total 8,471 +20% 146 +92% 36 +3,500%
2013–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 – total 3,524 –27% 94 –62% 820 +63%













2015–3rdquarter 98,209 +8977% 534 –60% 18,673 +12,603%
2015–4thquarter 408,021 +31579% 44 +2% 20,108 +3,510%
2015 – total n.a. +15 039% n.a. +3,337% n.a. +5,814%
2016–1stquarter n.a. –99% n.a. n.a. n.a. +16%
2016–2ndquarter n.a. –99% n.a. –99% n.a. –94%
2016–3rdquarter n.a. –100% n.a. n.a. n.a. –98%
2016–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. –75%
2016 – total n.a. –100% n.a. n.a. n.a. –76%
2017–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. –46%
2017–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. –93%
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VI.2.2.1 From FYR Macedonia
Overview
Throughout the 2011–2017 period, irregular
migrationacrosstheborderfromFYRMacedonia
to Serbia has occurred at very high levels.
Figure 41aboveshowsthathighincreaseswere
recordedin2011and2012.Numbersdroppedin
2013 and 2014, before rising to unprecedented
levels in2015. In thethreemonthsfromJuly to





Frontex publishes quarterly reports containing
the number of illegal border crossings detected
betweenandatbordercontrolpoints.Thisdata,
displayed in Figure  42 below, again shows the
verysteepriseinnumbersfromthethirdquarter
of2013tothefourthquarterof2015.Alsovisible
is the drastic drop in numbers since the start
of 2016. By comparing the numbers relating







The route from Greece via FYR Macedonia into
Serbiahasbeenanestablishedavenueforirregular









those entering Serbia from FYR Macedonia. It
was furthernoted that the increasingnumberof
detections in Serbia correspondedmore or less
directly with the growing number of irregular
Figure 42: Illegal border crossings, FYR 
























migrants entering Greece from Turkey.16 Until




areas.17 Reports that surfaced in 2015 stating
that both Hungary and Serbia were returning




entering Serbia from FYRMacedonia increased
quitedramatically.Thisincreasereflectsthemuch
highernumberofarrivalsrecordedinGreeceafew
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Serbiawas first noted in 2013, and corresponds






fromonly 40 in 2012 tomore than500 in 2013.
It was found that the profile and nationalities of
thesemigrantswas largelythesameasthoseof
migrantsenteringBulgaria illegally fromTurkey.22 







Irregular departures from Bulgaria to Serbia in-
creasedgreatlyin2015,especiallyinthesecondhalf
of that year. This increase reflects the rising num-
berof irregularflowsintheEasternMediterranean,
thoughin2015thesefiguresnolongercorrespond-













to travel fromGreece toFYRMacedonia. In late
2016,morethan1,000 irregularmigrantssought
to cross into Serbia from Bulgaria. Those who
were stopped at the border often made further
attempts later on, whichmay inflate the figures
showninFigure 42belowsomewhat.28 
Figuresfortheyear2017werenotavailableatthe
time ofwriting. Early in the year itwas reported
that, according to Bulgarian authorities, fewer
migrantswereseekingtoenterSerbia.Inthefirst
quarter of 2017, detections of irregularmigrants
fromBulgariatoSerbiadroppedby46%,andinthe
fourth quarter by asmuch as 93% compared to
thepreviousyear.29InJuly2017Frontexreported
that the number of detections of illegal border
crossingsbyBulgarianauthoritiesattheborderto
Serbiahaddroppedfurthercomparedtothethird
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VI.2.2.3 From other countries
Montenegro
Figure 41aboveshows—insofarasthosenumbers
are available—that the number of illegal border
crossings fromMontenegro into Serbia is quite
small. Illegalbordercrossings fromMontenegro
into Serbia appear to be a further variation






of irregular migrants entering Serbia from Koso-
voisverylimited.Inthiscontextitmustbenoted
thatSerbiadoesnotrecogniseKosovoasaninde-
pendent country, and that the precise line of the
border isdisputed insome locations.Reportsby
Frontexmerelyincludethenumberofillegalborder
crossings from Kosovo into Serbia, as shown in
Figure 44below,for2014andthefirsthalfof2015.
Figure 44: Illegal border crossings from Kosovo 
to Serbia, 2014–2015 (Frontex)33




change to same 
previous period




Reports of illegal arrivals from Romania into
Serbiaarequitescarce. In thefirsthalfof2012,
for instance, Frontex reported that Algerian and
Moroccannationalsweredetectedat theborder
ingrowingnumbers.34 In2017, reportsemerged
about an increase in the number of irregular
migrants departing from Romania to Serbia.35 




For the majority of irregular migrants entering
thecountry,Serbia isa transitpointen route to
Hungary,Croatia,andeventuallyotherEUMember
States.36Given the longdistances thatmigrants
have to travel fromenteringSerbia in thesouth
toexiting inthenorth,mostmigrantswillspend
severaldaysorweeks in thecountry.Somewill
stay temporarily, others permanently. Since the
closure of the border to Hungary in September
2015andthedifficultiesassociatedwithcrossing
the border to Croatia, many migrants have no
choicebuttostayinSerbiaformuchlongerthan
they had hoped, and some become stranded
there.






A further nine persons were granted subsidiary
protection. 551 applications were rejected,
thoughmostoftheapplicantshadabscondedor
leftSerbiabeforetheirapplicationwasfinalised.37 




For this reason, it has been remarked that the
large flow of migrants through Serbia was a
‘relatively marginal’ question for the country, as
it was evident thatmostmigrants weremerely
transitingthroughthecountryanddidnotplace




felt indifferent or even sympathetic to irregular
migrantscrossingthecountry.39
To expedite the transit of migrants through
Serbia, in late2015, thecountryallowedAfghan,
Syrian, and Iraqi migrants to enter the country
andremainlawfullyfor72hours,eveniftheyhad
no intention toapply for asylum inSerbia.They
105
  











irregularmigration through theBalkans towards
Western Europe.41 Up until September 2015,
this 175-kilometre-long border saw someof the
highestnumbersofillegalcrossingsintheregion.
The decision by the Hungarian government to
sealthisbordertoirregularmigrantsandbuilda
fencealongitsfulllengthledtodramaticscenes
of refugees and migrants rushing to cross the
border before it closed on 15 September 2015.
Once completed, this border fence triggered a








Serbia into Hungary as reported in annual and
quarterly reports published by Frontex. Illegal
border crossings from Serbia to Hungary have
historicallybeenquitehigh,aspeoplesought to
enter the EuropeanUnion (EU) along this route.
In theearly2010s,wellover4,000 illegalborder
crossings were detected annually. In 2014 this




For the period fromOctober 2013 to December
2017, Frontex has published separate data con-
cerning ‘illegal border crossings between border




change to same 
previous period

































2017 – total n.a. n.a.
*Forthemarkedperiods,separatepublicationsreportslightlydifferent
numbers.




crossings between border control points rose
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from2,959to142,918.Sincethattimethisnum-









































By the start of the 2011–2017period the route
from Greece via FYRMacedonia to Serbia was
well-established,andseveral thousandmigrants
crossed fromSerbia intoHungaryeachyear.By
2011 the highest number of illegal crossings
at any border in the Balkans was detected at
the Serbian-Hungarian border. At that time, and
throughout 2012, the largest group of irregular
migrantscrossingfromSerbiaintoHungarywere
Afghans,followedbyKosovarsandPakistanis.44
In the first half of 2013 the volume of irregular
migrationacross thisborder increased further.45 
The first quarter of 2013 recorded a threefold
increase compared to the first quarter of 2012,
mostlybecauseofchangestoHungary’sasylum
laws that were seen as making it easier for
asylum seekers to apply for asylum inHungary
and thenmove on to other destinations. At the
same time, and as a result of these changes,
other nationalities such as Algerians began to
move across this border in growing numbers.46 
Over the following three years most migrants




and Budapest, though many migrants crossed
theborderonfootinruralareasawayfromborder
checkpoints.47 
Amendments to Hungary’s asylum procedures
whichcameintoeffecton1July2013,introducing










Afghans and Syrians were among the largest
groups of irregular migrants detected at this
border.49 
Beginning in September 2014, the number of
border crossings again increased significantly,
resulting in an increase of 193% in the third
quarter of 2014 over the second quarter. In the
fourth quarter, nearly 30,000 migrants crossed
the border illegally, many of them—some 60%—








migrants crossed from Serbia into Hungary,
andnearly40,000 in the followingquarter.Until
February 2015, Kosovars were among the
largestgroupscrossing thisborder, though their
numberdwindledrapidlyfromMarch2015when
measures were adopted by several countries,
includingGermany,Austria,HungaryandSerbia,
to specifically prevent Kosovars from leaving
Kosovo, deter them from moving to Western
Europe and deport them back to Kosovo in
large numbers.52 However, the growing number
of Afghan and, in particular, Syrian nationals
moving along the Western Balkan route meant
that irregularmigration from Serbia to Hungary
continued to rise in the following months.53 As
thenumberofillegalbordercrossingsgreweven
further, the Hungarian Government announced
inAugust2015thatitwouldbuildafencealong
itsborderwithSerbia.Thisfencewascompleted
on 15 September 2015, thus effectively closing
theborder to irregularmigrants. The immediate
effect of the border fence was that far fewer




and 46 above, did not completely stop the flow
of irregular migrants from Serbia to Hungary.
Especiallyafter therouteviaCroatiatoHungary
wasclosedon16October2015,manymigrants
in Serbia once again sought to cross directly
intoHungary, trying tobreak through theborder
fenceinseveralplaces.ByMarch2016,some100
illegalbordercrossingsfromSerbiaintoHungary
were being recorded each day.55 When Croatia




Afghanistan, Iraq, andSyria to enter its territory,
the main nationalities now seeking entry to
Hungary were Moroccans and Algerians.56 In 
AprilandMay2016,thenumberof illegalborder
crossings from Serbia to Hungary reached its
highest level since the completionof theborder
fence. On average, some 120 persons crossed
into Hungary from Serbia illegally each day.57 
From about June 2016, the number of illegal
bordercrossingsfromHungarytoSerbiadropped
again as far fewermigrantswere able to reach
Serbiainthefirstplace.58Nevertheless,duetothe
relatively large number of migrants stranded in
Serbia,severalthousandweredetectedcrossing
into Hungary each quarter through the rest of
2016 and well into 2017.59 During the calendar
yearof2016,Hungaryreportedmorethan25,000
illegalbordercrossingsfromSerbia,farfewerthan
in the previous year but still one of the highest
numbersintheregion.60Asaresult,theHungarian
Government adopted further measures at its
border to Serbia to drastically limit the number
of people who could apply for asylum if they
enteredfromSerbia.Thesemeasuresexplainthe
decrease indetections in thefirstsixmonthsof
2017butaresaidtohaveplacedgreaterpressure




In total numbers, over the 2011–2017 period
moreirregularmigrantscrossedfromSerbiainto
Croatia than intoHungary.While the route from
SerbiatoWesternEuropeviaCroatiaislessdirect,
the measures adopted by Hungary to prevent
the entry of asylum seekers and other irregular
migrantsfromSerbiahadtheeffectthattheflow
of irregular migrants was diverted to Croatia.62 
Figure 47belowshowshowthenumberofillegal
border crossings increased from just 42 in the






Frontex has published quarterly data regarding
illegal crossings between and at border control
points along the Serbian-Croatian frontier. This
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2017 – total n.a. n.a.
data, shown in Figure  48 below, further demon-
strates that after a period of relative decline in
2014, illegal border crossings between Serbia
andCroatia rose to unprecedented levels in the
secondhalfof2015,andremainedhighinthefirst
quarterof2016.Justasrapidlyasthesenumbers




that while levels of irregular migration between




































A first increase in the number of irregular
migrantsleavingSerbiaforCroatiawasrecorded
in 2010 and 2011.65 In 2010, Frontex recorded
a 222% increase in detections of illegal border
crossings from Serbia into Croatia, followed by
a432% increase in2011.Manymigrants,most
ofthemAfghans,crossedintoCroatiabysimply
walking across the land border; some followed
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therailwayallthewayfromBelgradetoTovarnik
inCroatia.66ThehighnumberofAfghannationals





migration routes through the Balkans became
noticeable;duetochangesofasylumprocedures
in Hungary, migrants crossed from Serbia to
Croatiainstead.68 
In2013,severalpoliticaleventsaffectedthelevel
of irregular migration from Serbia to Croatia.
When,followinginternationalpressure,Hungary
stoppedthepracticeofdetainingasylumseekers
in early 2013, instead accommodating them in
opencentres,a‘massiveshift’ofmigrationflows
occurred away from Croatia and towards the
route from Serbia andHungary. By June 2013,
only 39 detections of illegal border crossings
were made at the Serbia-Croatia border. Once
the Hungarian Government reintroduced the
detention of asylum seekers from 1 July 2013,
detections of illegal border crossings from
SerbiatoCroatiastartedtoriseagain.69Alsoon
1 July 2013, Croatia became aMember of the
European Union (but not yet of the Schengen
Zone). There were some fears that this would
resultinafurtherincreaseofattemptstocross
from Serbia into Croatia –which now became
an external border of the EU– but the impact
wassomewhatsmallerthanexpected.Afurther
increase in irregularmigration fromSerbia into
Croatia was, however, recorded at that time
due to thegreaternumbersofSyriannationals
movingthroughtheregion.70
Throughout 2014 and into 2015, irregular
migration across the border from Serbia to
Hungary continued at high levels and, as was
widely reported, increased quite dramatically in
the late (northern) summerof2015.During this
period,theroutefromSerbiatoCroatiaremained
in operation but accounted for a relative small
percentage of illegal border crossings in the
region.In2014,onlyabout3%ofallnon-regional
migrants were detected at the Serbia-Croatia
border, compared to 73%at theSerbia-Hungary
border.71 With the growing flow of irregular
migrants from Greece via FYR Macedonia to
Serbia,detectionsattheCroatianbroderstarted
to rise in the spring of 2015.72 It reached an all-
time high, becoming the most significant route
for irregular migration, when the Hungarian
Government closed the border to Serbia.73 By
early September 2015, when it became known
thattherouteviaHungarywouldsoonbeclosed,
asmanyas9,200peoplecrossedfromSerbiato
Croatia in aday.Serbianauthorities andprivate
operatorsofferedtotransportmigrantswhohad
crossedintoSerbiafromFYRMacedoniadirectly
to cities like Šid, close to the Croatian border.74 
Within three days, 14,000 people had crossed
intoCroatia,manyonfootaftermakingtheirway
unsuccessfullytotheHungarianborder.75Bylate
September, as many as 10,000 migrants were
crossing intoCroatiafromSerbiaeveryday,and
up to65,000perweek.76AFrontex reportnotes
thatwhile an average of 66 persons permonth
were detected crossing from Serbia to Croatia
betweenJanuaryandAugust2015,betweenmid-
September and December 2015 nearly 557,000
crossedthatborder.77
In October 2015, Croatia started to undertake
sporadic attempts to stop or control the arrival
of people from Serbia, which caused long
delaysforregularcross-bordertraffic,aswellas
tensions between the two countries.78 Formost
of themonth, however, the border between the
two countries remained open, and the influx of
migrants, along with the difficulties in catering
forthem,continuedunabated.79Laterthatmonth,
Croatia restricted entry to asylum seekers from
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, considering other
nationalities to be ‘economic migrants’ and
rejecting them at the border, allegedly without
considering the causes of their displacement.80 
Coordination between the Serbian and Croatian
authorities improved in November 2015, when
mostmigrantswere transported by train and a
central registration and accommodation centre
was opened in Šid, Serbia. Further restrictions
onentryfromSerbiafollowedwhentheCroatian
authoritiesbegantoallowmigrantstoenterand
transit only if they stated that either Austria or
Germany was the intended destination where
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they would seek asylum.81 Nevertheless, until




By March 2016 Croatia, along with most other
WesternBalkancountries, hadall but closed its
borders to irregular migrants. Despite a small
increase in the thirdquarterof2016,detections
of illegal border crossings along the Serbia-
Croatiaborderremainedlowthroughouttheyear
and into 2017.83 Concerns remained, however,
that refugees and other migrants who became
stranded in Serbia would increasingly resort to
smugglerstoleaveSerbia,includingtoCroatia.84 
The measures adopted by Hungary in 2017 to
further limit the number of asylum seekers it
would accept from Serbia have placed further
pressureontheSerbia-Croatiaborder,andissaid
toexplain theslight increase indetectionat the
borderrecordedinthefirsthalfof2017.85
VI.2.4.3 To Romania
Figure  49 below shows that in the early 2010s,
considerable numbers of irregular migrants
illegally crossed the border from Serbia to
Romania. According to Frontex, from 2010 to
2011 the number of illegal border detections
increased from just 49 to over 2,000.86 The 
increase recorded in the first half of 2011 was
initiallyattributedtoerrors,thoughitlaterbecame
clear that the detectionsmostly involved North
African migrants who had previously travelled
through Greece and FYR Macedonia.87 This 
increase continued throughout 2012.88 When it
wasfurthernotedthatmostdetectionsoccured
close to the Serbian and Romanian borders
to Hungary, suggestions were made that the
movements from Serbia to Romania were a
(temporary) displacement of migrants who
encountered difficulties trying to cross directly
from Serbia into Hungary, as authorities made
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2017 – total n.a. n.a.
Towards the end of 2012 irregular arrivals began













illegal border crossings at the Serbian-Romanian
borderremainedlowuntilmid–2016.
Figure 50: Illegal border crossings, Romania–
Serbia, 2015–2017 (Frontex)94
Illegal border crossings 










Since mid-2016 the irregular migration of non-
regionalmigrantsfromSerbia intoRomaniahas
increasedconsiderably.Thishasbeenattributed
to the fact thatmigrants inSerbiagradually ran
outofotheroptionsforleavingSerbia,acountry
they did not wish to remain in. In late October
2016theRomanianauthoritiesrespondedtothis
developmentbyinstitutingstrictercontrolsatthe
Serbian border, though illegal arrivals continued





VI.2.4.4 To other countries
Based on the limited available information,
illegal border crossings from Serbia to Bosnia-
Herzegovina do not occur on a very significant
scale. Figure  51 below shows the available
data published by Frontex for the 2011-2017
period.Fortheyears2014to2017thenumbers
fluctuatesomewhat, thoughat low levels,and it
isnotpossibletodetectanyparticulartrendsor
developmentsforthereportingperiod.
Data and other information relating to irregular
migration fromSerbia toMontenegro is scarcer
still. Between 2016 and 2017 significant fluctu-
ations, shown in Figure  51 below, have been
reported, but the absolute numbers of persons
crossingfromSerbiatoMontenegrohavenot.
The border to Bulgaria appears to be of little
importance for irregular border crossings from
Serbia. There have been occasional reports of
irregularmigrantsenteringBulgaria fromSerbia,
thoughbasedonthelimitedavailableinformation
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Figure 51: Illegal border crossings from Serbia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, 
2011–2017 (Frontex)97
Illegal border crossings 
from Serbia to Bosnia-
Herzegovina
Illegal border crossings 
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2011 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–1stquarter 6 –57% n.a. n.a. 3 +200%
2012–2ndquarter 24 +100% n.a. n.a. 10 +400%
2012–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 – total 77 +4% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 – total 85 +10% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015–1stquarter 8 –68% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015–2ndquarter 35 +67% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015–3rdquarter 40 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015–4thquarter 14 –33% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015 – total n.a. n .a . n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–1stquarter n.a. +67% n.a. –99% n.a. n.a.
2016–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. –98% n.a. n.a.
2016–4thquarter n.a. +121% n.a. +32% n.a. n.a.
2016 – total n.a. +6% n.a. –97% n.a. n.a.
2017–1stquarter n.a. –16% n.a. –60% n.a. n.a.
2017–2ndquarter n.a. –12% n.a. –13% n.a. n.a.
2017–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
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VI.3 Profileofirregularmigrants
Irregular migrants who enter, stay, or transit
through Serbia come from a diverse range
of countries in the Middle East, South Asia,
and from various parts of Africa. Over the
2011–2017 period the single largest group






For most irregular migrants Serbia serves as a
transit country to other destinations, and only a
smallpercentageofmigrantsexpressanintention
toapply forasylum inSerbia.Fewerstill actually
lodgeapplications.99FiguresproducedbyUNHCR
(which combine Serbia and Kosovo) show that
relative to the vast number of irregularmigrants
passing through Serbia, very few are registered





and asylum seekers in Serbia and Kosovo are
Afghans,followedbyIraqisandSyrians.
Figure 52: Refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR, Serbia and Kosovo 2011–2016, top 
nationalities100
Afghanistan Iran Iraq Pakistan Syria
2011 – total 174 4 34 4 n.a.
- refugees n.a. n.a. 32 n.a. n.a.
- asylum-seekers 174 4 2 4 n.a.
2012 – total 81 8 25 21 49
- refugees n.a. n.a. 18 n.a. n.a.
- asylum-seekers 81 8 7 21 49
2013 – total 21 3 23 37 36
- refugees n.a. n.a. 16 n.a. 3
- asylum-seekers 21 3 7 37 60
2014 – total 58 n.a. 9 3 2
- refugees 0 n.a. 45 0 1
- asylum-seekers 58 n.a. 5 3 1
2015 – total 35 n.a. 12 7 11
- refugees 0 n.a. 7 0 11
- asylum-seekers 35 n.a. 5 7 0
2016 – total 3,519 338 1,357 n.a. 747
- refugees 3,449 335 1,353 n.a. 747
- asylum-seekers 70 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0
VI.3.1 TheMiddleEast
Syrians, as mentioned, constitute one of the




UNHCR.101 Syrians are also among the largest
groups of migrants entering Serbia from FYR
MacedoniaandBulgaria,anddepartingSerbiafor
Hungary and Croatia.102 The number of Syrians
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Syriannationalswere detectedpassing through
Serbiaillegally.104
Significant numbersof Iraqi, Palestinianand—in
smallernumbers—Iranianirregularmigrantshave





Afghan nationals feature very prominently
among irregular migrants in Serbia. Reports
from 2012 point to high levels of Afghan
migrants entering Serbia from Bulgaria and
Romania, and continuing to Hungary and
Croatia.106 The number of Afghan migrants
transiting through Serbia rose significantly
from2012to2014,andthemainfocusshifted





Afghan nationals have arrived in Serbia from
Greece via FYR Macedonia, though the route
via Bulgaria into Serbia remained a viable and
frequently-usedalternative.108
Theyear2015,asdiscussedearlier,witnessedthe
highest number of irregular migrants transiting
throughSerbia,andAfghannationals,alongwith
Syrians, constituted one of the largest groups.
Most continued to Hungary; a route which
subsequently shifted to Croatia once Hungary
closed itsborder toSerbia inSeptemberof that
year.109
Inearly2016theflowofirregularmigrantsshifted
to Bulgaria, and Frontex noted growing number
ofAfghanmigrantsseekingto leaveBulgariafor
Serbia. Despite increased efforts to close the
border,someAfghanscontinuedtousethemore
direct route fromGreece via FYRMacedonia to
Serbia.110
Pakistanis
Irregular Pakistani migrants frequently travel
alongside Afghan nationals and use many of
thesameroutesandmethodstotransitthrough
Serbia.111 Since Pakistani nationals have lower
chancesofbeinggrantedasylum,somePakistanis






Pakistanis of migrant smugglers to help them
enteranddepartfromSerbia.112
VI.3.3 Africa
Information concerning irregular migrants from
Africa passing through Serbia mostly concerns
Algerian and Moroccan nationals. Reports
from 2012 show large increases in the number
of Algerians and Moroccans entering Serbia




Serbia and Hungary, reports emerged of large
numbers of Algerians and Moroccans crossing





Kosovars constitute a large migrant group in
Serbia due to historical circumstances and the
fact that many Kosovars have roots in Serbia
(andviceversa).Kosovarscanenterandremain
in Serbia freely; they are not irregular migrants.
The migration of Kosovars becomes irregular if
theyenterothercountries,especiallyEUMember
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For these reasons, much of the information
concerning the irregular migration of Kosovars
through Serbia relates to their departure from
Serbia(ratherthantheirentryfromKosovo.)The
borderbetweenSerbiaandHungaryhasrecorded
some of the highest numbers of illegal border
crossing by Kosovars. The number increased
particularly sharply in late 2012 and early 2013,
when Frontex recorded a three-fold increase in
detections,making it thesingle largestgroupof
personsenteringHungaryillegally.116Thenumber
of Kosovars continued to rise through 2014.117 







ways dropped significantly after February 2015,
when several countries adopted measures to










men travelling by themselves, whereas women
makeupa smaller portionof irregularmigrants
and more likely to travel with others, including
theirpartners.A2016publicationnotes:
That the typical refugee in Serbia is a
27-year-oldman.Heislikelytobeunmarried,
to be travelling alone, to have 12 years of
schoolingand tohave lefthis family inhis
country of origin. He has probably spent
overayearintransitinhisattempttoreach





tooccur at high levels, as the country is oneof
themost affected by non-regional flows and is
one where, according to Frontex, migrants are
‘more likely toneed facilitation’ toenterandexit
the country.123 Most smuggling activities are
carried out by local people who operate within
Serbiaandacrossitsborders,whichexplainswhy
Serbian nationals constitute a large portion of
thenumberofsmugglersdetected intheregion.
Inthesecondquarterof2015,for instance,59%






into the use of smugglers by irregular Syrian
migrants who transited through Serbia and
Hungary. The paper draws some interesting
conclusions about migrants’ decisions on
whetherandwhentoemploysmugglers,noting




trusting smugglers may be the better option.
These views are often based on information
they receive from previous migrants, or on
reportstheyreadininternetforums.‘Thegreater
the anxiety’, note the authors, ‘the greater the




VI.4.1.1 Into the country
As with other irregular migration in Serbia, the
smuggling of migrants generally occurs in a
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In 2011 and 2012 the border between FYR
MacedoniaandSerbiawasoneofthe‘topborder
sections’ for the smuggling of migrants in the
region,withmostpeoplehidinginvehiclestocross
into Serbia and some, mostly Afghan migrants,
crossingtheborderonfoot(withorwithouttheaid
ofsmugglers).127Serbiaisthemaintransitcountry




attempting irregular entry into the country
engagedtheservicesofmigrantsmugglers.Most
enter Serbia from FYR Macedonia or, in some
cases,fromKosovoorBulgaria.128 
MiratovacandPresevoareusuallythefirstpoints
of entry on the Serbian side of the border to
FYR Macedonia. When the number of irregular
migrants and smuggling activities increased in





In late 2015,whenMacedonian authorities took
steps to reduce the flow of irregular migrants
throughthecountry,eventuallyclosingtheborder
to most of them, more migrants began trying
to reach Serbia via Bulgaria, and Frontex noted
an increase in smuggling activities across the
Bulgaria-Serbiaborderatthattime.130 This trend 
appearstohavecontinuedin2016,whenitalso
affected the border to Romania. With more
migrantstravellingfromBulgariatoRomaniaand
thenusingsmugglerstocrossintoSerbiarather
than Hungary, where additional measures had
beenimplementedtodeterirregulararrivals.131
VI.4.1.2 Through/within the country
Irregular migrants often rely on the services
of smugglers to cross the country and travel
the approximately 600 kilometres from the
Macedonian to the Hungarian border. After
entering Serbia, most smuggled migrants
travelfromVranje inthesouthofthecountryto






by smugglers either directly or indirectly.






referred to as a hub for migrant smuggling.
Irregular migrants usually spend some time in
Belgrade, making decisions about their onward
journey and choosing between the services
offeredbydifferentsmugglers.
VI.4.1.3 Out of the country
Most smuggling activities out of Serbia involve
bordercrossingsintoHungary.Thelevelofthese
activities and the need of irregular migrants to
employsmugglersisoftenlinkedtothestringency
of border controls and fortifications along this





Hungary clandestinely, or they may be diverted
to other routes. By and large, the smuggling of
migrants from Serbia to Hungary appears to
increasewiththeoverallrise in irregularmigrant
flows. In the third quarter of 2014, for instance,








migrants to or across the border, or gave them
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instructions onwhere to cross. Theywere then
metbycarsor vanson theHungariansideand
taken to Budapest, the Austrian border, or even
straight into Austria.134 With fierce competition
amongsmugglers,itisnotuncommonforsome
smugglers to offer guarantees to migrants,
meaningthattheywillmakerepeatedattemptsto
cross theborderuntil themigrantssuccessfully
make it to Hungary. Despite these guarantees,
somesmugglersneverthelessdouble-chargethe
smuggled migrants, who often have no choice
buttocomplywiththesmugglersdemands.135 It 
hasbeenestimatedthatthepricetobesmuggled
from Belgrade or Subotica to Hungary ranges







also determines the prices of smuggling
servicesanditisevidentthatmigrantstend
to seek more for assisted border crossing




In the 2011–2017 period, the border to Croatia
wasusuallyeasierforirregularmigrantstocross,
which explains why there are fewer reports of
smuggling from Serbia into Croatia. Despite
this, manymigrants are drawn to Hungary and
the established smuggling industry across the
Serbian-Hungarian border.137 The closure of this




VI.4.2.1 Smuggling by land
Mostsmugglingactivities inSerbia involve land-
















Generally, most migrants are not smuggled
throughSerbia inone legbut encounter several
smugglersalongtheway,ortheymayundertake
some part of the journey without the aid of





Smuggling migrants by hiding them in private
vehicles is another common method of
transporting them from Bulgaria to Serbia, and




embark on the trucks at rest stops alongmain






irregular arrivals from Serbia, the border from
Serbia to Croatia has become one of the main
areas for the clandestine smuggling of non-
regionalmigrantsinvehicles.146
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cargotrainsonwhichmigrantsmaytravelovertly,
with valid tickets, or covertly, hiding in separate
compartmentsorcargoareas.147
On foot 
Smugglers in FYR Macedonia frequently guide
migrants to and across the border on foot
through remote areas, usually in groups of 30
to40.Manycrossingsonfootaredoneatnight
to avoid detection by border guards.148 The fee 
for smuggling on foot with a guide from FYR
Macedonia to Serbia, including transportation
by car to and from the border is said to be
aboutEUR 200.149Ithasalsobeenreportedthat
migrantsmayreceivemapsfromtheirsmugglers,
or that smugglers use plastic bags hanging on
trees tomark the route across the border from









with themigrants, thesmugglersminimise their
risk of beingdetectedandarrested. Sometimes
pilotcarsaresentoutaheadof themigrants to
check for border guards before the migrants
arebroughttotheborderandreleasedfromthe








and specifically the smuggling of migrants.
Serbia records someof the highest numbers of
fraudulent document detections in the region,
especially at the border to Hungary and, to a
lesserextent,attheborderwithCroatia.152
Based on the available information, it appears
that border crossings involving fraudulent
documentsmostlyinvolveSerbiannationalsand,
to a lesser extent, Albanians and Kosovars.153 
In 2015, Frontex further noted an increase in
the number Afghan and Syrian nationals using
fraudulent documents to enter Hungary from
Serbia.154
















Between 2015 and 2017, Serbia consistently
detected the highest number of migrant
smugglersofanycountryintheregion,reflecting
theverygreatprevalenceofmigrantsmuggling
throughout the country and the involvement of
many localpeople in this formof crime. In the
third quarter of 2015, when irregularmigration
along the Balkan route peaked, 62% of all
detections of migrant smugglers in the region
weremadeinSerbiaalone.157In2015,anywhere
between260and340migrantsmugglerswere
arrested each quarter, bringing the annual
monthly average to about 100.158 For 2016,
absolute figures are only available for the first
quarter when approximately 260 smugglers
weredetectedduringthisthreemonthsperiod.159 
For the remainder of the year and the first six
months of 2017, only percentages relative to
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detectionsinothercountriesintheregionhave
beenpublished.ThesefiguresshowthatSerbia





As mentioned earlier, the single largest group
of smugglers detected in Serbia are Serbian
nationals. Indeed, Serbian nationals constitute




As in most other places along the Balkan
route, the majority of persons involved in the
smuggling of migrants are local people who
engage in smuggling or related activities if and
when demand and opportunity arise. Most of
the smugglers operating along and across the
borderbetweenBulgariaandSerbia,forinstance,
areBulgariansandSerbianswhousuallyoperate
within their home country by taking or guiding
migrants to the border ormeeting themon the
other side.Many are taxi drivers or peoplewho
use theirownvehicles tomakesomeadditional





Organisers, on the other hand, who connect
migrantstolocalsmugglersorwhooverseethe
smuggling ventures in more than one country
are often not from the region, and sometimes
have the same background as the people
they smuggle.164 Social networks also play an
importantroleinthiscontext.Irregularmigrants
may use existing contacts, online platforms
or internet forums to connect to overseas
diasporas, and to migrants who have made
the same journey earlier. These contacts then
connect the ‘next generation’ of migrants to
smugglersandotherknowncontactsalongthe
mainroutes.165
VI.4.3.2 Organisations and networks
Information about specific organisations and
networks involved in thesmugglingofmigrants
through Serbia, as well as their structure and
operations,was very limited in the sources con-
sultedforthisreport.Thefactthatlargenumbers
of local people are involved in smuggling activi-
tieslendscredencetothesuggestionthatmany
smugglers are opportunists and amateurs who
turntosmugglingactivitiessuchastransporting,






up the migrants themselves; in others, they are
connectedtootherdriversandformloose‘teams’
thathandthesmuggledmigrantsfromonedriver
to the next. As such, anymoney earned usually
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VII KOSOVO
VII.1 Overview












continue to Hungary or Croatia. Irregular migra-
tion intoKosovo has also been recorded across
theborderfromAlbania,whichinvolvesAlbanian
nationalsaswellasnon-regionalmigrants.
Up until 2015, the principal irregular migration
‘problem’ associatedwithKosovowas the large-
scaleemigrationofKosovarnationals,especially
young people seeking to escape unemployment
and dire economic circumstances in Europe’s
poorest nation. The ongoing uncertainty regard-
ingKosovo’sinternationalstatus,aswellaswide-
spread corruption and ongoing border disputes
withSerbia,contributetothecountry’seconomic
difficulties,andtothedesireofKosovarstofind
employment, seek asylum or join the existing
diasporaabroad.1Kosovars can travel toSerbia
freely and easily, and then continue toHungary,
Croatia and other EUMember States using the
same routes and methods as irregular non-re-
gionalmigrantstravellingthroughtheBalkans.2 
Due to the large number of Kosovars entering
Western European countries, often facilitated
by smugglers, in the spring of 2015 several
destination and transit countries including
Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Serbia adopted
measures todeter thearrivalof further irregular
migrants from Kosovo, and to swiftly return
irregularly-migrating Kosovars to their country







VII.2.1.1 Numbers relating to illegal entry 





States, and that many of these migrants were
assistedbysmugglers.Thenumberofdetections
is, however, very low by comparison to other
Balkan states, and the increase in detections
appearstobearesultofbettercross-borderlaw
enforcement cooperation rather than a trend
towardsmoreirregularmigrationviaKosovo.5
Kosovo’sMinistryof InternalAffairs reports that
in 2014, 2,827 persons were refused entry at
the country’s border control points, nearly twice
as many as in 2013 (1,449 persons). In 2014,
383 irregular migrants (or 14%) were detected
at Pristina Airport, Kosovo’s only international





IOM has published figures relating to irregular
entriesintoKosovofortheyears2016and2017.
Thesefigures,showninFigure 53below,confirm
the low levels of irregular arrivals identified by
Frontex.While the second half of 2016 saw an
increaseinirregulararrivals,thisnumberdropped
againin2017.
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Year total 279 147
in2014pointtoan increase indetectionsoffor-
eigners residing in Kosovo illegally, rising from
just 100 cases in 2009 to 817 in 2012, falling
to720in2013andthenrisingto1,030in2014.9 







countries intheregion,there is little information
aboutthemainbordersandentrypointsusedto
cross from neighbouring countries into Kosovo.
Based on the limited data published by Frontex
on illegal border crossings into Kosovo, shown
in Figure  54 below, it appears that small and
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Figure 54: Illegal border crossings into Kosovo, 2011–2017 (Frontex)12
Illegal border crossings 
from 
Serbia into Kosovo
Illegal border crossings 
from FYR 
Macedonia into Kosovo


















2011 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 – total n.a. n.a. 149 n.a. 104 n.a.
2015–1stquarter n.a. n.a. 56 +70% 9 –59%
2015–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. 35 –18% 15 –38%
2015–3rdquarter 58 –2% 31 0% n.a. n.a.
2015–4thquarter 32 –42% 34 –24% 21 –5%
2015 – total n.a. +2% n.a. +5% n.a. –37%
2016–1stquarter n.a. –17% n.a. –61% n.a. +133%
2016–2ndquarter n.a. +30% n.a. –47% n.a. –47%
2016–3rdquarter n.a. +3% n.a. –10% n.a. +1886%
2016–4thquarter n.a. +50% n.a. 35% n.a. +462%
2016 – total n.a. +10% n.a. –26% n.a. +454%
2017–1stquarter n.a. –6% n.a. –39% n.a. –59%
2017–2ndquarter n.a. +20% n.a. +29% n.a. –4%
2017–3rdquarter n.a. –39% n.a. 400% n.a. –83%
2017–4thquarter n.a. –47% n.a. n.a. n.a. 113%
2017 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Most instances of illegal border crossings
are recorded at the ‘Administrative Boundary
Line’, the official term used to refer to the
border between Kosovo and Serbia. In 2014,
for instance, 1,253 persons or 44%of all cases
in that year were rejected at border crossing
points to Serbia, though this figure includes
inbound as well as outbound travellers.13 The 
bordercrossingsnearDheu IBardhë inKosovo
andnearMerdare inSerbia, located to theeast
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andsoutheastofPristina,wereidentifiedin2014




were rejected at the border to Albania, 285
personsor10%atborder control points toFYR
Macedonia,and175personsor6%attheborder
with Montenegro.15 These figures appear to
include both inbound and outbound travellers,
andthusoffer little insight intothetruelevelsof 
irregularentry intoKosovofromthesecountries.
A report by Frontex suggests that illegal border
crossingsfromAlbaniatoKosovobecamemore
common in 2012 as irregularmigrants found it
hardertohideorbesmuggledintrucksthatwere




in Kosovo is almost non-existent. According to
Kosovarauthorities, itappears that those found
tobestayingillegallyaremostlyforeignnationals
who overstay or otherwise violate their visas,
or who are not in possession of work permits,
rather than persons who entered the country
clandestinelyorotherwiseillegally.17Forirregular
migrantsfromAsiaandAfrica,Kosovoismostly
a transit point en route to final destinations in
WesternEurope.18
VII.2.4 Departures
VII.2.4.1 Emigration of Kosovars
WhileirregularmigrationintoandthroughKosovo
tends to occur on very low levels, very many
Kosovarnationalsmigrate irregularlytoWestern
Europe in thehopesofworking, settling, joining
theexistingdiasporaor,insomecases,applying





majority of Kosovars leave their country across
the Administrative Boundary Line to Serbia, a
bordertheycancrosseasily.InSerbia,Kosovars
canmovefreely.21
The causes for emigration from Kosovo are
complexandmulti-faceted,andadetailedanalysis
of the circumstances that ‘push’ Kosovars to
leaveand‘pull’themtodestinationsabroadfalls
outside the purposes and scope of this paper.
TheuncertaininternationalstatusofKosovo,high
youth unemployment, the poor socio-economic
situationofmanypeople,corruption,weaknesses
in the rule of law, and the inability of Kosovar




nationals to other parts of Europe has been
attributed to the fact that Kosovo is the only
country in the region whose citizens continue
torequirevisastoentertheSchengenZoneand
othercountriesintheEuropeanUnion(EU).23 The 
inability to travel freely and the complications
and long waiting periods associated with
obtaining visas explain why many Kosovars
migrate irregularly—andwhymigrantsmugglers
take advantage of this situation by offering
transportationandentry intoEUMemberStates
inexchangeforpayment.24Therehavelongbeen
calls for visa liberalisation, and a consensus
exists among experts that visa-free entry to




hasyet tobeset. Itappears that thereluctance
tointroducethischangeisdrivenbythefearthat




by Kosovar nationals was recorded in 2013.
Between1Januaryand30June2013thenumber
of recorded illegalbordercrossingsbyKosovars
intoEUMemberStates increased six-fold (or by
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542%) compared to 2012.26 This rise has been
explained by both internal and external factors,
whichaffecttheabilityofKosovarsto leavetheir














affectedmany parts of Europe,most detections
of irregular migrants were made at the Serbian-
Hungarianborder,especiallyafterHungarybegan
accommodating families who requested asylum
inopencentresratherthandetainingthem.31 The 
outflowofKosovarswasapparentlyalsofuelledby
rumours among Kosovars, and promises spread
bysmugglers,thatKosovarmigrantscouldeasily
findworkandobtainsocialwelfarebenefitsinEU
Member States, and that theywould be granted
asylum. Of the Kosovar families who moved to
Hungary and applied for asylum, many did not
remaininHungaryforlongbutinsteadmovedon
toAustriaandGermany.32Austriarecordeda50%






Irregular migration from Kosovo peaked in
February 2015, though the focus shifted from
Hungary, where fewer Kosovars were detected
at the border with Serbia, to Germany, which
became their primary destination.34 A total of
72,480 asylum applications were submitted by
Kosovar nationals in the EU in 2015; 37,095 or
approximately 50% of those in Germany and
24,455inHungary.35
Starting in March 2015, Austria, along with
Germany, Hungary, and Serbia, took active
measurestopreventanddeterKosovarmigrants
from reaching their territories, and collaborated
with the government of Kosovo to facilitate
returns. Advertising campaigns were run to
counter the information spread by smugglers.
As a result, the number of migrants dropped







VII.2.4.2 Departures of non-nationals from Kosovo
Given the low number of irregular non-regional
migrants entering and staying in Kosovo, it is
notsurprisingthatinformationaboutdepartures
fromKosovoisverylimited,andthattheavailable
sources suggest that the number of irregular
departures is very low. Data relating to illegal
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Figure 55: Illegal border crossings from Kosovo, 2011–2017 (Frontex)39
Illegal border crossings 
from 
Kosovo to Serbia
Illegal border crossings 
from 
Kosovo to Albania















2011 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 – total 211 n .a . n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015–1stquarter 72 +50% n.a. n.a. 2 n.a.
2015–2ndquarter 53 +8% n.a. n.a. 2 n.a.
2015–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. 7 –56% n.a. n.a.
2015–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Irregular migrants passing through Kosovo
either continue to Serbia and on to Hungary
or, especially after the closing of the Serbian-
Hungarian border, travel from Kosovo to
Montenegro and Croatia.40 It appears that the 
AdministrativeBoundaryLinetoSerbiarecords
the highest number of illegal border crossings
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VII.3 Profileofirregularmigrants
Information about the profile and background









of Internal Affairs further reported that Syrians
were the largest group of applicants seeking
asylum in Kosovo, though their total number is
relativelysmall.42Kosovarauthoritiesalsoreport
thatPakistanis,Palestinians,Nigerians,Albanians,
Algerians, Moroccans, Malians, and Tunisians
were among the other nationalities detected










Figure 56: Top nationalities of irregular migrants 















by the secondary movements from Turkey and
that Pristina airport is obviously not used for
entry of non-European migrants to Europe with
intentiontomoveillegallytowardstheEU.’46Official
figurespublishedbyKosovarauthoritiessimilarly
point to a very low level of smuggling activities





occur across the border from FYR Macedonia,
usually involving migrants from the Middle
East,SouthAsia,orNorthAfricawhopreviously
travelled via Turkey and Greece. The route via
Kosovo is a less frequently used alternative to
irregularmigrationandsmugglingviaSerbia.48 In 
2017, Frontex reported on smuggling activities
across theborder fromAlbania involvingmainly
Afghanmigrants.49
Smuggling fromKosovo, alongwithother forms
of irregular migration involving non-regional
nationals, is usually done across the border to
Montenegro, from where the migrants continue




Hungary,and fromthere tootherdestinations in




nationals is said to lead via FYR Macedonia to
GreeceandfromtherebyferrytoItaly.51
VII.4.2 Methods
Information about smuggling methods across




ANDREAS SCHLOENHARDT  |  IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS ALONG THE BALKAN ROUTE 
smuggledacross the ‘greenborder’, presumably
on foot, though in some cases migrants have
been found hidden in trucks.52 There are also
known cases in which Pakistani migrants
were smuggled by air on flights from Turkey to
Pristina, taking advantage of the visa-free entry
which Kosovo affords Turkish nationals. This
alsomeans that the documents of passengers
on incoming flights from Turkey are not or not
always inspected, or that some Pakistanismay
travelon fraudulentTurkishdocuments.53Swiss
authorities have further reported that migrants
arefrequentlysmuggledtoZurichandGenevaon
flightsoriginatinginPristina.54
Kosovar nationals usually leave the country on
public transport, especially on long-distance
busesbound forSerbia.55 Theuseof fraudulent
travel or identity documents appears to have
beenverycommonamongKosovarsduring the
period when they migrated irregularly in large






Based on the available sources, most of those
involvedinsmugglingKosovarnationalstendalso
tobefromKosovo.GermanandSwissauthorities
detected a particularly high number of Kosovar
smugglersatthetimewhenmanyKosovarswere
arriving in the European Union and Schengen
ZoneStateswith theassistanceofsmugglers.58 
Swissauthoritiesfurtherreportthatthenetworks
involved in smuggling Kosovar nationals have
associatespositionedalongthemainsmuggling
routes, are usually organised along ethnic lines,
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migrants travellingsouthwestof themain route
that leads via Serbia. Irregular migration in
Montenegro mostly occurs in a southeast to
northwest direction, with most irregular entries
occurring across the border with Albania, and
most departures leaving for Serbia, Croatia,
or, in lesser numbers, to Bosnia-Herzegovina.1 
The route taken by irregular migrants crossing
throughMontenegroisfrequentlyreferredtoasa
sub-routeofthemainroute.
By regional comparison, Montenegro plays a
very limited role for irregular migration and the
smugglingofmigrantsacross theBalkans.This
smallcountrywithapopulationofapproximately
625,000 has not been affected by the flow of
non-regional migrants in recent years in the
same way as most of its neighbours.2 For this
very reason, information concerning irregular





VIII.2.1.1 Numbers relating to illegal entry 
Overall, Montenegro has been less affected by





for instance, Frontex noted a 625% increase in
detections.3Modest increaseswere recorded in
early2015,4lownumbersthroughout2016,5 and 
slightincreasestowardstheendofthatyear.6 
IOM has published figures relating to irregular
entries intoMontenegrofor theyears2016and
2017.Thesenumbers,showninFigure 57below,
confirmthat the levelof irregularmigrationhas
been low in the past two years. It is notable,
however, that 2017 saw many more irregular
arrivals than previous years, and that the
numbersgrewparticularlyquicklyinthesecond
halfof2017.















Year total 308 807
VIII.2.1.2 Numbers relating to persons staying in the 
country illegally
Informationon the number of persons staying
or residing in Montenegro illegally was not
available.
VIII.2.2 Entrypoints










2013, Frontex reported a ‘sharp rise’ of 625% in
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detections of irregular migrants in Montenegro
comparedtothepreviousquarter,signallingthat
thisroutewasbecomingmoreestablished.10
Theavailable numbers relating to illegal border
crossingsfromAlbaniaintoMontenegro,shown
in Figure  58 below, have fluctuated somewhat
overtime,withconsiderableincreasesrecorded
in 2011, 2012 and late 2016, and decreases
recordedatsomeothertimesinthe2011–2017
period.11Overall thenumbersdonotshowany
specific trends and, by regional standards, are
not very high, involving no more than several
hundred persons a year detected entering
illegally from Albania. Despite the significant
increases recorded in some months, there
appears to have been no displacement to the
route via Montenegro; the very mountainous
terrain and the fact that neither Montenegro
norAlbaniaareEUMemberStatesareseenas
further reasons for the ‘low attractiveness’ of
thisroute.12
Illegal border crossings into Montenegro from
othercountriesappeartobeevenlesscommon,
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Figure 58: Illegal border crossings into Montenegro, 2011–2017 (Frontex)14
Illegal border crossings 
from Albania to 
Montenegro
Illegal border crossings 
from Kosovo to 
Montenegro
Illegal border crossings 
















2011 – total 180 +260% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–1stquarter 104 +478% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–2ndquarter 165 +313% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 – total 387 +115% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 – total 235 +37% 3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015–1stquarter 34 –39% 2 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015–2ndquarter 122 +15% 2 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015–3rdquarter 7 –11% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015 – total n.a. –22% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–1stquarter n.a. –76% n.a. n.a. n.a. –99%
2016–2ndquarter n.a. –83% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–3rdquarter n.a. +471% n.a. n.a. n.a. –98%
2016–4thquarter n.a. +47% n.a. n.a. n.a. +32%
2016 – total n.a. –49% n.a. n.a. n.a. –97%
2017–1stquarter n.a. –76% n.a. n.a. n.a. –60%
2017–2ndquarter n.a. –74% n.a. n.a. n.a. –13%
2017–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 265%
2017–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 11%
2017 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
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VIII.2.3 Stay
Based on the available information, it appears
that in recent years the arrival of irregular mi-
grantsinMontenegrohasoftenbeenfollowedby
applicationsforasylumlodgedinthecountry.In
2012 and 2013Montenegro recorded a particu-
larly high increase in asylum applications, espe-




migrants staying in the country temporarily be-
forecontinuingtoothercountries.16
VIII.2.4 Departures





Figure  59 below, demonstrate that the borders
withBosnia-Herzegovina,Serbia,andCroatiaare
moreor lessequallyaffectedby irregularmigra-
tion from Montenegro, with great variations be-
tweendifferentperiods.Numbers relating to ille-
gal border crossings toAlbaniaandKosovoare
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suggest thatmost irregularmigrants transiting







measures lessthat20kilometres in length,and
onlyonemainroadconnectsthetwocountries.
In the first half of 2017, Frontex reported an
increaseinthenumberofclandestinemovements









via Albania to Montenegro and ultimately to
WesternEurope.22
Prior to visa liberalisations which came into
effect at end of 2009, irregular migration from
MontenegroalsoinvolvedMontenegrinnationals,
thoughthisproblemhassincesubsided.23In2015,
however, some reports emerged stating that
some3,500personsfromnorthernMontenegro
wereleavingthecountrytoseekasylumabroad.
Most of them appear to have originated in a
cluster of towns that are home to a Muslim
minority.Manyof themsoldtheirbelongingsto
move toGermany, somewith theassistanceof
facilitators.24Furtherup-to-dateinformationabout
thisphenomenonwasnot availableat the time
ofwriting.
VIII.3 Profileofirregularmigrants
Based on the very small number of sources, it
appearsthatSyriannationalsconstitutedthelargest
group of non-regional migrants in Montenegro
in the 2011–2017 period. A 2018 publication by
IOM includesa ‘nationalitybreakdownof irregular
migrantsapprehendedonentrytoMontenegro’for
the years2016and2017.According to thisdata,





the large rise in thenumberofAlgeriannationals,
though the numbers of Moroccan, Syrian, and
Pakistanmigrantsalsogrewsubstantiallybetween
theseyears.
Figure 60: Top nationalities of irregular migrants 











migrants from the conflict zones in the Middle
East and South Asia. The number of Afghan,
Iranian, Iraqi,PakistaniandSyrian refugees,and
other persons of concern to UNHCR, shown in
Figure  61 below, is quite negligible. The years
2013 and 2014 saw higher numbers of Syrian
nationals,albeitinlownumbersincomparisonto
othercountriesintheregion.26In2012Montenegro
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Figure 61: Refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR, Montenegro 2011–2016, top 
nationalities28
Afghanistan Iran Iraq Pakistan Syria
2011 – total n.a. 1 1 n.a. n.a.
- refugees n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
- asylum-seekers n.a. 1 1 n.a. n.a.
2012 – total n.a. n.a. 1 10 7
- refugees n.a. n.a. 1 n.a. n.a.
- asylum-seekers n.a. n.a. 0 10 7
2013 – total 2 n.a. 2 7 60
- refugees n.a. n.a. 1 n.a. n.a.
- asylum-seekers 2 n.a. 1 7 60
2014 – total n.a. 2 4 n.a. 36
- refugees n.a. 1 1 n.a. 0
- asylum-seekers n.a. 1 3 n.a. 36
2015 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 2
- refugees n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 2
- asylum-seekers n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 0
2016 – total 21 10 15 12 11
- refugees 0 0 0 0 10
- asylum-seekers 21 10 15 12 n.a.
Montenegro is also a home to and destination
forirregularmigrantsfromothercountriesinthe
region.Serbiannationalsand,insmallernumbers,





through, and out of Montenegro is very limited,






Irregular migration through Montenegro,
including the smuggling of migrants, as
mentioned, occurs along a secondary route.
Thelevels,locations,andmethodsofsmuggling
along this route are not well documented.
Generally, the smuggling of migrants occurs
in a southeast to northwest direction, with
migrants entering Montenegro from Albania
andexitingthecountrybycrossingintoSerbia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, or Croatia.31 Although the
smugglingofmigrantshasbeenreferred toas
‘the secondmost important criminal activity’,32 
littletonoevidencehasbeenprovidedtosupport
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VIII.4.2 Methods
Based on the limited information available, it
appears that the smuggling of migrants in
Montenegro mostly occurs by land, and either
involvessmugglinginvehicles,guidingmigrants










Once the driver is asleep, migrants cut all
securityfeaturesandhideinthecargoarea.
Theyeitherdo thiswithout external helpor
solicitservicesfromfellowmigrantsorlocal
facilitators.34
Illegal border crossings on foot can occur at
almost any location along the border. Usually,
ruralorremoteareasarechosen,wheremigrants
and their smugglers are less likely to encounter
borderpatrols.It isforthisreasonthatcameras




of migrants by air through Montenegro is a
common occurrence. In 2013, Frontex reported 
cases in which Albanian nationals crossed 
 
 
into Montenegro and then, using fraudulent




There are presently no publicly available reports
containing information about the profiles and
backgrounds of persons engaged in smuggling
of migrants through Montenegro, or about the
networks in or with which they operate. The
availableinformationlargelyconsistsof isolated
reports of individual arrests and other cases
in which perpetrators were caught smuggling
migrants through Montenegro.37 These are not 
sufficient to make generalisations about the
type of offenders and organisations smuggling
migrantsthroughthecountry.
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into, through, and out of Bosnia-Herzegovina






declined significantly since that time, and today
generallyinvolveslegalavenuesofmigration.
Fromthelimitedsourceswhichcouldbelocated
during this research, it appears that Bosnia-
Herzegovina was not affected by irregular
migrationflowsonasignificantscaleinthe2011–
2017period.Comparedtomostofitsimmediate
neighbours, thecountrywitnessed relatively low
levels of irregular arrivals and departures, and
avoided much of the frenzy associated with
the large flow of irregularmigrants through the
WesternBalkansinthesecondhalfof2015.
This is not to say, however, that Bosnia-
Herzegovinahasnotbeenaffectedbytheevents
and developments associated with irregular
migrationinrecentyears.Thecountryissituated
attheheartoftheWesternBalkansandborders
Serbia and Croatia, two countries that have
experienced particularly high levels of irregular
migration in recent years. Since Croatia—a 
country with which Bosnia-Herzegovina shares
a long border—became aMember State of the
European Union (EU) on 1 July 2012, Bosnia-
Herzegovina has been perceived as a potential




Information about the number of migrants
entering or staying in Bosnia-Herzegovina is
extremelylimited.Mostoftheavailabledataand




migrants into Bosnia-Herzegovina is scarcely
documentedinpubliclyaccessiblesources.Since
Bosnia-Herzegovina and its eastern neighbours
Montenegro and Serbia are not EU Member
States,Frontex,Eurostat,andotherEUagencies




In 2014, the International Organisation of
Migration(IOM),publishedareportonmigration
flows through the Western Balkans which
contains some data on illegal border crossings
for the years 2009–2013. These figures, shown
inFigure 62below,suggestthatthelevelofillegal
immigration into Bosnia-Herzegovina, including
‘apprehensions at border control points, at the
green border, apprehended in the country, and
uponexit fromthecountry’, isvery low,and the
figures reveal nomajor trendor development in
thisperiod,thoughnumbersdroppedsignificantly
from2012to2013.
Figure 62: Illegal entries (apprehended 
upon entry, in country, or upon exit, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 2009–2013 (IOM)2







The limited number of irregular arrivals into
Bosnia-Herzegovinaappear to enter the country
mostly from Serbia and Montenegro. Complete
data for illegal border crossings into Bosnia-
Herzegovina is not available. Frontex has
published data from some quarters for the
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periodof 2011 to2017, but this data, shown in
Figure 63below, is too incomplete tomakeany








Croatia into Bosnia-Herzegovina could not be
locatedduringthecourseofthisresearch.
Figure 63: Illegal border crossings into Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), 2011–2017 (Frontex)3
Illegal border crossings from 
Montenegro into BiH






2011 – total n.a n.a n.a n.a
2012–1stquarter 4 –84% 6 –57%
2012–2ndquarter 29 +190% 24 +100%
2012–3rdquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a
2012–4thquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a
2012 – total 194 +273% 77 +4%
2013–1stquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a
2013–2ndquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a
2013–3rdquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a
2013–4thquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a
2013 – total n.a n.a n.a n.a
2014–1stquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a
2014–2ndquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a
2014–3rdquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a
2014–4thquarter n.a n.a n.a n.a
2014 – total 47 –32% 85 +10%
2015–1stquarter 7 –59% 8 –68%
2015–2ndquarter 10 +100% 35 +67%
2015–3rdquarter 9 –36% n.a n.a
2015–4thquarter 9 ––18% 14 –33%
2015 – total n.a –26% n.a n.a
2016–1stquarter n.a –14% n.a +67%
2016–2ndquarter n.a –50% n.a n.a
2016–3rdquarter n.a +200% n.a n.a
2016–4thquarter n.a 0% n.a +121%
2016 – total n.a +34% n.a +6%
2017–1stquarter n.a +489% n.a –16%
2017–2ndquarter n.a –89% n.a –12%
2017–3rdquarter n.a n.a n.a +291%
2017–4thquarter n.a +122% n.a –4%
2017 – total n.a n.a n.a n.a
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IllegalentryofthirdcountrynationalsintoBosnia-
Herzegovina ismostly seenasadiversion from









do not intend to remain in the country, or at
least not for long. For themajority of irregular
migrants,Bosnia-Herzegovinaismerelyatransit
country used when other, more direct routes




raised as to whether the country would have






From Bosnia-Herzegovina, most irregular
migrantscontinuenorth(orwest)toCroatia.The
borderbetweenthetwocountries,measuringover
1,000kilometres in length, is thesecond longest
externallandbordersectionoftheEU.Becauseof
itslength,thelargenumberofsmallroadscrossing
the border, and the presence of established
criminalorganisationsonbothsides, therehave
been some concerns that this border may be
usedforarangeofillegalactivities,includingthe
smugglingofmigrants.6Asmentionedpreviously,
it appears that irregular migration via Bosnia-
Herzegovina to Croatia serves as an alternative
route for some non-regional migrants seeking
to reach Hungary or Slovenia. In 2011–2012,
for instance, it was reported that some Turkish
nationals fly directly from Istanbul to Sarajevo




border crossings to Serbia and Montenegro do
notoccuronaverylargescale.Figure 64below
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Figure 64: Illegal border crossings from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2011–2017 (Frontex)8
Illegal border crossings 
from Bosnia-Herzegovina 
to Croatia
Illegal border crossings 
from Bosnia-Herzegovina 
to Serbia


















2011 – total 610 –23% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–1stquarter 82 –52% 6 –57% n.a. n.a.
2012–2ndquarter 163 +14% 24 +100% n.a. n.a.
2012–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 – total 645 +6% 77 +4% n.a. n.a.
2013–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 – total 430 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 – total 287 –41% 85 +10% n.a. n.a.
2015–1stquarter 61 –8% 8 –68% n.a. 7
2015–2ndquarter 45 –22% 35 +67% n.a. 10
2015–3rdquarter 77 +10% 40 n.a. n.a. 9
2015–4thquarter 119 +28% 14 –33% n.a. 9
2015 – total n.a. +5% n.a. n .a . n.a. n.a.
2016–1stquarter n.a. –23% n.a. 67% n.a. n.a.
2016–2ndquarter 45 +0% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–3rdquarter 59 –23% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–4thquarter 212 +79% n.a. +121% n.a. n.a.
2016 – total n.a. +23% n.a. +6% n.a. n.a.
2017–1stquarter 67 –68% n.a. –16% n.a. n.a.
2017–2ndquarter 127 +90% n.a. –12% n.a. n.a.
2017–3rdquarter 259 +104% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–4thquarter 394 +86% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
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IX.3 Profileofirregularmigrants
In the available open source information there
is very little detail about the nationality and
backgroundofirregularmigrantspassingthrough
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
AMigration	 Profile published by theMinistry of
Security of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2014 notes




Frontex reports for the years 2015, 2016, and
2017confirmthatthelargestgroupofpersons
entering and staying in Bosnia-Herzegovina
irregularly are Serbian nationals.10 In 2016,




for asylum in Bosnia-Herzegovina; most merely





in 2013. Other nationalities typically involved in
irregularmigrationthroughtheWesternBalkans
haveonlybeenregisteredasrefugeesorasylum-
seekers in Bosnia-Herzegovina in very small
numbers.
Figure 65: Refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR, Bosnia-Herzegovina 2011–2017, top 
nationalities13
Afghanistan Iran Iraq Pakistan Syria
2011 – total 2 1 2 1 3
- refugees n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
- asylum-seekers 2 1 2 1 2
2012 – total n.a. 1 1 n.a. 31
- refugees n.a. n.a. 1 n.a. 5
- asylum-seekers n.a. 1 0 n.a. 26
2013 – total 6 2 1 2 66
- refugees n.a. n.a 1 n.a. 48
- asylum-seekers 6 2 1 2 18
2014 – total 7 n.a. 5 n.a. 27
- refugees 0 n.a. 3 n.a. 25
- asylum-seekers 7 n.a. 2 n.a. 2
2015 – total n.a. n.a. 13 n.a. 17
- refugees n.a. n.a. 2 n.a. 14
- asylum-seekers n.a. n.a. 3 n.a. 3
2016 – total n.a. n.a. 10 n.a. 27
- refugees n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 15
- asylum-seekers n.a. n.a. 6 n.a. 12
IX.4 Smugglingofmigrants







There is no specific information concerning the
routes used to smuggle migrants across the
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borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is also not










to Croatia and then to other countries such as
SloveniaandHungary.AccordingtotheBosnian
authorities, flights from Istanbul to Sarajevo
have been used to smuggle migrants into the
country, thenmove them closer to Croatiawith
the intentionofsmugglingthemonward.16Other
sourcesalsopointtothesmugglingofmigrants
from Turkey to Bosnia-Herzegovina by air on
boardcommercialflights,ofteninvolvingTurkish
nationalstravellingonfraudulentdocuments.17
No information could be found on the individuals
andgroupsinvolvedinthesmugglingofmigrantsin
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of several irregular migration routes, yet the
countryexperiencesonlyrelativelymoderatelevels
of irregular migration and migrant smuggling
compared tomanyother countries in the region.
Romania ismostly a transit country for irregular
migrants continuing to Hungary and Western
Europe.1SinceJanuary1st2007Romaniahasbeen
aMemberStateof theEuropeanUnion (EU)and
migration flowsaresaid tohave increasedsince
that time. Romania is not, however, part of the
SchengenZone,andmigrantsthusfaceadditional
hurdles when they seek to cross from Romania
intoHungaryorotherSchengenZonecountries.2
Most irregular migrants enter Romania from
Bulgaria after travelling via Turkey, sometimes 
also via Greece. Furthermore, Romania experi-
encesirregularmigrationandmigrantsmuggling
across its northern borders from Moldova and
Ukraine. Migrants entering Romania across the
country’s northern border have travelled along




used by irregular migrants runs from Serbia to
Hungary via Romania; a small detour that is
sometimes taken when border crossings from
SerbiatoHungaryarenotpossible.
For some irregular migrants, Romania is a
destinationcountrywheretheycanseekasylum
andareaffordedprotection.Agrowingnumberof
Syriannationals, alongwith smaller numbersof





X.2.1.1 Numbers relating to illegal entry 
(detections at the border)
Information about the total number of irregular
migrants detected in Romania annually is only
availableforsomeyearsinthe2011–2017period.
A2012publicationnotes that in2011,Romanian
authorities detected more than 1,000 persons
enteringRomaniaillegally,upfromjust6in2010.3 
For the year 2013, the International Organisation
for Migration (IOM), reported that 2,318 irregular
migrantshadbeenidentified.4In2014,IOMrecorded





A further indicator of the level of irregular
migration to Romania is the data collected by
Eurostat, the EU’s statistical office, relating to
refusalsofentrytonon-EUnationalsattheborder.
Accordingtothisdata,showninFigure 67below,
several thousandpeople are refused entry each
year,most of thematRomania’s extensive land
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Figure 67: Non-EU citizens refused entry, Romania 2011–2017 (Eurostat)8







2011 3,620 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 3,340 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 3,410 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 4,045 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015 4,810 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016 5,390 4,480 83.1% 815 15.1% 95 1.8%
X.2.1.2 Numbers relating to persons staying in the 
country illegally
Additional figures published by Eurostat show
that the number of foreigners found to be




numbers recorded in 2011. Based on this
information it appears that, unlike many other
countries in the region, the flow of irregular
migration in recent years has not led to a rise
in thenumberofpeople foundtobestaying in
Romaniaillegally.
X.2.2 Entrypoints
Romania experiences the arrival of irregular
migrants from a range of directions, as several
routes converge on this country. This includes
the entry of irregularmigrants fromTurkey and
Greece who arrive via Bulgaria, the arrival from





collects data on illegal border crossings into
Romania fromnon-EUMemberStates,which is
shown in Figure  69 below and examined in the
followingsections.
Figure 68: Third country nationals found to 
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Figure 69: Illegal border crossings into Romania, 2011–2017 (Frontex)10
Illegal border crossings 
from Serbia into Romania
Illegal border crossings 
from Moldova

















2011 – total 2,037 +4,057% 346 +77% n.a. n.a.
2012–1stquarter 1,021 +953% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–2ndquarter 1,157 +405% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 – total 3,288 +61% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 – total 73 –98% n.a. +228% n.a. n.a.
2014–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 – total 37 –49% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015–1stquarter 13 +30% 9 –47% 10 –66%
2015–2ndquarter 46 +2,200% 40 +67% 16 –27%
2015–3rdquarter 27 +358% 34 +209% 47 +52%
2015–4thquarter 15 –21% 2 –90% 72 +279%
2015 – total n.a. +2,489% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–1stquarter n.a. –90% 16 78% 23 130%
2016–2ndquarter n.a. –3% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–3rdquarter n.a. +815% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016–4thquarter n.a. +1,780% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016 – total n.a. –31% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–1stquarter n.a. +55% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–2ndquarter n.a. +95% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–3rdquarter n.a. –84% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–4thquarter n.a. 21% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
151
  
ANDREAS SCHLOENHARDT  |  IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS ALONG THE BALKAN ROUTE 
X.2.2.1 From Serbia
Figure  69 above shows that in the early 2010s,
considerable numbers of irregular migrants




2011was initially attributed to statistical errors,
thoughitlaterbecameclearthatthesedetections
mostly involved migrants of North African
backgroundwhohadpreviouslytravelledthrough
Greece and FYR Macedonia.12 The increase in 
irregular arrivals continued throughout 2012. It
was further noted that most detections were
madeclosetotheSerbianandRomanianborders
to Hungary, suggesting that the movements
from Serbia to Romania were a (temporary)
displacement of migrants who encountered
difficultiestryingtocrossdirectlyfromSerbiainto
Hungary, as authoritiesmade it harder to cross
that border illegally.13 Bymid-2012 itwas found
thatgrowingnumbersofAfghannationalswere
crossingintoRomaniafromSerbia,too.14
Towards the end of 2012 irregular arrivals
startedtodeclineagain;15atrendthatcontinued
through2013and2014,asshown inFigure69
above. The reintroduction on 1 July 2013 of
Hungary’s policy todetain asylumseekershad,
ifany,onlyaminorimpactonirregularmigration
via Romania;16 unlike, for instance, Croatia and
Slovenia. The flow of very large numbers of
irregular migrants through the region between
August and December 2015, and the closure
of Hungary’s border with Serbia and thenwith
Croatia,didnotaffecttheborderbetweenSerbia
andRomaniainanymajorway.Figure 70below
shows that illegal crossings between control
pointsattheSerbian-Romanianborderremained
lowuntilmid–2016.
Figure 70: Illegal border crossings, Romania–
Serbia, October 2015–2017 (Frontex)17
Illegal border crossings 










Since mid-2016, irregular migration by non-re-
gional migrants from Serbia into Romania has
increasedconsiderably.Thishasbeenattributed
to the fact thatmigrants inSerbia gradually ran
outofotheroptionstoleaveSerbia,acountrythey
didnotwishtoremainin.InlateOctober2016the








entering Romania across the border from
Bulgaria—an internalEUborder—isnotavailable,
though there are reports that border crossings
occurbothovertlyandcovertly,withandwithout
the use of smugglers.19 The scale of irregular
border crossings from Bulgaria to Romania
appearstobeaffectedbytheabilityorinabilityto
crossfromBulgariatoSerbia.TheUnitedNations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for
instance,notedinSeptember2016thatincreased
restrictions at the borderwith Serbia redirected
someirregularmigrantstotheRomanianborder
and forced them to use dangerous, clandestine
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X 2.2.3 From Turkey
Romaniaalsooccasionallyexperiencesirregular
arrivals by boat directly from Turkey, albeit in
small numbers. The first reports of irregular
migrants travelling across the Black Sea to
Romania,aswellasBulgaria,21emerged inmid
2013, when two groups of Syrian nationals
arrivedbyboatfromasmallportnear Istanbul.
Both cases were reportedly facilitated by
smugglers.22 Further arrivals, also including
Afghan nationals, followed in 2013 and 2014,
leading tosuggestions that thiswouldbecome
amoreestablishedrouteinresponsetogreater
surveillance in the Aegean Sea.23 In 2014, 433
persons were detected crossing the Black




from Turkey to Romania emerged, which again
resulted in speculation that smugglers were
testingnewroutestobringmigrantstotheEU.In
August 2013, for instance, the Romanian Coast
Guarddetected101adultsand56childrenfrom 
Iran and Iraq on a small, overcrowded fishing
vessel thathad travelled fromTurkeyandcame
intodistressduringstrongwinds.25
X.2.2.4 From Moldova
Information about the arrival of irregular
migrants fromMoldova into Romania is quite
limitedand,asshowninFigure 69above,data
isonlyavailable forsomeyears.Theavailable
information nevertheless demonstrates that
irregularmigrantsareregularlydetectedatthis
border, albeit not in largenumbers. It appears
that most of these border crossings involve
covert methods, such as hiding in vans or
even swimming across one of the rivers that
separate the two countries. Irregular arrivals
from Moldova generally involve non-regional
migrants such as Afghan, Bangladeshi and












For most irregular migrants, Romania is a
transitcountryenroutetoHungaryandWestern
Europe. The fact that Romania only has very
small communities of people from the same
background as newly arrivingmigrants appears
tobeafurtherreasonwhymanymigrantsprefer
tosettleelsewhere.Forsomeirregularmigrants,
however, Romania is a destination country,
thoughtherearenofiguresorother information
givingany indicationas towhich factors induce
irregularmigrantstoremaininorleaveRomania.27
X.2.4 Departures
Most irregular migrants transiting through Ro-
mania continue east to Hungary. This border,




the border between Romania and Hungary for




low, upuntil the autumnof 2015 theborder to
Romania recorded the second highest number
ofirregulararrivalsintoHungary,secondonlyto
Serbia.28
In 2017, reports emerged about an increase in
thenumberof irregularmigrantsdepartingfrom
Romania (and also from Bulgaria) for Serbia.29 
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come from a diverse range of source countries
in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Eastern
Europe.Theavailable informationmostlyrelates
to refugees and asylum seekers recorded by
Romanianauthorities.Broaderinformationabout
theprofileofirregularmigrantsisverylimited.
Generally,mostmigrantswho apply for asylum
in Romania are of Middle Eastern and South
Asianbackground,whileothernationalitieseither
use Romaniamerely as a transit point to other
destinations or remain in Romania illegally and
clandestinely. Figure  71 below shows that the
numberof refugees fromSyria increasednearly
tenfold between 2012 and 2013, and continued




Figure 71: Refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR, Romania 2011–2016, top nationalities30
Afghanistan Iran Iraq Pakistan Syria
2011 – total 148 60 612 99 47
- refugees 91 38 474 6 20
- asylum-seekers 57 22 13 93 27
2012 – total 127 52 562 11 162
- refugees 125 50 487 9 152
- asylum-seekers 2 2 0 2 10
2013 – total 125 75 304 20 1,023
- refugees 108 74 293 18 932
- asylum-seekers 19 1 110 2 91
2014 – total 159 75 382 56 1,392
- refugees 120 65 323 25 1,278
- asylum-seekers 39 10 26 31 114
2015 – total 182 82 438 34 1,687
- refugees 141 69 345 34 1,591
- asylum-seekers 41 13 68 30 96
2016 – total 130 67 438 47 1,796
- refugees 129 64 426 33 1,775
- asylum-seekers n.a. n.a. 12 14 21
SyrianandIraqinationalsareamongthe largest
groupsofirregularmigrantsdetectedinRomania.
Iranians are also frequently apprehended, albeit
insmallernumbers.Thesethreenationalitiesare
alsoamongthemainsourcecountriesofpersons
applying for asylum in Romania.31 While most
irregularmigrantsenterRomaniafromBulgaria,32 
therehavealsobeenreportsofSyriannationals
travelling directly from Turkey across the Black
Sea toRomania,usuallywith theaidofmigrant
smugglers.33
Afghanistan and Pakistan are two further
significant source countries of asylum seekers
andirregularmigrantsinRomania.34A2013report
further suggests that Afghan and Bangladeshi
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reportnotesthatChinaisafurthersourcecountry





growing numbers of Algerian and Moroccan
nationals who were detected at the Romanian-








The smuggling of migrants through Romania
generallyoccursinaneast-westdirection.
MigrantsaresmuggledfromBulgariatoRomania
using covertmethods, such as hiding in trucks









clandestine methods of entry. Some migrants
initially travel to Moldova, including legally by




While most irregular migrants, including
smuggledmigrants,reachRomaniaviaBulgaria,
there have been several instances ofmigrants
bypassing Bulgaria and the tight controls
alongthebordersbetweenBulgariaandTurkey






intoHungary. Some, albeit in smaller numbers,
continue to Serbia, and fewer still travel to




X.4.2.1 Smuggling by land
Smuggling ventures into and out of Romania
involves both overt and covert methods. The
‘better’andfasterthesmugglingmethod—i.e.the
lower the likelihood ofmigrants being detected,
andthegreatertherapiditywithwhichtheyreach
their next destination—the higher the price they
havetopaysmugglers.
It has been reported that thosemigrants who
can afford it transit through Romania using
fraudulenttraveloridentitydocumentssupplied
for high prices by their smugglers. Thosewho
cannot afford to pay for forged documents
travel in trucks, vans or cars, or are hidden
in compartments built specially to conceal
smuggled migrants when they enter, transit
through,orexitRomania.46
Covert smugglingmethods involving cars, vans,
andtrucksaresaidtobeparticularlycommonin
Romania. Thesemethods are used to smuggle
migrantsfromBulgariaorMoldovaintoRomania,
but also to bring them from Romania into
Hungary.47 Crossing Romania’s borders on foot
is cheaper still, andmigrantsmay attempt this
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X.4.2.2 Smuggling by air
Reports about the smuggling of migrants by
air into,viaor fromRomaniaarequite isolated,
and do not lend themselves to generalisations.
In some instances, smuggled migrants from
Vietnam initially flew to theRussianFederation
before continuing by plane to Romania, where
theywereaccommodatedinsafehousesbefore
beingtakenoverlandtoHungary.49Otherreports
refer to the arrival of Pakistani nationals at
Bucharestairport,thoughitisnotclearwhether
this information relates to the smuggling of
migrantsor to legitimate travel.50 Indeed,some
sourcesseemtoconflateandconfuselegaland
irregular migration and, in so doing, directly or
indirectly accusemigrants of using smugglers
even if the circumstances of their journey
are lawful and compliant with the applicable
immigrationlaws.
X.4.2.3 Smuggling by sea
In 2013, and again in 2017, reports emerged
ofmigrantsmuggling fromTurkey toRomania
across the Black Sea. In July 2013, Romanian
authorities detected two instances of Turkish
smugglersbringingatotalof59Syriannationals
fromTurkeytoRomaniaaboardTurkishfishing
vessels.51 At that time, Frontex suggested that
thismaybebecomingamoreestablishedroute.
These incidents still constitute isolated cases,
but they reveal possible increasing pressure
of seasonal irregular migration from Turkey
across theBlackSea.Theyarepossibly linked
to the increased surveillance on the Eastern
Mediterraneanrouteandtheincreasingnumber
ofmigrants waiting in Turkey to reach the EU
illegally.52
Amongthesourcesconsultedforthisresearch,
therewere no further reports of this kind until
September 2017 when Romanian authorities
detected one or more wooden fishing vessels
carrying a total of 101 adults and 56 children
from Iranand Iraq.Theyhadboardedavessel
designedtocarryaboutadozenpeopleinTurkey,
and were then taken across the Black Sea to
Romania.Atthattime, itwasagainspeculated





involved in the smuggling of migrants through
Romania covers a broad range of nationalities.
Some of this information stems from media
reports and is somewhat anecdotal, hence it is
not possible to point to specific nationalities




Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Syria, and
Turkey who have been involved in smuggling
migrants into or out of Romania.54 Most were
driversdetectedonenteringorexitingthecountry.
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XI HUNGARY
XI.1 Overview
Hungary plays a very complex role in irregular
migrationalongtheBalkanroute.Inrecentyears




irregularmigrants seeking to travel fromSerbia,
Croatia, and Romania via Hungary to Austria,
GermanyandotherpartsofWesternEurope.
The patterns and levels of irregular migration
through Hungary are uniquely influenced by
political developments and legal and practical
measuresadoptedbytheHungarianGovernment.
On24December2010, lawsrelatingtorefugees
and asylum seekers in Hungary were amended









policy change almost immediately triggered an
influx of irregular migrants using Hungary as a
gateway to theEuropeanUnion (EU) rather than
taking longer, slower routes via neighbouring
countries.Todeterrefugees,asylumseekersand
other irregular migrants from entering Hungary,
thedetentionpolicywasreintroducedasof1July
2013. Frontex, theEU’sBorder andCoastGuard
Agency,reportedthatHungary’sdecisiontoopen
or close asylum centres had a direct impact on
respective increasesanddecreases inmigration
flow within the region, though less so on the
number of transiting migrants.2 Some political
decisions concerning border measures and
asylumwere takenunilaterallyby theHungarian
Government, with little consultation and little
concernfortheeffectthesemeasuresmighthave
onneighbouring countries ormigrants. Someof
thesemeasureshavecausedconsiderableharm
andsufferingtomigrants,includingrefugees.





time, introducing new offences for unauthorised






























XI.2.1.1 Numbers relating to illegal entry 
In theyears leadingup to2015,Hungaryexperi-
enced high levels of irregular arrivals, especial-
ly across the border from Serbia and, in lesser
numbers, from Croatia and Romania.6 Frontex
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notedanincreaseinthenumberofillegalborder
crossingsintoHungarybetween2009and2011.7 
Figures rose moderately through 2012, but in-
creased fourfold in thefirstsixmonthsof2013.
IOM,theInternationalOrganisationforMigration,
reportsthat26,061migrantscrossedorattempt-
ed to cross intoHungary irregularly in 2013, up
from9,933in2012and6,904ayearearlier.8 This 








by theHungariangovernment tobuilda ‘wall to
keepoutdesperatemigrants’.11
Figure 72: Migrant arrivals Hungary, 2015–2017 
(IOM)12
2015 2016 2017
January 14,647 543 133
February 17,384 2,398 166
March 5,975 3,412 37
April 8,224 3,946 46
May 11,606 3,463 112
June 19,546 3,768 50
July 38,059 573 165
August 57,938 346 303
September 138,396 152 312
October 99,155 164 191
November 315 189 64
December 270 267 47
year total 411,515 19,221 1,626





riving inHungaryeveryday, rising tomore than
1,500 by early August and to 2,000–3,000 mi-
grantsperdayinSeptember.13
Beginning with the construction of the border
fence to Serbia, Hungary adopted a range of
measuresdesigned toprevent andobstruct the
arrivalof irregularmigrants,whichledtoarapid
decreaseinthenumberofarrivals,droppingfrom
99,155 inOctober2015 to just315amonth lat-
er.A small rise to nearly 4,000 irregular arrivals
was recorded in early 2016, but numbers have
remained very low since then. After counting
411,515irregulararrivalsin2015,thatnumberfell
to19,221in2016andjust1,626in2017.
XI.2.1.2 Numbers relating to persons staying in the 
country illegally
Up until 2012, most people found staying in
Hungaryillegallywereoverstayerswhooriginally
entered the country legally but failed to leave
when their visa or other permit expired.14 Since
2012,statisticsrelatingtothenumberofpersons
staying in the country illegally reflect the great
increase in the number of irregular migrants








Up until September 2015, the majority of
irregularmigrants enteredHungary fromSerbia.
The completion of the border fence along this
border temporarily shifted irregularmigration to
Figure 73: Third country nationals found to be illegally present, Hungary 2011-2016 (Eurostat)15
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
No . of persons 3,810 6,420 28,755 56,170 424,055 41,560
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Hungary’s border with Croatia, until this border
waslikewiseclosedbyerectingafence.Irregular
entries from Romania are an alternative route
through the Balkans to Hungary. Hungary also
shares borders with Ukraine and Slovakia, and
witnessessomeirregularmigrationalongtheso-
called Northern Route through these countries
toHungary. In 2015, the EuropeanCommission
publishedabreakdownofillegalbordercrossings
to Hungary by border section for the period of
January 2013 to July 2015, which is shown in
Figure 74below.
Figure 74: Illegal border crossings into Hungary 







Airports 2 0 0
Austria 0 0 0
Croatia 135 2016 359
Romania 686 995 533
Serbia 19,675 43,711 103,404
Slovakia 0 0 0
Slovenia 0 0 0
Ukraine 68 170 266
Inland 3,042 4,973 10,591
Total 23,608 50,065 106,938












pa. Kelebia (railway), Ásotthalom, Röszke (road
andrailway),Szeged(port),andTiszasziget.18





of refugees and migrants rushing to cross the
border before it was closed on 15 September
2015.UNHCRreportsthat:
The Hungarian authorities did not provide
shelter,food,waterormedicalcaretosome
2,000 individuals waiting in front of the
fence.Tensionsescalatedonbothsides,but
theHungarianauthoritiesdidnottakeupan
offer from UNHCR to mediate, and, on 16
September 2015, riot police responded to
scenesofdisorderwith teargasandwater
cannon. 19
Once completed, this border fence triggered a
massive displacement of migration flows, with
hundreds of thousands of people moving from
SerbiatoCroatiainsteadofHungary.
The scale of irregular arrivals from Serbia into
Hungaryiswelldocumented,thoughfiguresvary
somewhat between sources. Figure  75 below
shows the number of illegal crossings from
Serbia,asreportedinannualandquarterlyreports
published by Frontex. Illegal border crossings
from Serbia to Hungary have historically been
quitehighaspeoplesoughttoentertheEuropean




border illegally. With the measures adopted by
HungaryinSeptember2015,thenumberdropped
toverylowlevels.







crossings between border control points rose
from2,959 to142,918.Since that time thenum-
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Figure 75: Illegal border crossings from Serbia to 
Hungary, 2011–2017 (Frontex)20
absolute number











































































By thestartof the2011–2017period, the route
from Greece via FYRMacedonia to Serbia was
well established and, as already mentioned,
several thousandmigrants crossed fromSerbia
into Hungary every year. By 2011, the highest
numberof illegal crossingsatanyborder in the
Balkanswas detected at the Serbian-Hungarian
border.At that time,andthroughout2012,most
irregular migrants crossing from Serbia into
Hungary were Afghan nationals, followed by
KosovarsandPakistanis.22 
In the first half of 2013 the volume of irregular
migrationacrossthisborder further increased.23 
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Thefirstquarterof2013recordedathreefoldrise
compared to the first quarter of 2012, mostly
because of changes to Hungary’s asylum laws,
whichwereseenasmaking iteasier forasylum
seekerstoapplyforasyluminHungaryandthen
moveontootherdestinations.24 These changes 
aresaidtoexplainthesharpincreaseintheillegal
arrival of Kosovars in early 2013. At the same
time,andalsoasaresultofthesechanges,other
nationalities such as Algerians started tomove
across this border in growing numbers.25 Over
thefollowingthreeyears,mostmigrantscrossed




Budapest, though many migrants crossed the
borderonfootinruralareasawayfromthemain
bordercheckpoints.26 
Amendments to Hungary’s asylum procedures
introducing the detention of asylum seekers
arriving in Hungary, which came into effect on
1July2013, resulted inadropof50%  in illegal
border crossings in the third quarter of 2013.27 
It has been reported that Kosovars in particular





from Serbia into Hungary stabilised, albeit at
relatively high levels. Afghans andSyrianswere
among the largest groups of irregularmigrants
detectedatthisborder.29 
In the third quarter of 2014, especially from
September onwards, the number of border
crossings increased by as much as 193% over
thepreviousquarter. Inthefourthquarternearly
30,000 migrants crossed the border illegally,







nearly40,000 in the followingquarter.32Upuntil
February2015,Kosovarswereamongthelargest




to specifically prevent Kosovars from leaving
Kosovo, deter them from moving to Western
Europe, and deport them back to Kosovo in
largenumbers.33ThegrowingnumberofAfghan
and, inparticular,Syriannationalsmovingalong
the Western Balkan route, however, meant that
irregular migration from Serbia to Hungary
continuedto increase in the followingmonths.34 
As the number of illegal border crossings
continuedtorisestillhigher inAugust2015,the
HungarianGovernmentannouncedthat itwould




and that many more were diverted to a route




and 76 above, did not completely stop the flow
ofirregularmigrantsfromSerbiatoHungary.For







tostop,orat least limit, thenumberofmigrants
enteringfromSerbia,moreandmorepeopletried
to enter Hungary. Because Croatia continued to
allowasylumseekersfromAfghanistan,Iraq,and




reached itshighest levelsince thecompletionof
theborderfence;onaverage,some120persons
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again as far fewermigrants were able to reach




2016 andwell into 2017.41 In the 2016 calendar








the decrease in detections in 2017, but are said
tohaveplacedgreaterpressureonRomaniaand
Croatia,where illegal border crossing detections
roseasaresult.43
XI.2.2.2 From Croatia
Information about illegal border crossings from
Croatia intoHungary issurprisingly limited.This




Based on the available information, it appears
that irregular migration across the Croatian
borderhadoccurredat relatively low levelsprior
totheclosureoftheborderbetweenHungaryand
Serbia.44 The completion of the border fence to
Serbia,asmentioned,hadtheimmediateeffectof
shifting the flowof irregularmigrants toCroatia
fromwheremostofthemcontinuedtoHungary
inlargenumbersinthesecondhalfofSeptember







migrants moving through Romania. The border
between the two countries, measuring 448




migrants from Algeria were detected entering
HungaryfromRomania.47
The European Commission has published data
on illegalcrossingsof theborder fromRomania
to Hungary for selected years, showing that
detections of illegal border crossings rose from
686 in2013to995 in2014.Between1January
and 31 July 2015, a further 533 persons were
detected.While these figures are comparatively
low,upuntiltheautumnof2015theborderwith




Information about the levels and patterns of




from Russia via Belarus and/or Ukraine, or at
times via the Baltic States, to Poland, Slovakia,
Hungary,and/orRomania.Datapublishedbythe
EuropeanCommission,showninFigure 74above,
shows an increase in illegal border crossings
from Ukraine to Hungary from 2013 and 2014.
Further quarterly data released by Frontex,
showninFigure 77below,demonstratesthatthis
trend continued throughout 2015, when more
than600illegalbordercrossingswererecorded
inoneyear.
XI.2.2.5 From Slovakia and Slovenia
Data published by the European Commission
suggests that no illegal border crossings were
recordedfromSlovakiaandSloveniaintoHungary
(seeFigure 74above).SincetheseareinternalEU
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Hungary is nevertheless concerned that these
countries couldbeusedasdeparture points for
irregularmigrants trying toenter thecountry. In
October2015, for instance,Hungary temporarily
introduced controls at the border to Slovenia,
expecting that some irregular migrants might
seektoreachHungaryafterthebordertoCroatia
was closed and following steps taken by the




for irregular migrants. As a Member State of
the European Union and the Schengen Zone,
Hungary offers many of the perceived benefits
that draw migrants to Europe. From Hungary,
irregularmigrantscan,forthemostpart,continue
their journey freely, and up until 2013 Hungary
maintainedrelativelyliberalasylumpolicieswhich
explained why many refugees from warn-torn
countries such as Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq
sought to reach Hungary and apply for asylum.




Hungary’s increasingly tough and controversial
stand on all matters relating to international
migration,anditsovertlyhostileandxenophobic
campaigns against refugees, asylum seekers,
and other irregular migrants, has reduced its
attractivenessasadestinationcountry.52Notleast
because of these policy developments and the
publicityaroundthem,formostirregularmigrants
Hungary is primarily a transit point en route to
Austria and other Western European countries.
This became particularly evident in August and
September2015,whenlargenumbersofirregular
migrants travelled fromSerbia throughHungary
toAustriaandspentjustafewdaysinthecountry.
Therehavealsobeen reportsofasylumseekers
submitting applications for asylum in Hungary








instances, especially in the summer and fall of




In early 2016 there were some reports of an
increase in irregular migration from Hungary
to Slovenia and thence to Italy. This has been
attributedtothereintroductionofbordercontrols
along the Austrian border, which diverted some


















Figure  78 below, which displays the number of
refugeesandasylumseekersrecordedbyUNHCR
in Hungary for the years 2011 to 2016, shows
that although several hundred thousand people
passedthroughHungaryduringthisperiod,very
few reported to authorities andorganisations in
thecountryinordertoseekasylum.Upuntil2014,




Figure 78: Refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR, Hungary 2011–2016, top nationalities
Afghanistan Iran Iraq Pakistan Syria Somalia
2011 – total 1,697 167 998 68 42 406
- refugees 1,697 167 998 68 42 406
- asylum-seekers 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012 – total 1,131 145 563 77 86 431
- refugees 1,131 145 563 77 86 431
- asylum-seekers 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013 – total 1,446 79 235 201 325 488
- refugees 749 69 223 34 141 446
- asylum-seekers 697 10 12 167 184 42
2014 – total 3,442 151 392 144 1,157 529
- refugees 819 68 220 35 334 496
- asylum-seekers 2,623 83 172 109 523 33
2015 – total 9,411 458 2,661 3,677 19,083 684
- refugees 942 104 396 47 476 611
- asylum-seekers 8,469 354 2,265 3,630 18,607 73
2016 – total 2,400 241 862 246 1,448 662
- refugees 1,008 112 466 55 584 644
- asylum-seekers 1,392 129 396 191 864 18
XI.3.1 TheMiddleEast
Based on the available information, Syrian
nationalsconstitutethesecond largestgroupof
irregularmigrantsmovingtoorthroughHungary.56 
The number of Syrian nationals has been very
high since 2012, and increased further in 2013
and 2014, rising fourfold in the fourth quarter
of 2014.57Most enteredHungary fromSerbia.58 






Afghan nationals are said to constitute the
largestgroupofirregularmigrantswhoarrivedin
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route via FYR Macedonia and Serbia, though
somemoved through Bulgaria and/or Romania
before reaching Serbia and/or Hungary.60 The 
number of Afghan nationals entering Hungary
rose significantly in 2012 and 2013, and many




Irregular migrants from Pakistan constitute
another significant group in Hungary, though
theirnumbersappeartohavebeenhigherin2012
and 2013 than in more recent years. Pakistani










illegally. These reportsmostly relate to Algerian
nationals who enter Hungary from Romania or
Serbia.66InstancesofSomali,Eritrean,andMalian
nationalsmoving to or throughHungary appear
tobelesscommon.67
XI.3.4 Other
After Afghans and Syrians, Kosovars constitute
the third main group of irregular migrants who
enteredHungary inthe2011–2017period.Their
number rose considerably in 2012 and 2013.68 
In 2013, over 6,000 Kosovars entered Hungary
illegally, most of them to apply for asylum.69 In 
the first quarter of 2013, Hungary recorded a
threefold increase in the number of irregular
Kosovarmigrantsdetectedinthecountry,andan
eightfold increase in theirasylumapplications.70 
Inthesecondquarteroftheyear,abouthalfofall
personscrossingtheborderfromSerbiaillegally
were Kosovars.71 The changes to Hungary’s
asylum procedures which came into effect
on 1 July 2013 resulted in a significant drop in
irregulararrivalsfromKosovo,72onlytoriseagain
when some of these policies were reimposed
in 2014.73 In the third quarter of 2014, more
than 3,000 asylum applications were lodged
in Hungary by Kosovars, a 736% increase over
thepreviousquarter.74 It hasbeen reported that
many Kosovars moved to Hungary as family
units and then applied for asylum merely to
avoid immigration detention. Family units were
permittedtostay inopenasylumcentres,and it
appears thatmost Kosovars absconded shortly
after lodging their application and then moved
ontootherpartsoftheEU,especiallytoAustria,
Germany,andSweden.75ThenumberofKosovars
entering Hungary continued to rise throughout
the rest of 2014 and into 2015, until a number
of countries, including Germany, Austria, and
Hungary,adoptedmeasurestostopthearrivalof
Kosovarsandreturnthemtotheirhomecountry.76







the Western Eastern Balkan routes converge
here. Hungary is also situated at the end of a
smuggling route that leads via the Russian




show that the smuggling of migrants generally
occursinawest-bounddirection,andthatsome
means and methods are commonly used to
smugglemigrantsinandoutofHungary,itmust
benoted thatnotall smugglingactivities follow
predeterminedroutes, that illegalcrossingsmay
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XI.4.1.1 Into the country
During the 2011–2017 period, most smuggled
migrantsenteredHungaryacrosstheborderfrom
Serbia.Themigrantsareoftendriventolocations
near the border and then cross on foot orwith
the aid of a guide into Hungary. In other cases,
migrantsaresmuggledacrosstheborderhidden
intrucksorvans.78Notallillegalbordercrossings
from Serbia into Hungary are clandestine and
require the support of smugglers. Migrants
frequentlyusepublictransport,walk,ormaketheir
ownwayfromBelgradeorotherpartsofSerbia
to the Hungarian border. Before the completion
of the border fence along the shared border,
many migrants could also cross into Hungary
independently,withouttheaidofsmugglers.
Another smuggling route leads fromBulgaria or
Serbia via Romania into Hungary. For migrants
located in the north of Serbia, travelling via
RomaniatoHungaryinvolvesonlyaminordetour,















XI.4.1.2 Through and out of the country
Once in Hungary, most irregular migrants pass
through the capital Budapest, which is also at
the centre of the country’s railway and highway
networks. From Hungary, the main smuggling
routescontinuewesttoAustria.Mainroadsand
railwaylinesaregenerallyusedtotakemigrants
to and across the border. The Hungarian M1
motorway,whichturnsintotheA4ontheAustrian
side of the border, is themain andmost direct
road connecting Budapest and Vienna, and is
mentioned in many reports about smuggling
activitiesbetweenthetwocountries.81
In some instances, especially in the summer
andfallof2015whenlargenumbersofirregular
migrants were transiting through Hungary,
manymigrantsfollowedthemainroadsonfoot,
reaching the border and crossing into Austria
withouthavingtoresorttosmugglers.








Three principal methods are used to smuggle
migrants into Hungary: crossing borders in
groupsunaccompaniedbysmugglers(usuallyon
foot), crossing borders while hidden in vehicles






XI.4.2.1 Border crossings on foot
Crossing the border on foot was the most




usually in pairs, across the border. A 2015
publicationnotesthat:
Because of the relatively danger-free land-




ANDREAS SCHLOENHARDT  |  IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS ALONG THE BALKAN ROUTE 
smuggled through the Serbian-Hungarian
border section of the route is reportedly
the lowestalong theWesternBalkan route,
however, as one stakeholder noted: ‘The
pricedependsondemandandsupply’.85
Many smugglers later ceased the practice of
accompanying the migrants into Hungary and
rather gave them instructions aboutwhere and
howtocrosstheborderandprovidedthemwitha
contactnumbertocalloncetheyreachHungary.
The smuggledmigrants are then picked up and
takentoBudapestwherearrangementsaremade
for the next legs of their journey.86 When the
practiceofguidingmigrantssubsided,itbecame
more common formigrants to cross the border
inlargergroups,ofteninvolvingfamilyunitswith
children,ratherthanalone.87
XI.4.2.2 Smuggling by motor vehicle
The smuggling of migrants into Hungary inside
vehicles,mostlytrucksandvans,usuallyinvolves
covertmethodswhere themigrant is hidden in
thecargoareaorspecialcompartments.Iflarge
trucksorfreighttrainsareused,thisisoftendone
without the driver’s’ knowledge.88 Data collected
by Frontex shows that smuggling migrants by
hidingtheminvehiclesisamethodusedtocross
many borders in the region, but particularly to
cross the border between Hungary and Serbia.













transport four persons, nine in a mini-van
or, ifasmallvan,25personshidden in the
luggagearea.Thedriversreceivethelowest
amountandarepaidbytheorganisersonly
















There have also been reports about smugglers
organisingorusingcarsharingorcarpoolingasa
methodtotransportmigrantsfromHungaryinto
Austria and Germany. This involves smugglers
contactingprivatedriverswhooffer totransport











ugeesfromBudapest toVienna.96 Transportation 
ofthiskind,doneforhumanitarianoraltruisticpur-
poses,wasusuallyofferedfreeofchargeanddoes
not amount to smuggling of migrants, though
somedriversneverthelessranintoproblemswith
thelaworwerestoppedbytheauthorities.
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reports suggest that somemigrants, once they
reach Hungary, continue their journey by air,
especially if they intend to reach more distant
destinationssuchastheUnitedKingdom.Insuch
instances,forgeddocumentsareusedtoenable




In 2015and2016, of all countries in the region,
Hungary reported the second highest number
of detections of smugglers at its borders and
within its territory. In each quarter of 2014,
approximately40to60smugglersweredetected
by theHungarianauthorities.Thisnumbergrew
to approximately 90 in the first quarter of 2015,
and to about 120 in each of the following two
quarters.98 Since late 2015, the number has
dropped significantly to about 20 detections
between October and December 2015, and to
about 30 in the following quarter.99 Since that
time,Hungary’ssignificanceforthesmugglingof





ofmigrants into, through,andoutofHungary is
largelythesameasinotherBalkanStates:Most
smugglers, especially those organising local
transportation and accommodation, drivers and
guides, are Hungarian nationals and nationals
of neighbouring countries. The much smaller
numberoforganiserswhohavesomeoversight
ofthejourneythatmigrantstake,linkupmigrants
between transit points and connect them to
localoperators, areoftennationalsof thesame
countriesasthemigrantstheysmuggle,orwere
themselves once smuggled migrants. A 2015
studyfound:
In cases where a driver is used, migrants
usually pay for the ride in advance to the
driver. In some cases, these are local taxi
drivers and there is no larger organisation
behind it organising the journey; in other
instances, the drivers are part of ‘teams’
whoareeithersenttopickupandtransport







in Hungary. It is noticeable that if and when
smugglersarearrested inHungary, themajority
ofsuspectsareusuallyHungariannationalswho
are found to be working alongside Romanians,
Serbians,Austrians,Croats,Ukrainiansandother
nationalsfromtheregion.102Thesesmugglers,as
mentioned, are usually involved in transporting
or accommodating irregular migrants; many
of them engage in smuggling activities ad hoc
and opportunistically, if and when demand
arises.A2015studypublishedby theEuropean
Commissionfoundthat:
The largest group of smugglers (with
whom the Hungarian National Bureau of
Investigation has experience) are Serbian
nationals who enjoy residence rights in
Hungary, mostly based on family ties.
They are often the main organisers of the




have grown as mid-level organisers. They
collaborate with the main organisers in
Serbia and destination countries. Their
taskisrecruitingthedriversandorganising
accommodation for smuggled migrants
in the territory ofHungary. They also have
personalmeetings in Serbiawith themain
organiserstoagreeonthechangesinmodus
operandi after the capture of migrants in
illegaltransportation.103
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theirinvolvementinsmugglingofmigrants,then
thisusuallyrelatestotheirrolesasorganisersof
smuggling ventures.104 Many smugglers in this
category share the background, experience and
language of the migrants whom they smuggle,
and connect them to local people who can
organise transportation and accommodation.
Frequently, these organisers were once
themselves smuggled migrants who became
stranded in transit countries, andwho use their
own experience and know-how to facilitate the
irregularmigrationofothers.
XI.4.3.2 Organisations and networks
Based on the available sources it appears that
criminal networks engaged in the smuggling
ofmigrants through Hungary are slightlymore
organised and networked than in some of the
othercountriesexaminedinthisreport.Thismay,
however, also reflect the fact that smuggling
through Hungary is better documented than
inmost other countries. The structure of these
networks is mostly loose and fluid rather





als.Thestudy furtherpoints toadivisionof la-
bourbetweenthevariousparticipants,including
recruiters, transportation or accommodation
providers, guides and corrupt officials. Com-
munication between the various participants
mayoccurbyphoneoronline,orbymeetingin
publicplaces.105Thesmugglingnetworksoften
connect thecountryof transit (Serbia)withthe
firstpointofentryintotheEU(Hungary)andthe




More recent reports tend to suggest that, as
in other countries, smuggling networks are




abandoned the truck containing the 71 dead
migrantsalongamajorhighwaywas,forexample,
a network led by an Afghan national who was
once himself a refugee and smuggled migrant.
Hewasassistedbytwochiefaccomplicesfrom
Bulgaria, and various drivers and other actors
from Bulgaria. This network is alleged to have
smuggled more than 1,200 mostly Afghan
migrants throughHungary.107A further example
is the network led by Pakistani nationals based
in Milan who, with the assistance of people
from those countries, organised the smuggling
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migrants. Croatia shares borders with Serbia,
one of the countries most affected by irregular
migrationintheBalkans,andwiththeSchengen
ZoneMemberStatesSloveniaandHungary.This




of the European Union (EU). It was anticipated
that this would greatly impact on levels of
irregular migration, and that Croatia’s borders
would become much more attractive for the
smugglingofmigrants.Theavailableinformation,
however,doesnotrevealanysignificantchanges










The levels and patterns of irregular migration
and the smuggling ofmigrants through Croatia
aregreatlyinfluencedbytheabilityorinabilityof
migrantstoenterandtransitthroughHungary:At
those times when the border between Hungary
andSerbiaisopen,whenmigrantscanapplyfor
asyluminHungaryandarenotplaced inclosed
immigration detention centres, most migrants
choosetotravelfromSerbiatoHungary,andonly
asmallnumberopt for theroutefromSerbiato
Croatia. Few migrants seek asylum in Croatia,
andthecountryhasareputationamongasylum
seekers for slow asylum procedures and low
approval rates. As a result, migrants prefer to
continuetoHungaryifandwhenthisisfeasible.
Various initiativesby theHungarianGovernment
in the 2011–2017 period to tighten border
controlsandreducetherightsofasylumseekers
hadanimmediateimpactontheflowofirregular
migrants through neighbouring Croatia. Croatia










XII.2.1.1 Numbers relating to illegal entry
Croatian authorities publish annual statistics
relatingtothenumberofillegalbordercrossings,
and to the number of persons entering Croatia
illegally.Thesenumbers,summarisedinFigure 79
below,showaconsiderable increase from2010





Figure 79: ‘Illegal state border crossings’ and ‘aliens illegally entering into the Republic of Croatia’, 
2010–2014 (Croatia, Ministry of Interior)2
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Illegal state border crossings
Article 36Aliens Act (Croatia)
2,435 3,824 6,839 4,734 3,914
No . of foreigner illegally entering 1,757 2,720 4,926 3,333 n.a.
Increase to previous year +23% +54.8% +81.1% -32.3% n.a.
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In a 2013 report, Frontex stressed that in
the fourth quarter 2012, Croatia recorded
the second-highest number of illegal border
crossingsinEuropeafterSerbia,higherthan,for
instance,Greece,Italy,andSpain.3TheEuropean
Commission has also been cited as noting
that detections of irregular migrants in Croatia
increased from3,461 in 2011 to 6,541 in 2012.
Simultaneously, the number of unaccompanied
minors among these migrants nearly doubled
to726 in2012.4This increase, as laterpartsof





in to Slovenia starting in 2011 also signalled a




months after Hungary fenced off its border to
Serbia,whichdivertedirregularmigrationalong
theWesternBalkan route toCroatia.Statistics
produced by the Croatian Interior Ministry,
shown in Figure  80 below, demonstrate the
immediate consequenceof theborder closure:
Within24hoursof closing theborderbetween
Hungary and Serbia on 15 September 2015,
Croatia experienced a tenfold increase in the
number of arrivals. For the following month,
between 3,369 and 11,535migrants arrived in
Croatiaeachday.





































































































































in the months of October and November 2015
alone; 555,761migrants arrived in Croatia from
thedayHungarycloseditsborderuntiltheendof




years not displayed in Figure  81 belowwas not
available.9Accordingtoadifferent2016publica-
tion,betweenSeptember2015andMarch2016,
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Eurostat, the statistical information directorate
oftheEU,publishesinformationonthenumber
of non-EU nationals who are apprehended at
Croatia’s borders and who are refused entry
into the country. The total number of refusals
in the years 2013 to 2016 does not show any
significant trends (Figure  82 below). Figures
for the year 2016 show that the vast majority
of refusals, 95.7%, were made at Croatia’s
land borders. These figures demonstrate that
irregular migration to Croatia predominantly
involves movements over land (especially, as
the following sections show, from Serbia) that
detectionsofattemptstoenterCroatiairregularly
by air are limited and that, despite a coastline
totalling 5,835  kilometres (1,777  kilometres of
mainland coastline and 4,058  kilometres along
the islands), irregularmigration by sea is quite
insignificant.
XII.2.1.2 Numbers relating to persons staying in the 
country illegally
Datarelatingtothenumberofforeignersresiding
in Croatia illegally is limited. Eurostat publishes
some data on the number of ‘third country
nationalsfoundtobeillegallypresent’ inCroatia
for theyears2013 to2016.Thisdata,shown in
Figure  83 below, provides limited insight and






The vast majority of irregular migrants enter
CroatiafromSerbia.This isdespitethefactthat





fromSerbia intoCroatia, as reportedbyFrontex
andshowninFigure 84below,hasbeenathigh
levels throughout the 2011–2017 period but
increasedexceptionallyinthesecondhalfof2015.
Illegal entries from Montenegro and Bosnia-
HerzgovinatoCroatiaare,byregionalstandards,
quiteconsiderable,butpaleincomparisontothe
Figure 82: Non-EU citizens refused entry, Croatia 2011–2016 (Eurostat)15
Total
landborder airborder seaborder
number % number % number %
2016 9,135 8,745 95,7% 350 3,8% 40 0.4%
2015 9,355 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 8,645 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 10,015 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Figure 83: Third country nationals found to be illegally present, Croatia, 2011–2016 (Eurostat)16
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
No . of persons n.a. n.a. 4,150 2,500 3,295 3,320
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veryhighnumberofillegalbordercrossingsfrom
Serbia.Thefollowingsectionsexaminethethree
borders and the levels of irregular migration
acrossthemindividually.
Figure 84: Illegal border crossings into Croatia, 2011–2017 (Frontex)17
Illegal border crossings 
from Serbia to Croatia
Illegal border crossings 
from Montenegro to 
Croatia
Illegal border crossings 




















2011 – total 2,699 +432% 263 –33% 610 –23%
2012–1stquarter 315 –2% 20 –89% 82 –52%
2012–2ndquarter 1,075 +31% 44 +57% 163 +14%
2012–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 – total 5,887 +118% 226 –14% 645 +6%
2013–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 – total n.a. n.a. 133 n.a. 430 n.a.
2014–1stquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–2ndquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 – total 978 –58% 151 +14% 287 –41%
2015–1stquarter 64 –76% 67 +91% 61 –8%
2015–2ndquarter 42 –87% 50 117% 45 –22%
2015–3rdquarter 91,698 +35,649% 87 +50% 77 +10%
2015–4thquarter 465,506 +430,924% 50 +43% 119 +28%
2015 – total n.a. +56,909 n.a. +68 n.a. +5%
2016–1stquarter n.a. +58,863 n.a. –79% n.a. –23%
2016–2ndquarter n.a. –53% n.a. –66% n.a. +0%
2016–3rdquarter n.a. –99% n.a. –71% n.a. –23%
2016–4thquarter n.a. –100% n.a. +154% n.a. +79%
2016 – total n.a. –81% n.a. –28% n.a. +23%
2017–1stquarter n.a. –31% n.a. –35% n.a. –68%
2017–2ndquarter n.a. +18% n.a. –16% n.a. +90%
2017–3rdquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017–4thquarter n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017 – total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
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XII.2.2.1 From Serbia
Overview
Most illegal border crossings into Croatia
have been recorded at the border to Serbia. In
addition to the data shown in Figure  84 above,
Frontexpublishesquarterlydataof illegalborder
crossings‘between’and‘at’bordercontrolpoints
along the Serbian-Croatian border. This data,
shown in Figure  85 below, shows that after a
period of relative decline in 2014, illegal border
crossings between Serbia and Croatia rose to
unprecedentedlevelsinthesecondhalfof2015,
and remained high in the first quarter of 2016.




2015, from January–March 2016 to April–June
2016, illegal border crossings between Serbia











































Herzegovina andMontenegro, and continued to
SloveniawithoutspendingmuchtimeinCroatia.19 
In 2010, Frontex recorded a 222% increase in
illegal border crossing detections from Serbia
intoCroatia,followedbya432%increasein2011.
Manymigrants,mostof themAfghans,crossed
into Croatia by walking across the land border;
somesimplyfollowedtherailwaylinealltheway
fromBelgradetoTovarnikinCroatia.20
The high number of Afghan nationals transiting




when a westward shift in irregular migration






in early 2013, following international pressure,





June 2013, only 39 detections of illegal border
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crossingsweremadeattheSerbia-Croatiaborder,
comparedto4,100attheSerbia-Hungaryborder.




On 1 July 2013, Croatia became a Member of
theEuropeanUnion (EU) (thoughnot yet of the
SchengenZone).Thereweresomefearsthatthis
wouldresult inafurther increaseofattemptsto
cross from Serbia and Bosnia-Herzgovina into
Croatia, which now became external borders
of theEU.The impactwas, however, somewhat






across the border from Serbia to Hungary




but accounted for a relatively small percentage
of illegalbordercrossings intheregion. In2014,
onlyabout3%ofallnon-regionalmigrantswere
detectedat theSerbia-Croatiaborder,compared
to 73%at theSerbia-Hungaryborder.26With the
growing flow of irregularmigrants fromGreece
via FYRMacedonia to Serbia, detections at the
Croatian border started to rise in the spring of
2015.27 It reached an all-time high and became
themostsignificantroutefor irregularmigration







Croatia in a single day. Serbian authorities and
private operators offered to transport migrants
whohadcrossedintoSerbiafromFYRMacedonia
directly to towns like Šid close to the Croatian
border.29 The sudden arrival of large numbers
ofmigrantsat theCroatianborder in towns like
Tovarnik near one of themain border crossings
posed particular challenges, as Croatian
authorities struggled to manage such large






late September, asmany as 10,000migrants a
daywerecrossing intoCroatia fromSerbia,and
upto65,000aweek.32AFrontexreportnotesthat
while an average of 66 persons were detected
per month crossing from Serbia to Croatia
betweenJanuaryandAugust2015,betweenmid-
September and December 2015 nearly 557,000
crossedthatborder.33
Initially, Croatia was merely a further transit





which was completed by 16 October 2016,34 
diverting the flow of migrants from Croatia to
Slovenia andon toAustria.35At the same time,
Croatiaundertooksporadicattempts tostopor
control thearrivalofpeople fromSerbia,which
caused long delays for regular cross-border
traffic, as well as tensions between the two
countries.36 Throughout most of October 2015
theborderbetweenthetwocountriesremained
open, and the influx of migrants, along with
the difficulties in catering for them, continued
unabated.37Laterthatmonth,Croatiarestricted
entrytoasylumseekersfromAfghanistan, Iraq,
and Syria. Other nationalities were considered
to be ‘economic migrants’ and rejected at the
border,allegedlywithoutconsideringthecauses
of their displacement.38 The coordination 
between Serbian and Croatian authorities





only allowed migrants to enter and transit if
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they stated that Austria or Germanywere their





FromMarch 2016 onwards, Croatia, along with
most other Western Balkan countries, all but
closed its borders to irregular migrants. For a
brief period, some migrants, unable to enter
Croatia, were diverted to the Hungarian border,
where they either sought to break through the
border fenceorpaidsmugglers tobe taken into
Hungary clandestinely.Despite a small increase
in the thirdquarterof2016,detectionsof illegal
border crossings at the Serbia-Croatia border
remainedlowthroughouttheyearandinto2017.41 
Concerns remained, however, that refugees and
othermigrantswho became stranded in Serbia






measuring over 1,000  kilometres, is much




the large number of small roads crossing the
border,andthepresenceofestablishedcriminal
organisations on both sides, there have been
some concerns that this border may be used
for a range of illegal activities, including the
smugglingofmigrants.43
Figure 84aboveshowsthatthenumberofillegal
border crossings from Bosnia-Herzegovina to
Croatia varies across years, ranging from 645
in 2012 to just 237 in 2014. Although absolute
numbers are not available for recent years, it is
noticeable that illegal border crossings from
Bosnia-Herzegovina to Croatia increased in the
secondhalfof2015,albeitmuchmoremodestly
that at Croatia’s other borders. An even greater




Croatia serves as an alternative route for some
non-regionalmigrantsseekingtoreachHungary
or Slovenia. In 2011–12, for instance, it was
reportedthatsomeTurkishnationalswereflying
directlyfromIstanbultoSarajevoandthenmoving
through Bosnia-Herzegovina to enter Croatia
with the intention of continuing toSlovenia and
possiblyHungary.44
XII.2.2.3 From Montenegro
The number of illegal border crossings from
Montenegro to Croatia is smaller still than
the numbers from Bosnia-Herzegovina, but
considerable given that the border measures
less than 20 kilometres in length. Figure  84
aboveshowsthatfluctuationsbetweendifferent
quarters are quite significant, though seen in
absolute numbers, detections appear to range
between no more than 130 and 260 in most
years.
Aswithentries fromBosnia-Herzegovina, irreg-
ular migration from Montenegro to Croatia
appearstobepartofasmall,alternativeroute
to the flows that go from Greece via FYR
MacedoniaandSerbiatoHungaryandCroatia.45 
In some instances, irregular migrants enter
Montenegro from Serbia before continuing to
Croatia.46 In 2015, Frontex noted an increase
inthenumberofnon-regionalmigrantsmoving
from Greece via Albania to Montenegro and
Croatia (or Serbia), but also highlighted that
transport linksandother infrastructurearenot
well developed along this route, and that it is
harderbycomparisontoreachtheEU.47 In the 








ANDREAS SCHLOENHARDT  |  IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS ALONG THE BALKAN ROUTE 
XII.2.3 Stay
Croatia is not merely a transit country for
irregularmigrants, but also a destinationwhere
some migrants—deliberately or because of
circumstance, temporarily or permanently—
choose to stay. The literature tends to divide
migrantswhoremaininCroatiaintotwogroups:
The first involvesmigrants for whom Croatia is
the intended destination, the second involves
migrantswhoremaininCroatiareluctantly.49
Thosemigrants who arrive with the intention to
staytendtochooseCroatiaasadestinationeither
because theyhave relativesor friendswhohave
previouslymigratedtothecountry,andwhofacil-
itatetheirarrivalandintegration.Theexperiences
of somemigrantswho chose to stay in Croatia
also appears to be quite positive, even among

















For most other migrants, Croatia is merely a
transit country. Some migrants decide to leave
aftermaking efforts to stay and obtain asylum
in Croatia. Croatia’s asylum system is seen as
rather restrictive, andmany asylumseekers are
of theviewthat thechanceofbeingrecognised
as a refugee in Croatia is very low, and that







October 2015 most migrants continued from




of irregular migrants departing from Croatia
for Hungary, Slovenia or other countries are, for








until July 2013 Croatia was not an EUMember
State.Tothisday,CroatiaisnotaMemberofthe










Croatia from where they continued to Hungary
in largenumbers.55Asa result,Hungarystarted
tobuildanother fence, this timeat itsborder to




Irregular migration from Serbia via Croatia to
Slovenia (and on to other countries) emerged
as an alternative to the route from Serbia to
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ANDREAS SCHLOENHARDT  |  IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS ALONG THE BALKAN ROUTE 




and then continuing to Slovenia, crossing the
border clandestinely.57 In 2011 Frontex first
reportedthattherouteviaCroatiaandSlovenia
was growing in importance for non-regional
migrants,signallingawestwardshiftawayfrom
Hungary.58 Most of the persons detected were
Afghan nationals who had travelled via Turkey
andGreece along theWestern Balkan route to
Croatia.59 
Theincreaseindetectionscontinuedthroughout
therestof theyearand into2013.An increase
of138%comparedtothepreviousquarterwas
recordedinthethirdquarterof2012,anincrease
of 98% in the fourth quarter, and a further
increase of 192% in the first quarter of 2013,
indicating a shift of irregular migration flows
to the route via Croatia and Slovenia instead
ofHungaryorRomania.60Asmentionedearlier,
legislative changes in Hungary concerning the
detention of asylum seekers are seen as the
main reason for the diversion to Croatia and
Slovenia.61
Departures from Croatia to Slovenia—along
with irregular arrivals from Serbia to Croatia—
decreased rapidly in early 2013 when Hungary
suspendeditsdetentionpolicy.Irregularmigrants
thenmoveddirectlyfromSerbiatoHungaryuntil
the Hungarian Government reintroduced the
policy on 1 July 2013, diverting the flow once
moretoCroatiaandSlovenia.62
Departuresof irregularmigrants fromCroatia to
Slovenia increased enormously when Hungary
closeditsbordertoCroatiaon16October2015.
Croatian authorities subsequently started to
actively divert the flow of irregular migrants to
Slovenia.63 In the followingweeks up to 10,000
migrants arrived in Slovenia eachday,manyon
buses organised by the Croatian authorities.
The highest number of arrivals in a single
day was recorded on 21 October 2015, when
12,616 persons arrived. Most of them entered
Slovenia at the Slovenian border crossing of
Zavrč and Rigonce. Reception centres were set






Sloveniadecided to limit entry into thecountry
toAfghan,Iraqi,andSyriannationals,andtostop
irregular migrants of other nationalities at the
border; ameasure that was subsequently also
adopted by Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia.65 
As a result, the number of irregular migrants
arrivinginSloveniastartedtodropinDecember
2015,anddecreasedevenfurtherfromFebruary
2016 when FYR Macedonia closed the border
to Greece and fewer migrants were able to
travel through Serbia and Croatia. In the same
month Slovenia, along with other countries
along the Western Balkan route, limited entry
on humanitarian grounds to Iraqi and Syrian
nationals, thus further reducing the number of
irregulararrivals.66ByJune2016 the routehad
become ‘practically impassable’.67 A further
smallincreaseinirregulararrivalswasrecorded
bySlovenianauthoritiesinaroundOctober2016,
thoughby that timea bilateral agreementwith
Croatia had been signed, enabling Slovenia to




Information about the nationality of irregular
migrants transiting through Croatia is
surprisingly limited.While Afghans, Iraqis, and
Syrians constitute the three largest groups,69 
thesourcesconsultedforthisresearchdidnot
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XII.3.1.1 Non-regional migrants
Figure 86belowshows that thenumberof refu-
geesandasylumseekersinCroatia,asrecorded
by UNHCR, is very low by any standard. While





illegally started to rise in 2012 and 2013,when
approximately 700 Syrians were detected
crossing the border from Serbia illegally (per
year).70Since2013Syrianshaveconstituted the
largestgroupofasylumseekersinCroatia.71
The number of Iraqi nationals seeking asylum




Afghan nationals make up the second largest
group of irregularmigrants and asylum seekers





in Hungary due to the more restrictive policies




of Croatia. Following the closure of Hungary’s
borderstoSerbiaandCroatiain2015,theirnumber
roseagain,albeitfromlowlevels,in2016.
Data and other information about irregular mi-
grantsfromAfricannationswhoenterCroatiais
evenmorelimited.SomaliandAlgeriannationals
constitute someof the larger groupsof asylum
applicantsinthe2011–2017periodbut,74asFig-
ure  86 demonstrates, these numbers are never-
thelessverylow.
Figure 86: Refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR, Croatia 2011–2017, top nationalities75
Afghanistan Iran Iraq Pakistan Syria
2011 – total 151 8 2 2 4
- refugees 16 n.a. 1 n.a. n.a.
- asylum-seekers 135 8 1 2 4
2012 – total 147 11 5 7 52
- refugees 19 n.a. 3 0 12
- asylum-seekers 128 11 2 7 40
2013 – total 31 n .a . 6 14 59
- refugees 20 n.a. 5 n.a. 22
- asylum-seekers 11 n.a. 1 14 37
2014 – total 28 1 6 7 28
- refugees 21 0 6 2 22
- asylum-seekers 7 1 0 5 6
2015 – total 23 3 20 5 27
- refugees 22 1 9 3 23
- asylum-seekers 1 2 2 2 4
2016 – total 179 77 150 18 192
- refugees 39 8 30 n.a. 60
- asylum-seekers 140 69 120 15 132
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XII.3.1.2 Other nationalities
Until 2016 Croatia also witnessed irregular
migration by Kosovars, who left their country
in large numbers in the early 2010s. For most
Kosovars, Croatia was merely a transit country
enroutefromSerbiatoWesternEurope,andwas




with other Balkan states, adopted measures to
preventthe irregulararrivalofKosovarnationals
andspeedilyreturnthemtotheircountryoforigin,
the number of irregular migrants from Kosovo
enteringCroatiaalsodroppedsignificantly.
Albanian nationals constitute a further group
of migrants who are found to be entering and
staying in Croatia illegally.77 Absolute numbers





Several reports point to a significant number
of unaccompanied minors who enter or stay
in Croatia in an irregular situation. In 2011, for





within the region Croatia identified ‘the highest
number of unaccompanied and separated
children’:
ThemaincountriesoforiginareAfghanistan
and Somalia, but increasingly also other
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, such
as Mali and Eritrea. While most of the
children originating from Afghanistan are
adolescent boys of undetermined age, the





The smuggling ofmigrants affectsCroatia on a
considerable scale, and each year the Croatian
authorities detect and prosecute a significant
numberofsmugglerswhoarechargedwith the
offence of ‘illegal transfer of persons across
the state border’82 which was renamed ‘illegal
entry, movement and residence in the Republic
ofCroatia’ inofficialstatistics in2013.Figure 87
below shows the number of reported offences
of this kind, alongwith the number of offences
concerning ‘aliens illegally entering into the
RepublicofCroatia’.83
Figure 87: Reported offences relating to smuggling of migrants and illegal entry, 2010–2015, Croatia84
illegal transfer of persons 
across the state border
Illegal entry, movement and 
residence in the Republic of Croatia
aliens illegally entering into 
the Republic of Croatia
2010 89 n.a. 1,757
2011 88 n.a. 2,720
2012 184 n.a. 4,926
2013 n.a. 176 3,333
2014 n.a. 140 n.a.
2015 n.a. 68 n.a.
2016 n.a. 156 n.a.
2017(toNov) n.a. 287 n.a.
2018(toJan) n.a. 22 n.a.
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XII.4.2 Routes
Information concerning the smuggling of
migrantsintoCroatiaalmostexclusivelyconcerns
smugglingactivitiesacrosstheborderfromSerbia.
The route from Serbia via Croatia is, as already
mentioned,usuallyusedattimeswhenmigration
to Hungary is not attractive or not possible.
SmugglersaresaidtousetheroutefromSerbia
toCroatia tobringmigrants toSlovenia,Austria,
and Italy.85 Considerable truck and train traffic
crosses the border from Serbia to Croatia, and
irregularmigrants, especiallySyrians, oftenhide
in thecargoor inothercompartments.86A2017
publication notes thatwith the harshmeasures
adopted by Hungary to deny access and fair
treatment to irregular migrants and asylum
seekers,smugglersandsmuggledmigrantshave
takentheviewthat
the Croatian alternative is more porous
andunlikelytoendinbeatings,teargasand
attack dogs; or that certain periods of the





to the capital Zagreb, where they may stay
for a period of time while they consider their
optionsandcontactsmugglerswhocanassist
in organising their onward journey.88 Several
reports suggest thatmany smuggledmigrants
have next to no prior knowledge of Croatia’s
locationandborders,andaresometimesmisled
by smugglers as to where they are andwhere
theyaretravellingto.89
FromCroatia,smuggledmigrantseithercontinue
to Hungary or, in recent years, generally to




migrants to the border or smuggle them into a
neighbouringcountry.90 
XII.4.3 Methods
XII.4.2.1 Smuggling by land
ThesmugglingofmigrantsintoCroatiaforthemost
parttakesplaceoverland.Basedontheavailable
information, most smuggling activities seem
to involve covert methods whereby smuggled
migrants are hidden or otherwise concealed in
ordertopreventtheirdetection.Forthispurpose,
cars, trucks, and other vehicles are used to
cross the border; sometimes they are modified
to create spaces or compartments in which
migrants canbehidden.91 Thismodusoperandi
hasbeenobservedatarangeofbordersections
across the region, though since the beginning
of the reporting period, information published









90cases in2011 toover300 in2012.Over the
















fromSerbia to Croatia on foot tends to be less
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were moving through the region, and once
Hungary had closed its border to Serbia, many
migrantsusedpublictransportorsimplywalked
from Belgrade or other parts of Serbia to the
Croatianborderandthenwalkedacross.Similarly,
a report from 2011 observed thatmost Afghan
migrantsfollowedtherailwaylinefromBelgrade




using fraudulent travelor identitydocuments to
exitCroatia,especiallytoSlovenia.




A 2011 publication notes that ‘criminal groups
in Croatia’ use boats and fast ships to smuggle
migrants. These ships are then used to collect
migrantsinAlbaniaorMontenegroandtakethem
across to Italy.99 It appears that this report does 





The smuggling of migrants into, through, and
out of Croatia is mostly carried out by local
people or nationals of neighbouring countries
whotransport,guide,oraccommodatemigrants
or offer other menial services.100 It may also
involve smugglers with greater oversight over
the migrants’ journey, who are frequently not
basedinCroatiaandoftendonotcomefromthe
countriesinwhichtheyoperate.Theyoftenshare
the nationality of the migrants they smuggle
and connect themigrants to local groups and
individuals who can assist with smuggling
services.101 In2011,for instance,Frontexnoted





in smugglingmigrants through the country, and
collaboratewithgroupsinothercountries.These
groupsaresaidtobewellorganisedandusually




by other sources.103 It is also not clear whether
theseobservationsarestillvalid.
Frontex reports from 2011 and 2012 note that
smugglers and other ‘facilitators’ of irregular
migrationplayeda limitedrole inCroatia.At the
time it was noted that transportation and other
smugglingservicesweremostlyofferedbylocal
people and that very few migrants were ‘using
costlyorganisedsmugglingservices’.104 This has 
been explained by the fact that migrants didn’t
requiresophisticatedassistance; theywereable
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XIII SLOVENIA
XIII.1 Overview
Slovenia is almost exclusively a transit country
in irregular migration and the smuggling of
migrants. It sits along a sub-route of the main









generally not well documented, and there are
several information gaps. Generally, the flow of
irregularmigrantsthroughthecountryhasbeen
quite slow, though irregular migration through
Sloveniamovedintothespotlight intheautumn
of2015:WhenHungarycloseditsbordersto its
southern neighbours, hundreds of thousands
of migrants moved from Serbia via Croatia to
Slovenia.InNovember2015Sloveniaerectedits
ownfencealongthebordertoCroatia,andalittle
later restrictedentry toAfghan, Iraqi,andSyrian
nationals.1
Very fewmigrants remain in thecountry forany
length of time and fewer still apply for asylum
in the country. The vast majority of migrants
continue to Austria, crossing the border near





XIII.2.1.1 Numbers relating to illegal entry 





to travel from Serbia into Hungary, and to the
treatmentofasylumseekersinHungary.Attimes
when access to Hungary was easy and when
asylum seekers did not have to fear detention
there,thenumberofarrivalsinSloveniaremained
low. At those times when Hungary detained
asylum seekers or closed the border to Serbia,
migrantsreroutedviaCroatiaandSlovenia.
AstudybytheInternationalCentreforMigration
Policy Development (ICMPD) shows that in
2010, Slovenian authorities apprehended 785
‘border violators’, down from824a year earlier.2 
The decrease at that time was attributed to an
eastward shift of irregularmigration across the
Balkans, with more people moving from FYR
Macedonia via Serbia to Hungary rather than
to Slovenia. The decrease also reflects visa
liberalisationsforAlbanianandBosniannationals
enteringSlovenia.3
Illegal border crossings into Slovenia started
to rise again in late 2011.4 The westward shift
continued in 2012, affecting both Croatia and
Slovenia. This trend was seen as the result of
changes in Hungary’s asylum system, and the
approaching entry of Croatia into the European
Union (EU).5 This trend was, however, reversed
at the beginning of 2013 when Hungary
discontinued the practice of detaining asylum
seekersuponarrival.6 In the followingyear, and
throughouttheearlymonthsof2015,thenumber
or irregular arrivals inSlovenia remainedat low
levels.7
This situation changeddrastically in the second
halfof2015,especiallyinthemonthsofOctober
and November, following Hungary’s closure
of its borders with Serbia and Croatia, which
diverted the migration route back to Slovenia.8 
DatapublishedbyIOMandcompiledinFigure 88
belowshowsthatinOctober2015alone,116,627
irregular migrants arrived in Slovenia, rising to
164,313amonthlater.Between5,000and13,000
migrantswere arriving in Slovenia on individual
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Between 16 October and 31 December 2015
a total of 378,604 irregular migrants arrived in
Slovenia.11Figure 88abovealsoshowsthatafter
December2015thenumberof irregularmigrant
arrivals decreased very rapidly to just 1,607 in
March 2016. In December 2015 an average of
3,116 migrants crossed into Slovenia each day.
Thisfiguredroppedto1,986inJanuary2016,and
toabout800perday in lateFebruary2016.12 In 
the threemonthsof2016before the ‘closure’of
theBalkanroute inMarch2016,99,187 irregular
migrants entered Slovenia,13 while between
October2015andMarch2016,atotalof477,791
migrantsarrivedinSlovenia.14SinceMarch2016,
irregular migration to Slovenia has ‘effectively
stopped’.15
Eurostat publishes additional data relating to
the number of non-EU nationals refused entry




and include a broader spectrum of migrants,
suchaspersonsarrivingwithanexpiredvisaand
personsdeniedentryfor individualreasons. It is
noticeable that the number of persons refused
entryinSloveniadroppedsignificantlyfrom2012
to2013whenCroatiajoinedtheEUandSlovenia





XIII.2.1.2 Numbers relating to persons staying in the 
country illegally
Datarelatingtothenumberofirregularmigrants
staying in Slovenia illegallywas not available in
any of the sources consulted for this research.
Frontex reported that in the months of April,




Irregular migration into Slovenia mostly takes
place along the border to Croatia, Slovenia’s
longest border, whichmeasures 670 kilometres
in length. Slovenia no longer has any external
EU borders, thus data on the flow of irregular
migrants from neighbouring countries is not
well documented. For the 2011 to 2017 period,
Frontexreportsonlycontaindataonillegalborder
crossings for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013
(showninFigure 90below).
Figure 89: Non-EU citizens refused entry, Slovenia 2011–2016 (Eurostat)17
Total land border air border sea border
number % number % number %
2011 7,970 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2012 7,665 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2013 4,780 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2014 4,410 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2015 4,410 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016 4,455 4,080 91.6% 365 8.2% 10 0.2%
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Figure 90: Illegal border crossings from Croatia 
into Slovenia, 2011–2013 (Frontex)18
absolute 
number
change to same 
previous period










2013 – total 490 –24%





Croatia—most of them legally, some by plane—
and then continuing to Slovenia, crossing the
border clandestinely.19 In 2011, Frontex first
reported that the route viaCroatiaandSlovenia
was growing in importance for non-regional
migrants,signallingawestwardshiftawayfrom
Hungary.20Mostof thosedetectedwereAfghan
and Pakistani nationals who had travelled via
Turkey and Greece along the Western Balkan
routeandCroatia.21 
AlthoughCroatiasubsequentlysteppedupborder
control measures,22 the increase in detections 
continued throughout 2012 and into 2013: an
increase of 138% compared to the previous
quarterwasrecordedinthethirdquarterof2012,
an increase of 98% in the fourth quarter, and a
furtherincreaseof192%inthefirstquarterof2013,
indicating a further shift of irregular migration




Departures from Croatia to Slovenia—along
with irregular arrivals from Serbia to Croatia—
decreased rapidly in early 2013 when Hungary
suspended its policy of detention. Irregular
migrants then moved directly from Serbia
to Hungary until the Hungarian Government
reintroducedthepolicyon1July2013,diverting
theflowoncemoretoCroatiaandSlovenia.25
In the following two years, the flow of irregular
migrantsfromSerbiaacrossCroatiatoSlovenia
continued. The closure of the border between
Hungary andSerbia initially had a limited effect
ondeparturesfromCroatiatoSlovenia,thoughas
earlyas15September2015reportsemergedthat
the border from Hungary to Croatia, too, would
soon be closed.26 When some larger groups of
migrants first arrived at theSlovenian border in
mid-September 2015, there were tumultuous
scenesatoneofthemainbordercrossingsnear
Harmica as migrants sought to enter Slovenia
andbrokethroughborderfortifications.27
Departuresof irregularmigrants fromCroatia to
Slovenia increased enormously when Hungary
closed itsborder toCroatiaon16October2015
andCroatianauthoritiessubsequentlystartedto
actively divert the flow of irregular migrants to
Slovenia.28 Slovenian authorities pre-emptively
introduced controls at the border to Hungary,
expecting that some irregular migrants would
enter along this route.29 In the following weeks,
up to10,000migrantsadayarrived inSlovenia
from Croatia, many on buses organised by the








To stop the flow of irregular migrants from
Croatia, Slovenia started to build a razor-wire
fence along the border on 11November 2015.
A week later, Slovenia decided to limit entry
into the country to Afghan, Iraqi, and Syrian
nationalsandtostopirregularmigrantsofother
nationalitiesat theborder,ameasurethatwas
subsequently also adopted by Croatia, Serbia
193
  
ANDREAS SCHLOENHARDT  |  IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS ALONG THE BALKAN ROUTE 
and Macedonia.31 As a result, the number of
irregularmigrantsarrivinginSloveniastartedto
drop inDecember2015,anddecreased further
from February 2016 when FYR Macedonia
closeditsbordertoGreece,andfewermigrants
wereable to travel throughSerbiaandCroatia.
In the same month Slovenia, along with other
countries along the Western Balkan route,
limited entry on humanitarian grounds to Iraqi
andSyriannationals, thus further reducing the
numberofirregulararrivals.32ByJune2016,the
routehadbecome‘practicallyimpassable’.33 
Afurthersmall increase in irregulararrivalswas
recordedbySlovenianauthoritiesinaboutOctober





Slovenia ismostly a transit country for irregular
migrants; only a small number chooseSlovenia
asadestination,orremaininthecountryforlack
ofalternatives.
Those staying in the country, temporarily or
permanently,compriseregionalandnon-regional
migrants.35AreportpublishedbyFrontexin2014,
for instance, shows that a total of over 2,000










nia depart forAustria. Theborder crossingnear
Spielfeld, south of Graz in the Austrian state of
Styria has been themain entry point for irregu-
larmigrantsleavingSlovenia.TheflowtoAustria
fromSlovenia increased considerably afterHun-
gary closed its borders to Serbia in September
2015,andmigrantsdivertedtotherouteviaCroa-
tiaandSlovenia.37 
Information about the departures of irregular
migrants from Slovenia to Italy is very limited.
In 2014, Swiss authorities reported that some




Information about the nationalities and other
background of irregular migrants entering and
transitingthroughSloveniaisquitelimited.Until
about 2010, most of those caught entering
Slovenia illegally were nationals of other




be crossing Slovenia’s borders illegally in the
early2010s.40
Fromabout2011,reportsemergedaboutagreater
number of non-regional migrants, especially
Afghans and Pakistanis, crossing through
Slovenia. Most entered from Serbia via Croatia
andusedclandestinemethodstocrossborders.41 
In 2012, 864 Afghan nationals were detected
crossing from Croatia into Slovenia, while 143
Pakistanisand313Algeriansweredetectedinthe
sameyear.42
In 2015, as outlined earlier, Slovenia became a
major transit point for irregular migrants after
HungarycloseditsSerbianandCroatianborders
to irregular migrants. By that time, the single
largest group of migrants (about 40%) were
Syriannationals,followedbyIraqis, Iraniansand
Afghans.43 In 2016, when far fewer migrants
weremovingalongtheWesternBalkanrouteand
enteringSlovenia,Afghanswerethelargestgroup
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The number of refugees and persons seeking
asylum in Slovenia is very low. According to
IOM, in 2012 for instance, the largest group of
persons being granted asylum were Afghans
withtenpersons, followedbyeightSomalisand
fiveIranians.Numbersweresimilarlylowin2013,
2014 and 2015, though more Syrian refugees





risen from 2014 to 2016, especially for Afghan
and Syrian nationals, though total numbers are
verylowbycomparisontoothercountriesinthe
region.
Figure 91: Refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR, Slovenia 2011–2016, top nationalities46
Afghanistan Iran Iraq Pakistan Syria
2011 – total 36 19 7 3 6
- refugees 8 9 3 n.a. n.a.
- asylum-seekers 28 7 4 3 6
2012 – total 36 17 6 3 10
- refugees 18 15 4 n.a. 2
- asylum-seekers 18 2 2 3 8
2013 – total 25 20 5 3 11
- refugees 22 18 4 1 9
- asylum-seekers 3 2 1 2 2
2014 – total 34 28 10 2 28
- refugees 23 25 4 1 20
- asylum-seekers 11 3 6 1 8
2015 – total 38 57 22 19 39
- refugees 22 45 5 1 30
- asylum-seekers 16 12 17 18 9
2016 – total 129 91 47 29 159
- refugees 39 57 34 n.a. 118





observed, with detections of migrant smugglers
dropping from214 in2009 to140ayear later. It
appearsthatat that time illegalbordercrossings
andmigrantsmugglingmostly involvedmigrants
fromcountries in the region, suchasSerbia and
Kosovo,whowereaidedby locals fromSlovenia,
Croatia,andBosnia-Herzegovina.47 
From 2011/2012 onwards this trend was re-
versed, as the ‘level of reliance on smuggling
services increased’ together with the number
non-regional migrants moving along the West-
ern Balkan route.48 This increase continued and
becamemore significant in the following years,






and 257 in 2013.50 At the same it became less
common for smuggled migrants to cross into
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XIII.4.1 Routes
The smuggling of migrants through Slovenia
mostly follows the same routes as the general
flow of irregular migrants: Most smuggled
migrants cross into Slovenia from Croatia and






region, the smuggling of migrants via Slovenia
serves as a sub-route of the main Western
Balkan route which leads from Greece via FYR
Macedonia and Serbia to Hungary. Smuggling





Based on the available information, the
smuggling of migrants into, through, and
out of Slovenia is almost exclusively done by
land; in fact, the many sources consulted for
this research contained no information about
smuggling by air (through Ljubljana airport) or
by sea (though the country’s coastline is only
about20kilometreslong).Astudypublishedin
2011showsthatmorethan90%ofall‘migration
related apprehensions’ in Slovenia occurred




If cars or other vehicles are used to smuggle
migrants, migrants are usually hidden
behind seats, among the cargo, or in special
compartments of the vehicle. In 2011/2012,
whenthe levelofsmugglingactivitiesbeganto
rise,Frontexnotedthatconcealmentinvehicles
was becoming a frequent method to smuggle
migrants along the Western Balkan route.
Slovenia,especiallyatthebordertoCroatia,was
singled out as a location where this method








foot—that is, by guiding them to or across the
border—mostlydatesfrom2010and2011and,
as mentioned, appears to have become less
common in later years.Many of the smuggled
migrants at that time came from countries
in the region, and it has been noted that the
visa liberalisation for nationals from Albania
and Bosnia-Herzegovina that came into effect
in 2010 had the immediate effect that fewer
migrants had to rely on smugglers to cross
throughSlovenia.57
Several reports broadly refer to the use of
fraudulent travel or identity documents to enter
or leave Slovenia, but these reports contain no
specific details about the types of documents,
the specific purpose of their use, and the
circumstancesofsuchcases.58In2011,Frontex
reported that 20% of all detections of forged
documents in the region were made at the




The available information on the nationalities of
migrant smugglers apprehended in Slovenia—
which, however, is from the year 2011—shows
that thegreatmajorityofsmugglerscomefrom
Slovenia and neighbouring countries. In 2009
and 2010, about 50% of all ‘human smugglers
apprehended’ by Slovenian authorities were
Slovenian nationals. Smugglers from Croatia,
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Recent information about the way in which
smugglersoperatinginSloveniaareorganisedand
networkedis,forthemostpart,non-existent,save
for isolated reports of smuggling networks that
operate across borders and involve organisers
whohavethesamemigrationbackgroundasthe
migrantstheysmuggle.61 
The fact that most smugglers are Slovenian or
comefromneighbouringcountriesmay indicate
thatmanysmugglersareopportunisticamateurs
whooperate independentlyor in loosenetworks,
andarenotorganised inmafia-style syndicates.
Recent sources confirming these observations
are, however, not available. A report on ‘illegal
migration, human smuggling and trafficking in
Central and Eastern Europe’ published in 2011
drewsimilarconclusions:
Criminal groups involved in human
smuggling in Slovenia are usually small,
composed of 3-10 people, with links to







relationships can be observed within the
structure of networks. There is usually a
leaderwithconnectionstoorganisersfrom
the country of origin, who is responsible
for contactswith other groups and for the
organisationof transportation.At the lower
level, there are drivers and othermembers
involvedinsmuggling.62 
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XIV AUSTRIA
XIV.1 Overview
Austria is both a destination and and a transit
countryforirregularandsmuggledmigrants.The
countryisanimportanthubforirregularmigration
and smuggling because of its geographical
location, history, and economic strength. For a
long time, apart from Greece, Austria was the
mosteasterlypointof theEuropeanUnion (EU),
borderingcountriestothenorth,eastandsouth
which were once part of the Soviet Bloc. For
this reason, Austria emerged as a gateway for
migration and travel to other parts of Western
Europe.TheeasternenlargementoftheEUmoved
theexternalbordersof theEuropeanUnionand







Balkan route, as well as border crossings from
Italy made by people travelling on the Central
Mediterranean route.EspeciallybetweenAugust
andNovember 2015, large numbers of irregular









in 2015 is not known, though many reports
suggest that over one million people migrated
irregularly, often with the aid of smugglers, to
GermanyviaAustria.
The levels and characteristics of irregular
migration and the smuggling of migrants to
Austria are much better documented than in
mostothercountriesfeaturedinthisreport.This
is due in part to annual reports published by
Austria’s federal criminal investigation authority
(Bundeskriminalamt) on the specific topic of
migrant smuggling. Academic research and





The number of persons found to be entering
Austria irregularly, with and without the aid of
smugglers, is very high by regional standards.
Austrian authorities publish detailed annual
reports on the number and profile of smuggled
migrantsandpersonswhohaveenteredAustria
illegally, or who are found to be staying in the
country illegally.Thereportsseparatethesetwo
categories based on whether there is evidence






After experiencing very high levels of irregular
migration and migrant smuggling in the early
2000s, numbers dropped between 2007 and
2010. The drop in the number of smuggled
migrants from a high in the years 2005 and
2006toalowin2010hasbeenexplainedbythe
easternenlargementoftheEuropeanUnion,and




72,179, in addition to 20,975 personswhowere
foundtobeenteringorstayinginAustriaillegally.
Earlysignsthatthenumberofirregularmigrants
entering Austriawould risewere noted as early
asMay2012by thedesignateddepartments in
Austria’s federal criminal investigation authority
(Bundeskriminalamt) tasked with confronting
migrant smuggling, when it stressed that the
continuingcrisesinSyriaandAfghanistan,along
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Figure 92: Detections of irregular migrants and migrant smugglers, Austria, 2001–20163
year Smuggled migrants Illegally entered or staying Migrant smugglers total
2001 15,508 30,857 2,313 48,751
2002 19,626 27,560 1.221 48,435
2003 18,533 25,568 1.025 45,126
2004 15.630 22.047 964 38,642
2005 20,894 18,133 713 39,740
2006 12.571 26,379 864 39,814
2007 9,987 4,416 682 15,085
2008 8,734 5,914 371 15,367
2009 10,248 7,885 438 18,571
2010 6,779 9,621 327 16,727
2011 9,812 11,132 288 21,232
2012 12,426 1,714 235 24,375
2013 12,323 14,811 352 27,468
2014 20,768 12,791 511 34,070
2015 72,179 20,975 1,108 94,262
2016 27,850 22,749 249 50,848





Austria’s eastern borders, especially its border
to Hungary, have been particularly affected by
irregularmigrationandthesmugglingofmigrants
duringthethe2011to2017period. It isforthis
reason that the largest numbers of smuggled
migrants are apprehended in Burgenland
and Lower Austria, the two States nearest to
that border. Figure  93 below shows that very
few smuggled migrants are apprehended in
Vorarlberg,which bordersGermany, Switzerland,
and Liechtenstein. Austrian authorities stress,
however,thatthedatashowninFigure 93relates
to the location where the person was detected
or first contactedauthorities, andnote that this
doesnotautomaticallymeanthatthepersonalso
enteredAustriathroughthatState.4
According to Austria’s federal criminal investi-
gationauthority,62.3%ofallmigrantsmuggling
activities occurred across the border from Hun-






Salzburg Styria Tyrol Vorarlberg Vienna
2011 460 159 6,251 830 221 336 378 168 1,009
2012 2,481 153 6,806 949 155 348 293 140 1,101
2013 1,016 154 7,358 949 294 210 862 165 1,315
2014 4,104 508 9,671 1,436 448 534 975 162 2,984
2015 10,894 1,272 27,611 6,310 4,672 3,931 2,314 1,230 13,945
2016 5,802 787 7,699 3,245 1,986 2,062 1,290 456 4,523
200
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garyin2012.6Thismarksaconsiderableincrease
compared to previous years: in 2011, 34.6% of
smuggled migrants arrived from Hungary, and
in2010only27.8%.7Only11.8%ofsmuggledmi-
grants enteredAustria from Italy in 2012, down
from 31.1% in 2011 and 32.5% in 2010. These
changesdocumentashiftinthemainsmuggling






migrants and persons not facilitated by smug-




3.6% of smuggled migrants entered across the
borderfromtheCzechRepublic(2011:3%),3.1%
from Slovakia (2011: 3%), 2.1% from Germany
(2011:4.7%),1.5%fromSlovenia(2011:3%),and
1.3% from Switzerland (2011: 3%). 14.3% (2011:
17.6%)ofsmugglingactivitiesweredonebyairor
from‘othercountries’.10
Austrian authorities publish additional data
relatingtothelocationwheremigrantsmugglers
areapprehended.Thisdata, shown inFigure 94
below, does not present a uniform picture, and
thedistributionbetweenstates varies fromyear
to year. Burgenland, Lower Austria, and Tyrol
tendtobetheStateswiththehighestnumberof
detectionsinmostyears.






Salzburg Styria Tyrol Vorarlberg Vienna
2011 32 15 28 20 13 8 79 19 74
2012 45 25 37 26 7 19 52 6 18
2013 86 27 52 25 13 23 90 5 31
2014 151 33 59 53 18 15 136 7 38
2015 239 32 254 174 55 24 46 14 270




of irregular and smuggledmigrants detected in
Austria demonstrates the close links between
refugee flows, asylum seeking and irregular
migration. Nor surprisingly, countries marked
by war, persecution, discrimination, political
instability and upheaval are overrepresented
among that ‘top nationalities’ of smuggled
migrants apprehended by Austrian authorities.
Figure  95 below shows that themain countries
of origin of smuggledmigrants apprehended in
Austria in the 2011–2016 period are countries
that have experienced violence, armed conflict,
destruction,anddisplacementformanyyears.
Inrecentyears,mostsmuggledmigrantsdetected
in Austria were Afghan and Syrian nationals. In




and which feature prominently among the top
nationalities of smuggled migrants in Austria.
Stateless persons broadly fall into the same
category.
Russian nationals constitute another large
groupofsmuggledmigrantsdetectedinAustria,
especially in the years 2012 and 2013. Many
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Figure 95: Top nationalities of detected smuggled migrants, Austria, 2011–201612
County of 
nationality
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011
Afghanistan 9,445 20,391 4,069 1,632 3,035 2,809
Algeria 850 807 412 796 464 376
China n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 166 n.a.
Georgia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 198 n.a.
India n.a. n.a. n.a. 330 340 410
Iran 1,850 2,656 532 369 622 326
Iraq 2,134 12,732 925 n.a. 344 303
Kosovo n.a. 1.772 1.429 690 213 n.a.
Morocco 909 n.a. n.a. 435 290 n.a.
Nigeria 1,424 1,084 431 516 258 n.a.
Pakistan 2,298 2,633 n.a. 793 1,705 804
Russian 
Federation
852 n.a. 897 1,661 1,813 1,100
Serbia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 89 n.a.
Somalia 1,058 1,538 770 n.a. 337 432
Syria 2,880 21,473 6,510 1,951 729 364
Turkey n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 189 302
stateless n.a. 1.165 843 n.a. 98 n.a.
smugglerstoapplyforasylum.13Alsonoteworthy
is the relatively high number of Kosovars who
weresmuggledintoAustriauntil2015,whenthe







year are men. Despite greatly varying levels of
smuggling,thisproportionhaschangedverylittle
overtheyears.
The very high percentage of men has been
explained by the socio-economic and cultural
background of migrants, though the specific
circumstances may vary greatly between
individuals.The literaturegenerallynotes that in
manyfamiliesandsocieties,menareseenas(or
liketobeseenas)morecapableofcopingwiththe
strains and challenges associatedwith irregular
migration, and that it is believed theywill find it
easier to settle andfindwork in thedestination
countries.Manymen,especiallyyoungmen,are
chosenbytheirfamiliestomigrate,andthecosts
of their journey are paid for by relatives, in the
hopethattheywillsupporttheirfamiliesathome
with remittances,orenable themto followonce
theyreachedtheirdestination.15
Figure 96: gender of detected smuggled 




2011 9,812 80% 20%
2012 12,426 79% 21%
2013 12,323 76% 24%
2014 20,768 80% 20%
2015 72,179 77% 23%
2016 27,850 76% 24%
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Mostmigrantswhoaresmuggled toAustriaare
young adults. Figure  97 below shows that per-










Figure 97: Age of detected smuggled migramts, Austria, 2011–201618
year Under 7 
y .o .








2011 7% 6% 15% 46% 17% 6% 2% 1%
2012 n.a.
2013 9% 6% 10% 43% 20% 7% 3% 2%
2014 6% 6% 15% 41% 19% 8% 3% 2%
2015 9% 8% 16% 41% 16% 6% 2% 1%
2016 9% 9% 20% 40% 14% 5% 2% 1%
XIV.3.3 Refugeesandasylumseekers
The available sources show a close correlation
between the levelsof irregularmigrationand the
smugglingofmigrantstoAustriaontheonehand,
and thequest toseekasylum in thatcountryon
theother.Acomparisonbetweenthesenumbers,
showninFigure 98below,demonstratesthatboth
categories rose equally in the period from 2011
to 2016. Furthermore, each year the number of
persons seeking asylum is approximately 20 to
30%higherthanthenumberofsmuggledmigrants.
It should be noted, however, that figures for
smuggledmigrantsandasylumapplicationsare
Figure 98: Smuggled migrants detected and 













makes it difficult to draw direct comparisons
betweenthem.Moreover,manypersonsmaybe
smuggled to Austria in one year but not lodge
an asylum application until the year after. This
makes it difficult to compare numbers for the
sameyear.What isevident,however, is that the
intention to seek asylum and find protection
is one of the principal reasons why migrants
resort to the services offered by smugglers.
This is further confirmed by a look at themain
nationalities of smuggledmigrants (above) and
the main nationalities of refugees and asylum
seekers(Figure 99below).
ThedatashowninFigure 99belowshowsasharp





nearly tenfold over the same period. Austria
further hosts significant numbers of refugees
andasylumseekers fromcountriesnot listed in
Figure 99,includingArmenia,Georgia,Nigeria,the
RussianFederation,SerbiaandKosovo,Somalia,
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Figure 99: Refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR, Austria, 2011–2017, top nationalities21
Afghanistan Iran Iraq Pakistan Syria
2011 – total 13,212 3,133 3,515 1,133 1,399
- refugees 8,636 2,509 2,622 74 903
- asylum-seekers 4,576 624 893 1,059 456
2012 – total 16,361 3,620 3,670 1,350 2,369
- refugees 10,158 2,816 2,863 94 1,675
- asylum-seekers 6,203 804 807 1,256 694
2013 – total 18,154 3,875 3,665 785 4,309
- refugees 11,906 3,188 2,966 131 2,748
- asylum-seekers 6,248 687 699 654 1,561
2014 – total 21,757 4,147 4,543 917 11,525
- refugees 14,793 3,203 3,015 179 6,653
- asylum-seekers 6,964 944 1,172 738 4,872
2015 – total 41,725 6,899 15,617 2,102 33,563
- refugees 17,458 3,379 3,732 203 14,894
- asylum-seekers 24,767 3,520 11,742 1,899 18,669
2016 – total 50,003 8,088 15,766 2,260 40,770
- refugees 20,220 3,598 5,555 230 30,958
- asylum-seekers 29,783 4,490 10,211 2,030 9,812
2017 – total 51,172 7,998 15,219 1,615 47,825
- refugees 26,939 4,565 7,414 270 43,888
- asylum-seekers 24,333 3,433 7,805 1,345 3,937
XIV.4 Smugglingofmigrants
XIV.4.1 Routes
Several routes used for irregular migration and
the smuggling ofmigrants converge on Austria,
and the popularity of routes used by migrants
toreachAustriavariesacrossyears.TheBalkan
route that takes migrants from Hungary or
Slovenia to Austria saw the largest number of
migrants in the 2011–2017 period, followed by
bordercrossingfromItalybymigrantsusingthe
CentralMediterraneanroute.Furthermore,some
irregular migrants reach Austria from Hungary
orSlovakiaalongtheNorthernroute(orEastern
Bordersroute).IrregularmigrationontheWestern
Mediterranean route to Spain and France does
not significantly affect Austria.22 Section XIV.2.2
on entry points gives further insight into the









that most migrants were smuggled individually
or ingroupsof lessthanfivepeople.Smuggling
in larger groups only occurred inmore isolated
cases.23 
Reportsfortheyears2003to2012containfurther
informationabout themethodused to smuggle
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Figure 100: Means of transportation used by smuggled migrants at border crossing, Austria, 2011–
201224
year on foot car van bus truck train plane boat unknown
2011 n.a. 21% n.a. 3% 19% 18% 7% n.a. 32%
2012 3% 19% n.a. 4% 22% 15% 7% n.a. 30%
A2014publicationprovidessomeinsightintothe
feeschargedbysmugglersforbringingmigrants










From Serbia to Austria: between 700 und
1,200Europerperson.25
A2016publicationfurthernotesthatsmugglers
demand approximately 1,000 Euro to take






the number and profiles of smuggled migrants
detectedinthecountry,aswellasthenumberof
smugglers convicted for migrant smuggling by
Austriancourtseachyear.
Figure 101: Detections of migrant smugglers and convictions for the smuggling of migrants under 
§ 114 Policing of Foreigners Act [Fremdenpolizeigesetz (FPG)]/§ 104 Fremdengesetz 1997 [Foreigners 
Act 1997 (FrG)] (total offences), 2010–201527
year Migrant smugglers 
detected





















2012 235 93% 7% § 114FPG 143 127 16
2013 352 92% 8% § 114FPG 144 134 10
2014 511 96% 4% § 114FPG 234 222 12
2015 1,108 93% 7% § 114FPG 748 729 19
2016 249 93% 7% § 114FPG 342 324 18
Figure  101 above shows that the number of
migrant smugglers detected by the Austrian
authorities rose from 235 in 2012 to 1,108 in
2015. Over the same period, convictions for
migrant smuggling rose from 128 to 748. The
vastmajorityofpersonsdetectedandconvicted
for migrant smuggling are men. In 2016 the
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Furtherdatashowsthatmostdetectedsmugglers
areyoungadultsbetween21and30or31and40
years of age.28 The number of smugglers under




in the percentage of smugglers over the age of
50, which may indicate that more older people
weredrawnintomigrantsmugglingbytherising
demand for smuggling services in these years.
Thistrendappearstohavereversedin2016.
Figure 102: Age of detected migrant smugglers, Austria, 2011–201629
year Below 20 y .o . 21–30 y .o . 31–40 y .o . 41–50 y .o . Over 51 y .o .
2011 5% 28% 33% 24% 10%
2012 2% 26% 35% 26% 11%
2013 3% 35% 28% 25% 9%
2014 2% 29% 30% 26% 13%
2015 2% 29% 31% 20% 18%
2016 9% 29% 36% 20% 6%
The top nationalities of persons detected
smugglingmigrants into Austria in the 2011 to
2016period,showninFigure 103below,broadly
fallintothreecategories.
The first and largest group involves smugglers










that the smugglers use their own cars, trucks
and local knowledge to facilitate migrants’
journeys.30





instances the smugglersmay even be relatives
orfriendsofthesmuggledmigrants.Smugglers




frequently act in an organising capacity, and
are networked across international borders.31 In 
some cases these smugglers themselves once
arrivedinAustriaassmuggledmigrants,andlater
used their contacts, experience and knowledge
to smuggle othermigrants along similar routes.




and 2015, when many Kosovar migrants were
smuggledtoAustria.32
The third group is made up of smugglers from
destinationcountries,whichincludestheAustrian




is influencedby the level ofdemand, and it has
been suggested that some of these smugglers
may have a migration background.33 In the 
absence of further information , however, it is
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Figure 103: top nationalities of detected migrant smugglers, Austria, 2011–201634
Nationality 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011
Afghan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 15 14
Austrian 14 57 19 29 10 23
Bulgarian n.a. 35 n.a. n.a. n.a. 11
Egyptian 9 n.a. 17 n.a. n.a. n.a.
German n.a. n.a. 32 n.a. 15 16
Greek n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 26
Hungarian 29 139 64 71 27 17
Iraqi 10 42 n.a. n.a. n.a. 8
Italian n.a. n.a. 24 16 n.a. 8
Kosovar n.a. 74 34 n.a. n.a. 12
Pakistani 17 26 n.a. 17 13 17
Polish n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9 n.a.
Rumania 30 141 32 14 n.a. n.a.
Russian n.a. 30 n.a. 13 16 10
Serbian 14 190 56 17 23 20
Slovak n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6
Syrian 14 62 34 16 7 n.a.
Turkish 13 n.a. 18 31 21 24
Ukrainian 10 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
XIV.4.3.2 Organisations and networks
Information about criminal networks involved
in the smuggling of migrants into and through
Austriaandabouttheirorganisationissomewhat
limited.Most of the available literature tends to
doubtmythsaboutmafia-stylesmugglinggroups,
arguingthatsuchstructuresareneitherwarranted





movements,36 it appears to be less common for
smugglerstoestablishstructuredgroups.Inthis
context it has also been emphasised thatmany
smugglersareopportunistswhobecomeinvolved
in smuggling activities when there is demand,
and that they use their vehicles and know-how
to transport or guide smuggledmigrants.37 It is 
further believed that these ad hoc offenders are
unlikelytobecomeinvolvedinandtakeupformal
rolesinmorehighlystructuredorganisations.38
Networking among smugglers and between
smugglersandassociatesmayoccurhorizontally
or vertically.39 Horizontal networking refers
to communication and cooperation between
smugglers located indifferent transithubs,who
act as contact points for smuggled migrants
and pass them on from one smuggler to the
next along the main smuggling routes. This
does not necessarily mean that they meet the
smuggled migrants in person; it often suffices
to communicate by phone or electronically to
passoninformation,contactdetails,ortoidentify
specificmeetingpoints.Asmentioned,smugglers
of this kind often share the background of the
migrants they smuggle, in that they come from
thesamecountryandspeakthesamelanguage.40
Vertical networking refers to the cooperation
betweentheseorganiser-typesmugglersandlocal
groups and individuals who actually transport,
guide, accommodate or otherwise assist the










The loose connection between smugglers also
reflects the fact that most migrants do not
‘purchase’ the smuggling services as a single
package that covers the entire journey from
source to destination country. In the majority
of cases, migrants use different smugglers at
differentstagesof their journey,andoftenresort




thus have to spend prolonged periods in transit
countries to earnmoney orwait for transfers in
order topay for thenext legof their journey.For
thesereasons,manysmugglersonlyoperatealong
one legofmuch longer journeys.Bynetworking
withothers,theycanpassthemigrantsontoother




profits, explains the fierce competition between
smugglersinsomelocations.This,inturn,canlead
toconflictand, insomecases, toviolentclashes
between smugglers. Conversely, as has recently
beenobservedbyEuropolandInterpol,itcanhave
the effect that larger networks will attempt to
consumeordestroysmallergroups.45Theextent
to which this can also be observed in Austria
is, however, not clear. What is noticeable is that
any concentration of smuggling activities in the
hands of fewer but larger networks significantly
increases the dangers and costs for smuggled
migrants. Less competition means, on the one
hand,thatsmugglerscandemandhigherfees.On
theotherhand, largernetworksareusuallymore
sophisticated, and thus better equipped to stay





has led to another phenomenon that Austrian
authoritieshavecalledthe‘de-professionalisation
ofthesmugglingofmigrants’.Thisreferstothe
fact that many new perpetrators have become
involved in smuggling activities which they
conduct in amateurish ways. In some cases,
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XV OBSERVATIONS 
This research demonstrates that irregular mig-
rationandthesmugglingofmigrantsoccurson
a significant scale throughout the region, that




by irregular migration flows and the smuggling
of migrants, most as transit points, some also




are complex and long-standing issues for the
thirteen countries featured in this report. They
involve both non-regional migrants who enter
andtransitthroughtheregion,aswellasregional
migrants who are nationals from the region
moving to other countries in the region or other




While irregular migration and the smuggling
of migrants affects all countries in the region,
the levels and characteris of these phenomena












This ismost evident in the events that followed
theclosureofHungary’sbordertoSerbia,which
almost immediately shifted the flow of irregular
migrantstoneighbouringCroatiaandSlovenia.






These four points should be considered in the











to dominate news reporting, aswell as political
and public debates, and despite the plethora of
opinionsonhow tostop irregularmigration, the
actual evidence base is mixed at best. Despite
themagnitudeofirregularmigrationandmigrant
smuggling in the region, and despite the height-
enedemotionsurrounding these topics, there is
verylittlein-depthdocumentationandanalysisof
the causes, circumstances, characteristics and
consequencesofthesephenomena.
Academic books and articles, thorough and
independent research, along with reliable
reports from experts and organisations have
growninnumbersandtosomeextentimproved
in quality, Nevertheless, the bulk of available
open-source information consists of short-term
periodicreporting,informationpresentedthrough
the lense and within the mandate of specific
international organisations and NGOs, and, in
the absence of other sources, a considerable
number of media reports which vary greatly in
quality and journalistic rigour. Put simply, the
topics of irregularmigration and the smuggling
ofmigrantsalongtheBalkanrouteremainquite
poorlydocumented,researchedandunderstood.
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of information that are produced around
particularevents,atcertaintimes,andinspecific
locations. This in turn explains the uneven
depth of information presented in the separate
countrychapterscontained in this report.Some
developments,suchastheclosureofHungary’s





migration and migrant smuggling cannot be
clearly ascertained for some other parts of the
region.Inlightoftheglobalattentionandpolitical
rhetoric devoted to this topic, it is surprising
that the topic is not more comprehensively
documentedandresearched.
This situation is alarming, since it is not always
clear on what, if any, information and evidence
policy initiatives, legislation, and practical
measures to combat irregular migration and
migrantsmugglingarefounded.Unabletogauge
the true dimensions and manifestations of the
problem,itisequallydifficulttoassessthequality
andeffectivenessofresponsesadoptedbystates,
both individuallyandcollectively. Itappears that
many of the policies, laws and othermeasures
proposed and implemented to stop irregular
migrationandmigrantsmugglingweredeveloped
withoutaproperknowledgebase.
There are some obvious obstacles to better
reporting and analysis of irregular migration
and migrants smuggling in the Balkans. First
amongthese is thedifficultyofdatacollection
and research on issues that frequently occur
out of sight of the authorities. Many borders
are crossed and many migrants smuggled
withoutanyonenoticing,andwithoutanyentity
recording such movements. Furthermore, it
is acknowledged that some data and other
information may be collected but not made
public,especiallyifthatdatarelatestoongoing
investigations. Estimates of the dark figures
relatingtoirregularmigrationandsmugglingof
migrants,whichcapturethenumberofpersons
crossing international borders undetected, are
notavailable.
Further obstacles stem from the fact that even
if data is recorded and published, this is often
done inconsistently and in an ad hoc manner.
Regularreportingofdataforcomparableperiods
using consistent criteria and parameters is the
exception rather than the rule. Moreover, the
methodology used to collect and analyse data




movements frequently shift the criteria and
mechanismsused to record and report relevant
data,making itdifficult tocompareandanalyse
theavailablestatistics.
This is particularly evident in the vast amount
of data collected and published by Frontex, the
European Border and Coast Guard Agency. In
the absence of other information, this research
frequently had to rely solely on Frontex reports.
Likenootheragency,Frontexpublishesaplethora
of quarterly and annual reports that give great
insightintomanyfacetsofirregularmigrationand
migrant smuggling in the region. In this context
it must be emphasised, however, that Frontex
reportingisnotalwaysconsistentandcomplete;
some data is available for some quarters and




nothing that over this period, themandate and
budgetofFrontexhasgrownsignificantly,along
withFrontexoperationsattheexteriorbordersof
theEuropeanUnion.While this has led tomore
reporting on illegal border crossings, it has not
necessarilyimprovedtheconsistencyandquality
ofsuchreporting.Itfurtherneedstobestressed
that, given itsmandate, Frontex primarily views
migrationandsmugglingthroughabordercontrol




for Migration, which gradually assumed a role
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only recently produced more complete reports
that are published regularly. It is worth noting
that IOMtakesamorepositiveattitudetowards




data published by UNHCR, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, concerning
asylumseekersandrefugees.Unlikemanyother
organisations,UNHCRhasamuchlongerhistory
of data collection and analysis, though figures
published by UNHCR may not always conform
withthosereportedbynationalagencies.
Fuelling this problem is the fact that different
sources use different vocabulary, terminology,
and standards. This often makes difficult, if
not impossible, to make observations about
trends and developments in different places at
different times. With the exception of the term
‘refugee’,mostotherexpressionsusedtoreferto
irregularmigrantsarenotbasedonclearcriteria
or established legal definitions. Terms such as
‘smuggled migrant’ and ‘asylum seekers’ are
sufficiently established and distinguishable in
much of the literature, but expressions such
as ‘illegal asylum seekers’, ‘economic migrants’
and the like are often politically tainted, based
on uncertain criteria or, in some instances,
simply incorrect. This report, along with many
other scholarly sources, adopts the term
‘irregularmigrant’ to refer topersonswhocross
internationalborderwithoutfullcompliancewith
therelevantlawsrelatingtoentryandexit.
It is evident that different countries place
different emphasis on irregular migration and
migrant smuggling. Some view these issues as
top priorities, as amenace threatening national
security and local populations. Others, directly
or indirectly, view themas secondary, neglibible
matters;insomestatesthe‘problem’ofirregular
migration is overshadowed by other more
pressing issues. It is further acknowledged
that the countries examined in this report have
differentcapacitiesandresourcesto investigate
irregular migration andmigrant smuggling, and
tocollectandanalysethatdatacomprehensively.
Nevertheless, to better document the level of
irregular migration and provide some common
ground to enable comparisons between states,
and to inform policy development, it would be
desirable if, at a minimum, all states would
report thenumberofpersonsdetectedentering
their territory illegally each year, the locations
andmeansof theirentry,aswellas thenumber
of persons detected staying in the country
unlawfullyandnumbersrelatingtoinvestigations,
prosecutions, and convictions for offences
relatingtothesmugglingofmigrants.
The lack of better information on irregular
migration and migrant smuggling has led to
manymythsaboutthelevelsandcharacteristics
of these isues. This also explains many
misrepresentationsmadeinmediareportingand
other sources. The absence of better sources
hasalsobeenexploitedbysomereporters,public
officials and politicians, wittingly or unwittingly,
to make misrepresentations about irregular
and smuggled migrants, and the causes and
conditionsoftheirjourneys.
It is a core responsibility of states to fully and
accuratelydocumenttothebestoftheirabilities
the scale and patterns of irregular migration
into, through, andoutof their territoriesand, as
faraspossible,tomakethisinformationpublicly
available. More transparency on all matters
relatingtoirregularmigrationandthesmuggling
of migrants along the Balkan route is urgently
needed,notonly tobetter informthepublicand




Further and ongoing documentation, research,
and analysis are crucial in preventing irregular
migrationandmigrantsmuggling.
XV.2 Alackofforesight
Many governments in the region, politicians
and themedia, alongwith large swathes of the









movements vary greatly, most reliable sources
agree that about one million irregular migrants





most of them asylum seekers. Few had the
capacitytoadequatelymanagethemanypeople
whoarrivedatonce,andtocaterfortheirspecific
needs. With more than 1,000 people crossing
some borders in a single day, some countries
quickly ranoutof space, staff and resources to









had travelled hundreds of kilometres and often
walked long distances, leaving them exhausted
and in poor condition. Residents of Austria and
Germany drove into Hungary or Slovenia, or to
theborder,topickupmigrantsandtakethemto
Vienna,SalzburgorGermanyfreeofcharge.
Inother instances,authoritiescapitulated to the
influxofnewmigrantsandsimplyturnedablind
eye to their irregularmovements; elsewhere, for
example in FYR Macedonia, authorities used
buses and trains to transportmigrants through
andoutofthecountryasquicklyaspossible.In
otherplaces,theresponseto irregularmigration
was more hostile and resulted in measures to
closebordersanderectfences.Insomeinstances,
compassion fatigue set in, and gestures of
support and welcome turned into hostility and
xenophobia.
The analysis in this report has shown that
irregularmigration through theBalkans is not a
newphenomenon.Thecountriesintheregionare
interconnected, and have histories of migration
both inboundandoutbound.Allcountries in the
region have diasporas of their own nationals
abroad, and many are home to communities








What is frequently overlooked in debates about
migrationintheBalkansisthefactthatirregular
migrationintheregioninvolvesbothregionaland




abroad. Many reports about irregular migration
intheregion,andmanyresponsesdevelopedto
counteract these movements, fail to recognise
the diversity and complexity of thesemigration
patterns.
The causes driving irregular migration towards
Western Europe and across the Balkans are
longstanding; many predate the 2011–2017
period.Withinthatperiod,therewereearlysigns
in2011to2014signallingthatarise in irregular
migration was imminent. At that time, the




With the situation in countries such as Syria
and Afghanistan worsening, Western countries
slashing their support to host countries such
asJordan,Lebanon,andTurkey,andwithmany
displacedpersonsrunningoutofhopethatthey
would ever return to their home country, it was
obvious that some migrants would ‘pack up’
and try tomake theirway toplaceswhere they
hoped to find greater security and a better life
forthemselvesandtheirfamilies.Intheabsence
of resettlement locations and legal avenues of
migration, itwasnotatall surprising thatmany
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no country could really have been surprised by
thedevelopments that tookplace in thesecond




In particular, therewas a near complete lack of
engagement with the main source, host, and
transit countries. Furthermore,many responses
were left too late and, if they came at all, were
quiteshortsightedandfailedtoaddresstheroot
causes of displacement and irregularmigration.
Themeasuresadoptedbystatesinrecentyears,
collectivelyandindividually,to‘closetheBalkans






the protection of borders over the protection







This is particularly evident in measures to
close borders and erect fences or build other




and create, human suffering, and merely divert










a lackof propermanagement ofmigration, and
of coherent and effective immigration policies.
Criminalising the smuggling of migrants and
punishingsmugglersdoeslittletoreduceirregular
migrationunlessitgoeshandinhandwithproper
planning of migration intakes and cooperation
withsource,host,andtransitcountriesaswell.
It shouldbenoted that themyriadmeasures to
controlandclosebordersintheregion,enhance
bordercontrolandlawenforcementcooperation,
increase the budget, powers, and mandate of
agenciessuchaFrontex,andtostrikequestionable
agreements with some transit countries, have
greatly reduced the flow of irregular migrants
through the Balkans. To call the Balkan route
‘closed’ is, however, an exaggeration, given that
many thousands of irregularmigrants continue
totravelthroughtheregion.Numbershaveclearly
dropped since the peak in late 2015, butmany
migrants have been diverted to other routes.
IrregularmigrationalongtheCentralandWestern
Mediterranean routes from Northern Africa to
Italy andSpain has risen dramatically since the
Western Balkan route was declared closed by
somepoliticians.What ismore alarming is that










The lack of foresight and preparedness of
manystatesgoeshand inhandwith the lackof
management of regular and irregularmigration.
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Many states in the region (and elsewhere)
were—and some continue to be—altogether
oblivious to internationalmigration and refugee
flows.Many adopt the view that ‘this is not our
problem’. All too frequently, this attitude results
in utter unpreparedness if and when irregular
migrantsandrefugeesarrive.Manygovernments
dismisscallsforbetterpreparationandplanning
with simplistic statements that they are not
immigrationnations,orwithclaimsthatnational





have been shaped by migratory movements,
including voluntary and forced migration by
national, regional, and non-regional migrants.
Despite this, many countries in the region lack
transparent, rules-based systems to properly
and fairly manage international migration.




fail toadhere tobasicprinciplesof international
law.
Moreover, many countries do not have
comprehensive immigration laws, do not have
fully developed asylum systems, and do not
maintainimmigrationpoliciesthattieimmigration
intakes to labour market needs, demographic
developments,andhumanitarianconsiderations.
With the rise of globalisation and increasing
humanmovementworldwide,theseare,however,
core responsibilities. Nevertheless, many
governments,wittingly or unwittingly, choose to
neglectthisduty.
It must be noted in this context, however, that





experience to set up sophisticated immigration
andasylumprocedures. Inthesecircumstances,
regional and international cooperation and
support from Western European nations and
the European Union are all the more important
to enhance the capacity and preparedness of
Member and Non-Member States to manage
migrationinallitsforms.
Justasmanystatesfailedtoprepareforirregular
migration and refugee flows, many failed to
anticipate and manage community reactions
tothe largeflowofmigrantsthroughtheregion.
Similarly,manystatesfailedtoaccuratelyinform
the public about the true levels and patterns
of these flows, the causes of displacement,
and the conditions of the migrants’ journeys.
In this environment, it was to be expected that
community concerns about irregular migration
would grow, and that xenophobic sentiments
would rise.Nevertheless,manypoliticians failed
toaddress theseconcerns;otherschose to fuel
them in order to gain political capital. Myths
and misinformation about irregular migration,
refugees, and other groups of non-citizens are
widespread, and few countries actively provide
accurate information and transparency to
counteractfalseclaimsandanimosities.
On a broader level, it appears thatmany states
have yet to see the benefits of international
migration, and to adopt policies that enhance
human mobility rather than obstruct it. To this
day, some governments prioritise the control of
bordersovertheprotectionofpeople.Manyfailto
realisethatmigrationisinevitableandcannotbe





migration and the smuggling of migrants have
often been characterised by ad hoc measures
accompanied by populist rhetoric. Most of the
initiatives taken by states have been short-
term rather than strategic, andnot in a spirit of
cooperation and burden-sharing. Across the
Balkans, narrow and nationalistic views prevail
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innearlyallmatterspertaining tomigrationand
asylumsystems.
When borders were closed, fences erected and
controlsinstituted,statesgavelittleconsideration
to the impact such measures would have on
neighbouring states and on other transit points
anddestinationscountriesalongtheBalkanroute.
Inmanycases,thesemeasuressimplydisplaced
migration routes, passed problems and people
fromonecountry toanother,orpushed irregular




borders has been, at best, selective, and has
mostly been limited to law enforcement and




to be a thorny issue. This goes hand in hand
with a failure to fully engage with and trust





up dutieswhen stateswere unwilling or unable
to renderbasicassistance to those inneed.But
evenifNGOstookonresponsibilitieswhenstates
failedtodo,theywereoftenblamedforthearrival
of irregularmigrantsorwereobstructed in their
work.
Calls for greater cooperation and coordination
between EU Member States are not new, but
many states, chief among them the Visegrad
States of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia
and Hungary, as well as Austria, remain fiercly
opposed to the concept of burden sharing and
solidarity, and refuse to accept a quota system
whereby asylum seekers would be distributed
fairlyacrossEUMemberStates.
What is urgently needed is a coordinated EU
asylum and migration policy that articulates
basic priniciples to which either all Member
States or a groupofwilling partners agree, and
on which practical measures can be built. The
implementation of these principles should be
supportedthroughadditionalfundingawardedto
cooperating states. These initiatives need to go
hand inhandwithclosepartnerships thatbring
together government agencies, international
organisations,NGOs,andcivilsociety.Moreover,
the EU and its Member States need to engage
activelywithandsupportnon-EUMemberStates
in developing strategies and practical solutions.
The answer to irregular migration and the
smuggling ofmigrants along the Balkans route
mustnotgiverisetoa‘FortressEurope’buttothe
emergenceofcollegial,strategicandcooperative
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XVI THE WAY FORWARD
Although this report did not document and
analyse specific policy actions and other
countermeasures to prevent and stop irregular
migration and migrant smuggling, and while it
is beyond its scope to develop concrete policy











documentation, and analysis are an essential
prerequisiteforabetterunderstanding,meaningful
discussion, and sustainable, evidence-based
policymakingon irregularmigrationandmigrant
smuggling.Thisincludes
  comprehensive collection and dissemination
ofrelevantdatabygovernmentagencies,
  documentation and independent analysis of
the levels and charateristics of irregular mi-
grationandmigrantsmuggling,
  critical examinationofmeasures adopted to
stopthesephenomenathroughproperlyfund-
edscholarlyresearch,
  collaboration between government entities,
international organisations, NGOs, academic
scholars,andotherexperts,
  disclosureanddisseminationofdataand re-
searchfindings,and
  informed public debate and community en-
gagementabouttheseissues.
(2) One of the main lessons learned from the
experience of irregular migration and migrant
smuggling in the2011–2017period is theneed
for better planningandprojection. Toanticipate
and prepare for irregular migration flows, it is
necessaryto:
  monitor and analyse political, economic, de-
mographicandenvironmentaldevelopments
















port thework of, international organisations,
NGOs, localcommunitiesandotherareasof
civilsociety,
  develop contingency plans for situations in-
volving sudden displacement andmass exo-
dus,and
  facilitate the voluntary return of migrants
whereitissafetodoso.
(3) The smuggling of migrants prospers in
situations where fences, fortifications, border
controls,visaregimes,orother legalorpractical
measures obstruct a demand for international
migration.Topreventthesmugglingofmigrants,
reduce the loss of lives and other dangers
associated with smuggling, and to deter would-
besmugglers,statesmust:
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  facilitateaccesstoofficial traveland identity
documents,
  criminaliseprofit-seekingmigrantsmuggling,
especially in situations in which smugglers
place the health and lives of smuggled mi-
grantsatrisk,or if theyexploitsmuggledmi-
grantsortreattheminhumanely,
  ensure that smuggling forhumanitarianand




(4) International migration and human mobility
are realities, and are certain to grow in the
future. Ifproperlymanaged,theycreatebenefits,








economic, family, and international relations
matter,andshiftitawayfromthemandateof











  develop and properly fund comprehensive






  disseminateaccurateandcomprehensive in-
formation on all aspects ofmigration to the
mediaandthepublic,and
  actively counteract xenophobia and racism
andprotectvulnerablemigrants.
(5)Greatercooperationatlocal,national,bilateral,
regional and international levels is essential to
reduce irregular migration and the smuggling
ofmigrants, and is integral toanyof thepoints
articulatedabove.Inparticular,
  regional dialogue and forums on internation-






rights treatiesalongwith theGlobal Compact 
for MigrationandtheUnitedNationsProtocol 
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